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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
THIS BOOK IS AN ATTEMPT to change the way we think about competition, 
universal service, and interconnection in telecommunications. It does so by revisiting a critical 
period in the development of American telecommunications: the period of unbridled competition 
between the Bell system and independent telephone companies in the early 1900s. 
 
Universal service as a term and a concept originated during that period. Since then, it has 
been one of the key touchstones of U.S. telecommunications policy. Although the meaning of the 
term has changed, its essential connotation is not hard to grasp: universal service means a 
telephone network that covers all of the country, is technologically integrated, and connects as 
many citizens as possible. The importance of rapid, widespread telecommunications to 
government, business, and society can scarcely be overstated. Telecommunications makes it 
possible to administer a national economy and maintain social bonds across great distances. 
Because communications infrastructure coordinates and unifies a country in countless ways, the 
universal service concept spans the realms of economic and social policy. 
 
In recent decades policymakers have come to believe that universal telephone service was 
an historical achievement of regulated monopoly. Superficially, the fit between telephone 
monopolies and universal service objectives seemed a natural one. Monopoly organization 
simplified the process of standardization and so provided the basis for uniform nationwide 
connectivity. The absence of competition also made it easier for regulators to make telephone 
companies' rates conform to social policy goals. The use of long-distance revenues to subsidize 
local service, a practice common to telephone monopolies worldwide, found ready justification 
in the idea of making access to basic telephone service affordable to larger numbers of people. 
5 
 
The alleged historical link between the universality of the telephone and a monopolistic 
industry structure has set the stage for a momentous policy debate in contemporary 
telecommunications. The natural monopoly paradigm is eroding everywhere. Competition is 
spreading throughout the sector on a global basis. If, as the traditionalists claim, universal service 
was the raison d’etre of regulated monopoly, what will become of it as competition proceeds to 
revolutionize the industry? Are competition and universal service compatible? 
 
The importance and pervasiveness of that question has led to worldwide adoption of a 
peculiarly American phrase. A slogan coined by AT&T President Theodore Vail in 1907, 
“universal service” is now regularly invoked by telecommunications authorities from China1 to 
Japan2  to the British Commonwealth countries.3 Here in the United States, the federal 
government is concerned not only with the financing of universal service in a competitive 
environment, but also with the extension of universal service ideals from simple voice telephony 
to the new technologies of a “national information infrastructure.”4 
 
The reconciliation of universal service goals with the new market paradigm forms one of 
the central problems of contemporary policy. But the universal service issue is really a subset of 
a more fundamental problem posed by telecommunications competition, namely that of 
interconnecting competing networks. Few if any of the new, competing networks are stand-alone 
entities; they require access to the users of the established telephone network via interconnection 
arrangements.  Those relations of interconnection have the power to virtually predetermine the 
winners and losers of competition. Overly restrictive interconnection arrangements may cripple 
new competitors. Overly liberal arrangements may undermine the incumbent and destroy 
universal service by allowing newcomers to “cream skim” the most profitable markets while 
leaving the costly services to the incumbent. Thus, without exception the countries that have 
introduced competition have been forced into long debates over the conditions and prices of 
interconnection, all the while looking over their shoulders at the universal service implications of 
their policies. 
 
The essential issue in those debates is the impact of interconnection upon competition 
and universal service in telecommunications. This book attempts to illuminate that problem by 
conducting a detailed historical examination of early telephone competition in the United States. 
The prominence of competition, interconnection and universal service concerns today makes an 
accurate analysis of the early competitive period of telephone development in the United States 
of special relevance. From 1894 to about 1912 the telephone industry in the United States was 
open to practically unlimited entry. The Bell system was forced to compete with independent 
telephone companies in thousands of cities. More important still was the specific form that the 
competition took. Unlike today’s telecommunications industry, the competing exchanges of the 
Bell and independent companies were not connected to each other. The companies conducted 
                                                 
1 Hongmei Wang. Competition and Regulation of China’s Telecommum•carions Industry, 7 World 
Telecommunications (Chinese language) 7-8 (Nov.  1994). See also He Fei Chang. Lian Tong: A Quantum Leap in 
the Reform of China’s Telecommunications, 18 Telecommunication Policy 206, 208 (Apr. 1994). 
2 Koichiro Hayashi, Universal Service in Japan (Japanese language) (Chuokoron-Sha 1994). 
3 The size and financing of “universal service obligations” (USOs) are being actively debated in Great 
Britain, Hong Kong. New Zealand, and Australia. 
4 National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Inquiry on Universal Service and Open 
Access, Docket. No. 940955-4255 (Sept. 19, 1994). 
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their rivalry as separate systems. As such, the Bell-independent contest of the early 1900s 
provides an extended experiment with an essentially unregulated market for interconnection. 
 
A historical analysis of that experiment challenges some of the most cherished tenets of 
contemporary telecommunications policy. Contrary to the prevailing mythology, it was that 
period of systems competition, not the ensuing period of regulated monopoly, which gave birth 
to both universal service as a policy prescription and the physical reality of a geographically 
ubiquitous telephone infrastructure. Moreover, the refusal of Bell and the independents to 
interconnect with each other actually promoted the rapid geographical extension of the network. 
Our understanding of the concept universal service is greatly enriched by reexamining the 
historical background. The policy first emerged in the thick of the competitive battle between 
Bell and the independents. The universality of telephone service became an issue at that time 
because of the fragmentation of telephone users into competing local exchanges. At that time, 
universal service did not mean a telephone in every home or rate subsidies to residential users, 
but the unification of the telephone system so that all users could call each other. In other words, 
the original universal service debate was about interconnection. The policy choice faced at that 
time may seem eerily familiar to modern observers of the telecommunications and computer 
industries. Like us, our predecessors in the early 1900s were confronted with a difficult choice 
between compatibility, uniformity, and monopoly on the one hand, and competition, 
fragmentation, incompatibility, and diversity on the other. 
 
The book attempts to combine theory and history in a way that can make the historical 
data relevant to current policy problems. Chapter 2 provides a more thorough introduction to the 
historiographical issues addressed in the book. It shows that numerous misconceptions and 
myths have grown up around the subjects of universal service and early telephone history. 
Chapter 3 outlines the economic theories that are applied to the historical data. With the 
conceptual framework in place, chapters 4 through 11 constitute the historical narrative, which 
runs from the expiration of the Bell patents in 1894 to the final act of telephone service 
unification, the passage of the Willis-Graham Act of 1921. Chapter 12 provides a summary of 
the impact of early competition on telephone network scope and penetration. Chapters 13 and 14 
move the discussion into the present. Chapter 13 shows how the politics of rate regulation from 
the 1930s to the 1970s led to an important and somewhat misleading change in the definition of 
the term universal service. Chapter 14 explains how the book’s reinterpretation of the history of 
universal service, the economic effects of interconnection, and the origins of monopoly are 
relevant to current policy debates. The final chapter is a summary of the book’s main points. 
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UNIVERSAL SERVICE: A CONCEPT IN SEARCH OF A HISTORY  
 
 
UNIVERSAL SERVICE entered the vocabulary of American telecommunications in 1907. 
The slogan “one system, one policy, universal service” was coined by Theodore Vail, the President 
of AT&T, and propagated in the company’s annual reports from 1907 to 1914.5 Its appearance came, 
as we shall see later, at the peak of a fierce competitive struggle between the Bell system and 
thousands of independent telephone companies. The idea of universal service served as the linchpin 
of the Bell system's argument for transforming the telephone industry into a regulated monopoly. 
The emergence of the concept thus marked an important turning point in the history of American 
telecommunications. 
 
Most historians and policy makers believe that when Vail invoked universal service he meant 
the same thing we mean by it today: regulatory policies to promote the affordability of telephone 
service through cross subsidies.6 This book disputes that widely-accepted view. There is, it argues, an 
important difference between Vail's concept of universal service in 1907 and the conception 
prevailing now.  Understanding that difference is what this book is all about. At stake is not simply 
a question of historical semantics, but a far-reaching reinterpretation of the history of 
telecommunications with significant implications for current and future telecommunications policies. 
 
In contemporary discourse, universal service policy is synonymous with government policies 
to promote the affordability of telephone service and access to the network. Sometimes this means 
direct subsidies to telecommunications construction in remote areas, such as the Rural Electrification 
Administration loan program. More commonly, it refers to attempts to maintain affordable local rates 
                                                 
5 American Telephone and Telegraph Company, ANNUAL REPORT 17-18 (1907). 
6 See, for example, Herbert S. Dordick, Toward a Universal Definition of Universal Service, UNIVERSAL 
TELEPHONE SERVICE: READY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY?   (Annual Review of the Institute for Information Studies, 
1991). 
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by means of rate averaging and cross-subsidies within the nation’s telecommunications system. This 
might mean, for example, imposing higher charges on long-distance users in order to reduce charges 
for basic local telephone service for households. Or it might mean charging the same rates for a 
long-distance call between two small, remote towns in Montana as for calls between Philadelphia and 
New York, when in fact economies of scale make calls between the latter two high-traffic centers far 
less expensive than the former. Whatever the mechanism, pushing telephone penetration towards 100 
percent is seen as a policy goal of sufficient importance to justify various forms of public intervention 
in the industry. Underlying all these policies is the assumption that without active government 
intervention, access to telecommunications would be well below the socially optimal level. 
 
Universal service in that respect is an expression of liberal egalitarianism, like universal 
schooling, literacy, or voting rights. More than just a telephone in every home, it implies that a 
ubiquitous communications infrastructure can contribute to national unity and equality of opportunity. 
In debates over the emergence of competition in the telephone industry during the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s, the concept has become a pillar of the developed world’s postal, telephone, and telegraph 
monopolies.7 Telephone companies and regulators warned that universal service could not have been 
achieved without the regulated monopoly structure, and that competitive market forces had to be 
thwarted or tempered lest those goals be undermined. More recently, advocates of a new 
“information superhighway” have also drawn upon the concept to promote broadened access to new 
technologies. 
 
This is the modern construction of universal service policy – the definition that has 
prevailed from about 1975 to the present time. This construction, and particularly its link with the 
regulated monopoly regime, draws its legitimacy and support from (questionable) interpretations of 
history. The all-encompassing network is perceived as an historical achievement of public regulation 
and a monopoly structure. Indeed, the modern idea of universal service comes with a full-blown 
version of its own historical origins. According to the conventional wisdom, universal telephone 
service was a public policy mandated by the 1934 Communications Act, and consciously brought into 
being by regulators acting in conjunction with telephone monopolies. A typical statement of this view 
appeared recently in an industry trade journal. “Telecommunications public policy crystallized in 
America with the Communications Act of 1934. Its goal was clear: the provision of universal service 
to every citizen in the country… Telephones at the time were viewed as a ‘ social necessity’ that 
should be provided to all.”8  The crowning achievement of this system, so the story goes, was the 
92 percent household penetration ratio of the telephone just prior to the AT&T divestiture. 
 
The authors of that claim are not historians and offer no evidence for their claim. But that 
is precisely my point: the viewpoint they express is so common and so widely accepted that it is 
assumed to need no substantiation. In making such a statement the authors are merely reiterating 
something that most business people, academics, and regulators involved in the telephone industry 
take as a truism. There are minor variations on the theme. The telephone companies, particularly those 
associated with AT&T, emphasize Vail’s formulation of the idea and the telephone industry’s 
contribution to its realization. In their view, the Communications Act simply ratified the far-sighted 
                                                 
7 Nicholas Garnham, Universal Service in Western European Telecommunications. European Telecommunications 
Policy Research (lOS 1989). 
8 Barbara J. Farrah and Mike Maxwell, Building the American Infostructure, Telephony 45 (Apr. 20, 1992). 
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vision of a corporate statesman. Academic scholars generally follow in this vein. A recent book on the 
subject, for example, hails the 1934 Act as the codification of Theodore Vail’s vision of universal 
service9 and highlights the role of redistributive rate regulation in promoting broader penetration.10 In 
short, the modern definition of universal service is based on a holy Trinity comprised of the 
Communications Act, regulated monopolies, and rate subsidies. 
 
But it is surprisingly easy to refute those historical claims. The words ‘universal service’ never 
appeared in the 1934 Communications Act. In preparing the law, Congress filled thousands of pages of 
the Congressional Record with research and documents about communications companies, but one will 
search that record in vain for the words ‘universal service,’ or for any evidence of a policy 
corresponding to the one described above. No mechanism for subsidizing telephone service was created 
or authorized in the legislation. Indeed, federal regulation could not have had much impact on the 
universality of telephone service in the 1930s or 1940s, or even the 1950s.  The Communications Act 
and the FCC had jurisdiction over interstate telecommunications only, and in 1934 less than 2 percent of 
all telephone traffic crossed state lines.11 The 1934 Act thus affected only a tiny portion of the overall 
telephone marketplace.  Most of the regulatory action was at the state level and thus was in the hands of 
state commissions.  
 
If one bothers to examine the text of the 1934 Act, one finds that it is little more than a piece of 
legislative consolidation. Its stated purpose was to put federal authority over communications into one 
specialized agency.  In order to implement this goal its drafters took parts of the Interstate Commerce 
Act authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate interstate telephone service (passed in 
1910) and combined them with the 1926 Radio Act, which created a Federal Radio Commission to 
regulate broadcasting. The result was a consolidated Communications Act and a single regulatory 
agency, the Federal Communications Commission. The bill’s House sponsor, Speaker Sam Rayburn, 
explicitly stated that the Act did not change existing law.12  
 
That brings us back to the point at which this chapter began. If the universal service concept 
originated not in the Communications Act of 1934 but in the Bell-independent competition of the early 
1900s, why did a debate about universality emerge at that time? And if, as I have asserted, Theodore 
Vail and his contemporaries did not mean by universal service what we mean today, what did they 
mean? As usual, the historical reality is more interesting than the myth. The universality of telephone 
communications became an issue in the early 1900s because the local telephone exchanges of the Bell 
system and the independents were not connected to each other. Competition took the form of two 
separate telephone systems in the same city or town vying with each other for subscribers and for 
connections to other localities.  Subscribers who joined one system could not call the subscribers of the 
other –unless, as happened about 13 percent of the time, the user subscribed to both systems. Duplicate 
subscribers (mostly businesses) literally had two separate telephone instruments, Bell and Independent, 
                                                 
9 Herbert S. Dordick, supra note 6. 
10 “The goal of having a universal telecommunications service has historically been to keep charges low enough that 
all but the poorest Americans could afford to make and receive telephone calls...” R. Entman, Introduction, Universal 
Telephone Service: Ready for the 21st Century? (Annual Review of the Institute for Information Studies 1991). 
11 Smith et al v. Illinois Bell 282 U.S. 133 (1930). 
12 “...the bill as a whole does not change existing law, not only with reference to radio but with reference to 
telegraph, telephone, and cable, except in the transfer of jurisdiction [from the ICC to the new FCC] and such minor 
amendments as to make that transfer effective.”  78 Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, 10313 (1934). 
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on their desks or walls. Even when there was only one exchange in a community, dual service divided 
subscribers. A Bell exchange could not make connections with the subscribers of competing 
independent exchanges in other cities, and vice-versa. In effect, telephone users confronted the same 
kind of barriers to communication as IBM compatible and Macintosh computer users of the 1980s and 
1990s. The incompatibility, however, was usually due more to the companies' refusal to deal with each 
other than to technological incompatibility.13  
 
“Dual service” was the contemporary name for competing, non-interconnected telephone 
exchanges in the same community. Dual service diverges so radically from our current experience with a 
universally interconnected telephone system that it is hard to appreciate just how widespread and long-
lived the phenomenon was. It existed in some form for thirty years, from 1894 to 1924. From 1900 to 
1915, at least 45 percent of the U.S. cities with populations over 5,000 had competing, unconnected 
telephone exchanges. During the peak of the independent movement’s strength, between 1902 and 1910, 
this percentage remained over 55 percent. Some of the nation’s largest cities had dual telephone systems 
for more than fifteen years: Cleveland, Buffalo, Minneapolis-St. Paul, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and 
Philadelphia. 
 
The term universal service emerged from within this environment. It was put forward by the Bell 
system as the policy alternative to dual service. Universal service meant consolidating the competing 
telephone exchanges into a local monopoly so that all telephone users could be interconnected. It did not 
mean a telephone in every home, or government policies to subsidize telephone penetration or 
affordability. (That argument, which is vehemently disputed by historians whose work has been 
supported by the Bell system, is documented at length in chapter 8, and also in chapters 9 and 11.) 
After 1907, the Bell-independent business rivalry was transformed into a political and ideological 
struggle between two opposing principles of industry organization: dual service vs. universal service. 
Vail and other Bell spokesmen challenged the fragmentation and duplicate subscriptions caused by the 
presence of competing telephone exchanges. Independents defended it as a small price to pay for the 
price restraints, service improvement, and innovation promoted by competition. It is impossible to 
understand the historical meaning of the term universal service without grounding it in the context 
of dual service competition. One goal of the book is to reconstruct that original meaning and explore 
its implications for our understanding of telephone history and policy. 
 
There is another reason why the universality of telephone service was implicated in the 
competitive struggle between Bell and the independents. It was true that dual service competition 
restricted universality by fragmenting telephone users. But, paradoxically, such competition also 
rewarded the pursuit of universality by the telephone companies themselves in a way that regulation and 
monopoly have never been able to do. A telephone system with more people on it is ceteris paribus 
more valuable than one with fewer subscribers.14 Competing systems which are not connected to each 
other gain a competitive advantage over their rivals as they extend service to more users and locations. 
This dynamic was the driving force behind the Bell-independent rivalry of the early 1900s. Dual service 
propelled both systems into a race to wire all parts of the country and attract as many subscribers as 
                                                 
13 Technological differences did play a role, however, as independents often used automatic switching during these 
years whereas the Bell system was still relying on manual switching. 
14 This is known as the “network externality” in economics. A more formal analysis of its properties and its 
implications for early telephone competition is conducted in chapter 3. 
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rapidly as possible. Penetration and geographic coverage in the United States, particularly in rural areas, 
made the most rapid gains in that period.  The other goal of the book is to construct a systematic 
argument that dual service competition did more to promote the universality of the telephone than the 
later policies and practices of regulated monopoly. Together, the two arguments challenge orthodox 
views of telephone industry history. The reconstruction has both historiographical and policy import. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, recasting that period of telephone history leads to a fundamental 
reinterpretation of why the telephone system became a monopoly. Odd as it may seem, after three 
anti-trust cases and scores of journal articles, the monopolistic character of telephone service is still a 
subject of intense historical and theoretical controversy. Traditionally, economists explained the 
structure of the telephone industry as the most efficient form of organization due to the presumed 
existence of supply-side economies of scale and scope. This explanation is grounded in the theory of 
natural monopoly. Many historians and economists have rejected the natural monopoly explanation, 
however, insisting that monopoly resulted from abusive and predatory actions of the Bell System. 
Whether monopoly was a product of “natural” economic forces or market manipulation is a matter of 
some consequence in a country governed by antitrust laws, and until now these two positions have 
defined the spectrum of opinion on the subject. 
 
This book rejects both views. A different explanation, which might be called the universal 
service theory of monopoly, is advanced. That theory portrays telephone monopoly as a product of a 
conscious, publicly mediated policy decision to “unify the service;” i.e., to eliminate the user 
fragmentation created by dual service. In chapter 3, I characterize that outcome in economic-theoretic 
terms as an attempt to realize demand-side economies of scope. That represents a new theoretical 
position, in that it shifts the explanation for the efficiency of monopoly from the supply side to the 
demand side and from economies of scale to economies of scope. It is also a distinct historical position 
in that it stresses that the elimination of dual service was the product of a political consensus rather than 
a unilateral product of the Bell system. (The existence of a policy consensus, however, does not 
necessarily mean that the right decision was made, nor does it mean that there was no cleavage between 
losers and winners. In chapter 11, I explore the political dimension of this choice by examining in detail 
the consolidation of competing telephone exchanges in several major urban centers after 1915.) 
 
Another historical issue revisited by this text is the role of interconnection (and the absence of 
interconnection) in the development of the American telecommunications infrastructure. This is a badly 
neglected and often misinterpreted topic in the historical literature.  The most influential account of the 
competitive period, the Telephone Investigation of the Federal Communications Commission (1939), 
devotes only a few dismissive sentences to dual service competition.15 Its incomplete and inaccurate 
treatment of the subject has misled two generations of historians. Lipartito (1989), Langdale (1978), 
Fischer (1987, 1993), and other historians with access to primary sources mention it, but fail to draw the 
crucial linkages between the lack of interconnection, the pursuit of universality by the competing 
telephone companies, and the demand for complete interconnection as the rationale for the choice of 
regulated monopoly as the institutional form for the telephone.  Since dual service has not been taken 
seriously by historians, data about its nature and extent has not been systematically collected. Previous 
                                                 
15 Duplication of telephone exchange service is dismissed by the FCC Report as “wasteful from the viewpoint of 
investment and burdensome to the subscriber.” Federal Communications Commission, Investigation of the Telephone 
Industry, 133 (GPO 1939). 
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studies have never adequately quantified the phenomenon. Aside from that, the existence of fragmented 
telephone service raises a number of intriguing historical questions. To what extent did the division of 
subscribers into two systems correspond to other social divisions, such as social class or ethnic groups? 
How frequently were users unable to reach desired parties due to competitive fragmentation? Which 
user groups perceived subscriber fragmentation as the most serious inconvenience? To what extent did 
the availability of long-distance connections affect the choice of a local subscription? How many and 
what type of users took out duplicate subscriptions? This book explores these economic and 
communicative features of dual service in detail. 
 
When the phenomenon of non-interconnection is not simply overlooked, it is often 
misrepresented. Policy analysts and economists who have written about the early competitive period 
generally treat the lack of interconnection as an anti-competitive abuse. The interpretation that has 
generally arisen from those works is that it was Bell’s refusal to interconnect with the independents 
which ultimately defeated them.  The truth, as subsequent chapters will show, is very different. Until 
1910, the independents were as uninterested in interconnecting with Bell as vice-versa. Further, Bell’s 
refusal to interconnect utterly failed to stop the independents from proliferating throughout the country. 
Conversely, Bell’s decisions from 1901 to 1908 to aggressively interconnect its toll lines to 
noncompeting independent exchanges was a damaging blow to dual service and the most powerful 
method of promoting  its concept of universal  service. Furthermore, the Kingsbury Commitment of 
1913, which is almost unanimously represented by historians as the “end” of the dual service era and 
mistakenly counted as the beginning of universal interconnection, has been completely misinterpreted. 
 
If revisiting the dual service era leads to substantial revisions in the way we understand and 
periodize telephone history, it also has important implications for current and future 
telecommunications policies. The policy relevance of history is often neglected by decision makers 
in business and government. Their attention consumed by an uncertain future and a complex, 
demanding present, they tend to assume that historical analysis can contribute little to their 
understanding. But upon reflection it is apparent that conceptions of the telecommunications 
industry’s past can and do play a decisive role in policy thinking. The origins myth linking the 
Communications Act and universal service policy did not come about for nothing. In chapter 13, I show 
how and why this myth was created in the 1970s, when AT&T was beset by new competition once 
again. Likewise, current conceptions about the competitive consequences of interconnection and the 
need for “equal access” are derived mainly from interpretations of telephone and telegraph history. 
Telephone history has policy implications, which is why it so often has been, and will probably always 
remain, a contested area. The real issue is whether decision makers will be guided by accurate 
history or inaccurate history. 
 
This book attempts to reframe the ongoing debate about universal service. If the standard 
historical assumptions about regulated monopoly's role in the creation of universal service are true, then 
developing countries and other nations considering competition and liberalization must control and limit 
competitive forces to preserve universal access. If, on the other hand, dual service competition played a 
critical role in the development of a ubiquitous telephone infrastructure, and that experience accounts for 
the tremendous U.S. lead in the extension of telecommunications service, then very different policy 
conclusions can be drawn. 
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More broadly, interconnection of competing networks is a critical issue – perhaps the critical 
issue – in contemporary telecommunications policy. The Bell-independent rivalry of the early 1900s 
provides a reservoir of empirical data about the effects of various approaches to interconnection. True, 
the social and technological conditions of that period are far different than today’s. The economic 
principles, however, are the same. A historically accurate portrayal of the evolution of interconnection 
arrangements in the U.S. telephone industry from the 1890s to the 1920s can only be helpful. The 
implications of that evidence for current policy are discussed in chapter 14. 
  
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THEORY OF ACCESS COMPETITION 
 
 
ALTHOUGH THIS IS PRIMARILY a historical work, it must begin with a discussion of 
theory. The argument of the book is that the refusal of competing telephone companies to interconnect 
gave them a powerful incentive to expand the scope of their networks. That incentive played a crucial 
role in bringing about universal service as we know it. More generally, the book is about the problem of 
interconnecting competing networks, and how those relationships of interconnection lead to competitive 
or monopolistic industry structures. To clarify the historical treatment of those issues, a theoretical 
framework regarding network competition is outlined.  
 
The chapter begins with a critique of the common assumption that telephone monopoly can be 
explained by means of supply side efficiencies alone. It shows that from the standpoint of traditional 
natural monopoly theory, the telephone system has always been an exceptional and seemingly 
contradictory case. The next four sections sketch out a theoretical alternative to the natural monopoly 
paradigm that avoids those problems and, it is hoped, sheds new light on the interpretation of the 
historical events.  In essence, it argues that a better understanding of the unique characteristics of 
telephone competition and monopoly must come from two sources: i) a better definition of the output of 
networks and ii) a focus on demand side rather than supply side economies. The discussion of theory is 
intended to be accessible to readers who are not professional economists, while maintaining a level of 
logical rigor sufficient to satisfy those who are. (It is possible of course that neither audience will be 
satisfied with the result, but such are the exigencies of interdisciplinary work.) 
Natural Monopoly Theory and the Telephone 
Economists typically attempt to explain monopoly organization by reference to the theory of 
natural monopoly. Although that theory is the main conceptual tool available to account for the 
existence of a monopoly as pervasive and long-lasting as the telephone system, the uneasy fit between 
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the two has been apparent for more than seventy years. I will begin with an account of the theory 
and its development over the years, and then cite six reasons why telephone monopoly posed a 
puzzle within that theoretical framework. 
The Development of Natural Monopoly Theory 
From the 1870s to the 1930s, business regulation by specialized regulatory commissions gained 
acceptance by nearly all states. The thinking behind it was the product of a new school of political 
economy, born in the populist turmoil of the 1880s, which held that in certain industries competition 
was destructive and inefficient and ought to be superseded by government regulation. In their 
attempt to come up with a scientific definition of which industries should be regulated, they developed 
the concept of natural monopoly. 
 
Natural monopoly theory concentrated on supply-side phenomena; that is, it attempted to explain 
industrial organization by looking at the costs of the firm. The simplest and most straightforward 
definition of natural monopoly was articulated in 1887 by Henry Carter Adams, an influential professor 
who was also the recipient of the first doctorate in Economics awarded by Johns Hopkins University. 
Adams divided industries into three classes: those with constant returns to scale, those with diminishing 
returns to scale, and those with increasing returns to scale. Businesses in the first two categories, he 
believed, could be left to the regulatory pressures of the market. In industries characterized by 
economies of scale, however, competition was disruptive, inefficient, and temporary. A firm became 
more efficient as it controlled more of the market. “The control of the state over industries should be 
coextensive with the application of the law of increasing returns in industries,” Adams wrote. 16 
Other theorists concluded that there was no single characteristic defining natural monopoly, 
though scale economy was always an important factor. Thomas Henry Farrer, the Secretary of the 
British Board of Trade, listed five separate factors defining inherent monopolies, four of them 
pertaining to the peculiar fixity of utility infrastructures.17  The ‘natural monopoly’ label was coined 
by Richard T. Ely, a contemporary of Adams's. Ely was a professor of political economy at Johns 
Hopkins University and the founder of the American Economic Association. Like Farrer, he saw 
monopoly as the product of a conjunction of factors, including scale economies, a high proportion of 
fixed to variable costs, and physical obstacles to the multiplication of competing facilities. 
 
Since the time of Ely and Adams, natural monopoly theory, like economic theory generally, 
has become more refined and formalized. Economists no longer equate natural monopoly with 
economies of scale as such. In the 1960s James Bonbright contended that a single firm could be the most 
efficient supplier even when the expansion of output results in increases in average cost.18 A theoretical 
breakthrough carne with Faulhaber’s (1975) work on the sustainability of cross-subsidies in markets 
                                                 
16 Henry Carter Adams, The Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 Publications of the American Economics 
Association, 465-549 (Jan. 1887). 
17 Farrer’s criteria  of monopoly were: 1) What they supply is a necessity, 2) They occupy  peculiarly favored spots 
or lines of land, 3) The product or service they supply is used at the place where and in connection with the plant or 
machinery  by which it  is supplied, 4) The product or service can be increased in supply  without a proportionate  increase in 
plant and capital,  5) The business requires a "certain, and a well-defined harmonious arrangement, which can only be 
attained by unity." Quoted in Edward D. Lowry, Justification for Regulation: The Case for Natural Monopoly, Public 
Utilities Fortnightly 18-19 (Nov. 8, 1973). 
18 James Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Regulation 14-16 (Columbia University Press 1961). 
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which were naturally monopolistic.19 The emergence of the ‘contestable markets’ school of industrial 
organization theory, developed by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, verified Bonbright’s observation.20 In 
the new theory, cost subadditivity replaced scale economies as the recipe for natural monopoly. Cost 
subadditivity means that the production costs of one supplier serving all of the market are less than those 
of any combi- nation of multiple suppliers serving a portion of the market. The improved formalization 
vindicated Bonbright’s earlier observation that a monopoly could be the most efficient supplier in the 
absence of decreasing costs. At a given output, scale economies are sufficient to make cost functions 
subadditive, but cost functions can still be subadditive when average costs are increasing. 
 
The revamped industrial organization theory was a powerful advance in that it formalized and 
mathematicized the definition of natural monopoly. Gone are the clumsy, descriptive lists of special 
features set out in the works of Ely and Farrer and the early utility textbooks. But the refinement in 
theory did not change its exclusive focus on supply-side efficiencies. The key to industrial organization 
was still sought in the way the production costs of the firm(s) responded to changes in the quantity of 
output. Despite the revolution in analytical technique, the basic conception of natural monopoly, as 
reflected in the verbal definition, did not change. Natural monopoly was said to exist “when one firm 
can supply the entire market at less cost than two or more firms.”21 
 
The Telephone as Natural Monopoly: Six Anomalies 
The theory of natural monopoly had developed primarily from observations of the railroad and 
natural gas industries in the 1880s. The telephone was perceived to be like those industries in that 
monopoly, once controlled, was thought to possess certain benefits. But if one returns to the writings 
of the earliest observers of the industry, a very different view of the rationale for telephone monopoly 
can be found. Instead of pointing to increasing returns or other supply-side efficiencies, the utility 
economists of the 1920s and 30s asserted explicitly and repeatedly that the telephone had become a 
monopoly in order to “unify the service.” 
 
J. Warren Stehman’s Financial History of AT&T (1925) was the first comprehensive economic 
history of the American telephone industry.22 It was written in the years 1920 to 1922, just as the 
competitive phase of the industry was drawing to a close. Stehman asserted that “complete monopoly” 
was “the ideal condition for telephone service,” and added that the telephone industry, “perhaps to a 
greater degree than any other public utility, [is] essentially monopolistic in character.” According to 
Stehman, however, “wasteful duplication of facilities” was not the primary reason for its special status: 
 
                                                 
19 Gerald Faulhaber, Cross-subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprise, 65 American Economics Review 966 (1975). 
20 William Baumol, John Panzar & Robert Willig, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRY  STRUCTURE (Harcourt,  Brace,  Jovanovich 
1982); William Sharkey, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (Cambridge University Press 1982). 
21 Lowry, supra note 17, at 22. Compare Lowry’s pre-contestable markets definition with Sharkey’s: “There is 
natural monopoly in a particular market if and only if a single firm can produce the desired output at lower cost than any 
combination of two or more firms.” See also Richard Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STANFORD L. REV. 
548-643 (Feb. 1969). 
22 J. Warren Stehman, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY (Houghton Mifflin, 1925). 
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[T]here is an additional and more important peculiarity of the telephone industry: that is, that 
the efficiency and value of the service depend upon the number of persons with whom the 
subscriber can communicate. Two telephone systems in a community are a source of great 
inconvenience and usually of expense to the subscribers. An individual who desires to talk to 
people on each of the two systems is compelled either to install telephones of both companies 
or to go, from time to time, to some other place than his residence or place of business to use 
the telephones of the system to which he is not a subscriber.23 
 
The need for universal interconnection was thus recognized as a separate and even stronger 
reason than supply-side efficiencies for preventing competition in telephony. Thus, anomaly #1 is 
that unification of the service, not increasing returns on the supply side, was cited by the most 
informed contemporaries as the reason why a telephone monopoly came about. 
 
Anomaly #2 is even more striking: those familiar with the telephone industry at the time it 
became a monopoly believed that it did not possess decreasing costs on the supply side. On the 
contrary, the average cost of providing local exchange service was thought to increase with the 
number of subscribers. The main source of the diseconomy was switching technology, specifically, 
the geometric increase in the number of possible connections as the number of subscribers grew.24 
Within a city, growth in the density of stations could result in decreases in per station expenses, as 
the additional subscribers led to more efficient utilization of outside plant. But growth in the size of 
an exchange always increased the average costs associated with switching and maintenance.25 That 
generally offset the other economies so that utility commissions usually granted rate increases as 
exchanges grew. During the 1930s, it was normal for textbooks about public utility regulation to 
contain explicit discussions of that peculiar aspect of the telephone system. Jones and Bigham’s 
Principles of Public Utilities, for example, published in 1931, recognized that subscriber growth 
produced diseconomies rather than economies. The ultimate justification for monopoly, they 
maintained, was not scale economies but “ the necessity of a unified service.”26 Similar arguments 
were made in other utility manuals published before 1940.27 Thus, the cost characteristics of the 
industry not only failed to conform to the expectations of natural monopoly theory, but actively 
violated them. 
 
The Jones and Bigham text cited above also dwelt at some length upon another anomaly, 
even more central than the previous one. In telephone service, the authors observed, it is not 
obvious what is the appropriate unit with which to measure increasing scale. In the early discussions of 
the diseconomies of scale associated with telephony, economists generally treated the number of 
subscribers as the measure of the scale of output. But, Jones and Bigham argued, a telephone exchange 
                                                 
23 Ibid at 234. 
24 In the manual and electromechanical switches of that period, every terminal was hardwired to every other terminal 
in the switch, so that as subscribers were added to a switch the number of connections multiplied by N(N-1)/2. Larger 
telephone exchanges thus had higher average costs than smaller ones. For a detailed history of the diseconomies of growth in 
switching technology, see Milton Mueller, The Switchboard Problem 30 Technology & Culture 534-60 (July 1989). 
25 For a quantitative study of those issues see “Cost of Exchange Telephone Service,” memo from Joseph P. Davis to 
Frederick Fish, October 14 1902. AT&T Archives. 
26 Jones & Bigham, Principles of Public Utilities (MacMillan 1931). 
27 G.  Lloyd Wilson, James M. Herring & Roland B. Eutscher, Public Utility Industries (McGraw-Hill 1936); James 
M. Herring & Gerald C. Gross, Telecommunications: Economics and Regulation (McGraw-Hill 1936), 189. 
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that connected a user to a larger number of other users was offering a distinctly different service, not 
more of the same service.28 The volume of traffic was also an important aspect of telephone system 
output. Perhaps, they speculated, some composite unit such as the “call-mile-minute” could be 
developed to provide a more scientific measure of the telephone system’s output. Although neither the 
authors nor other utility economists of the period pursued the matter, the question they raised had 
profound implications. The concept of the scale of output is fundamental to economic analysis. Natural 
monopoly theory, in both its classical and modern incarnations, hinges on mathematical analysis of the 
relationship between scalar variables P (price) and Q (quantity). Yet here was an open confession that 
economists did not know how to define Q. Thus we are left with anomaly #3: in telephony, the unit of 
output is problematical. 
 
An intuitively plausible definition of the ‘scale’ of a network is the number of users. That is in 
fact the definition used most often by classical and contemporary economists. Equating the number of 
users with the Q scale, however, has the paradoxical effect of creating an upward-sloping demand curve 
(Anomaly #4). In their work on network externalities, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985) treat the 
number of users as the output scale of a network, and explicitly state that firms will raise their prices as 
more subscribers join.29 While that assumption is an accurate description of how consumers really do 
value a growing network, it contradicts everything economics tells us about marginal utility and the 
downward slope of demand curves. That problem was noted by Allen (1988), who went to extraordinary 
lengths in an attempt to square that anomaly with orthodox economic theory.30 
 
By the time of the debate over AT&T divestiture in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the issue of 
monopoly organization in telephony had been fully absorbed by the supply-side paradigm. The historical 
basis of telephone monopoly in universal interconnection, and the early doubts about the paradox of 
diseconomies and the definition of output, had been largely forgotten. Instead, during United States v. 
AT&T econometric studies of Bell system cost functions were brandished by both sides in the 
courtroom. Oddly, (and that is anomaly #5) empirical studies of the supply side failed to uncover 
conclusive evidence of scale and scope economies. It was clear from empirical studies that there were 
significant economies of density; i.e., that urban areas were cheaper to serve than rural areas. But some 
of the most comprehensive studies failed to prove the hypothesis that there were economies of scale and 
scope across all telecommunications services."31 Other studies, using different statistical techniques and 
different measures of output, concluded that there were significant economies of scale and scope.32 Once 
again, defining output proved to be problematical. In his review of empirical studies of returns to 
scale in telecommunications, Littlechild (1979) observed that the only obvious scale economies were 
                                                 
28 "To one who uses electricity, gas, water and street railways it matters not whether he be served by the same 
company as his friends, but to the user of the telephone it is highly important that he be on the same system with them and 
with all those with whom he might wish to get in touch... Jones & Bigham (1931) at 89-90. 
29 Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities Journal of Political 
Economy 1985. 
30 David Allen, New Telecommunications Services: Network Externalities and Critical Mass 13 
Telecommunications Policy 257-71 (Sept. 1988). 
31 Melvyn Fuss & Leonard Waverman, The Regulation of Telecommunications in Canada, Technical Report No. 7, 
Economic Council of Canada, March 1981; David Evans & James Heckman, A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function 
with an Application to the Bell System 74 American Economic Review 620 (1984). 
32 Baldev Raj & H.D. Vinod, Bell System scale economies from a randomly varying parameter rrwdel _ J. EcoN. 
BUSINESS 247-52 (Feb. 1982); J.B. Smith & V. Corbo, Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope in  Bell Canada, 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Concordia University, Mar. 1979. 
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in long distance transmission, whereas the least clear pattern of scale economies was in the local 
exchange.33   We need not become too deeply embroiled in the complex and highly technical issues 
raised by those studies to find corroboration for the main point here: the results of studies of supply-
side costs have been equivocal, despite the industry’s long-term status as a monopoly. 
 
Occasionally, a modern economist resurrected the old puzzles. The most notable example is 
in Alfred Kahn’s classic two volume treatise, The Economics of Regulation. In the course of arguing 
for a definition of natural monopoly as a product of long- run decreasing average costs, Kahn had 
this to say about the telephone system: 
 
There are cases of natural monopoly that would seem at first blush not explicable 
in terms of long-run decreasing costs. [A]s the number of telephone subscribers goes 
up, the number of possible connections among them grow more rapidly: local 
exchange service is therefore believed to be subject to increasing, not decreasing unit 
costs, when the output is the number of subscribers. And yet, it seems clear that this 
service is a natural monopoly: if there were two telephone systems serving a 
community, each subscriber would have to have two instruments, two lines into his 
home, two bills if he wanted to be able to call everyone else. Despite this apparent  
presence  of  increasing  costs,  in  short, monopoly is still natural because one 
company can serve any number of subscribers (for example, all in a community) at 
lower cost than two.34 
 
That passage bears close analysis. Kahn recognized that the requirements of connecting 
telephone users forces a competitive system to completely duplicate the network of its rival, 
and that subscribers in such a competitive market would be forced  to pay twice for essentially 
the same service. But for him, the simple observation that one company can interconnect “any 
number of subscribers ... at lower cost than two” is sufficient for it to qualify as a traditional 
natural monopoly. The argument appears persuasive and was often cited by others. In reality, it 
highlights another theoretical anomaly (#6), namely that the efficiencies which are alleged to 
make telephone service a natural monopoly occur on the demand side and not the supply side. 
Contrary to natural monopoly theory, Kahn's rationale for monopoly is entirely independent of 
the scale of output (if users are taken as the unit of scale); the elimination of the need for 
duplicate subscriptions occurs whether a telephone system has 100 subscribers or 100 
million subscribers.  Moreover, the argument proves that a single firm is more efficient not 
because it makes telephone service cheaper to produce, but because it makes telephone service 
cheaper to consume by eliminating the need for duplicate subscriptions. 
 
To recap, the application of industrial organization theory to the telephone system has 
generated a series of puzzling inconsistencies:  
1. Contemporary observers of the monopolization process insisted that its object was 
to “unify the service” and not to realize supply-side efficiencies;  
                                                 
33 Stephen C. Littlechild, Elements of Telecommunications Economics (Institute of Electrical Engineers 1979). 
Ironically, long-distance transmission is precisely where new competition took root, and local exchange service remained 
largely monopolistic. 
34 Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions Vol. 2, 123 (Wiley 1971). 
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2. The firm's unit costs appeared to increase rather than decrease as the size of the 
network grew;  
3. There was considerable doubt about the proper definition of output;  
4. The most common definition of the scale of a network, the number of subscribers,  
resulted in a paradoxical, upward-sloping demand curve;  
5. Empirical studies failed to verify the existence of the supply-side cost 
characteristics of a monopoly; and  
6 .  The most convincing argument for the efficiency of a single system was based on 
demand-side rather than supply-side phenomena.  
 
Despite the number and persistence of those issues, few economists have been willing to make 
an explicit break with the classical natural monopoly paradigm. 
 
The rest of the chapter proposes an alternative conceptual framework for the analysis of network 
competition, one that resolves these problems. That theoretical framework has two basic elements. One 
is a redefinition of the output of networks. The other is a focus on demand-side rather than supply-side 
economies as the critical determinant of market structure. The latter draws on a new branch of economic 
theory about the network externality. Network externality theory developed in the mid-1970s, 
independently of the natural monopoly tradition. It uses game theory as well as standard economic 
techniques to model the way one consumer’s demand for a product is affected by the behavior of other 
consumers. Originally applied to understanding telephone demand, it found fruitful application in 
economic analysis of standardization and new technology adoption as well. The pioneers of that 
theoretical literature are Rohlfs (1974), David (1985), Arthur (1989), and Farrell and Saloner (1987). 
Prior to that, however, the theory has not been applied to that period of telephone competition. 
Communications Access Networks as Radically Heterogeneous 
A key assumption underlying natural monopoly theory, and indeed most economic analysis, is 
that a firm's output is composed of homogeneous units. Homogeneity means that each unit of q must be 
the same as any other unit; or, to put it another way, the product remains constant as the amount 
produced increases or decreases. That assumption seems plausible enough when the product in question 
is potato chips, electric power, soft drinks, or wheat. It is easy to imagine identical units of such items 
increasing or decreasing in quantity along a scale Q. When the product is communications access, 
however, the assumption of homogeneity is both false and misleading. 
The most important output dimension of an access network is the people and places it 
connects. From an economic point of view, neither users nor the locations connected are 
interchangeable; each one is sui generis. Access to New York is not a substitute for access to Chicago. A 
telephone connection to one's mother is not a substitute for a connection to a phone sex number.  Each 
unit of access represents a separate output. A telephone directory is a gigantic menu, a Sears-Roebuck 
catalogue listing all the different access services a user can order by punching numbers on the phone. 
The economic discreteness of those services is demonstrated forcefully whenever a wrong number is 
dialed. The wrongly dialed party is not a substitute for the desired party; the system has failed to deliver 
what the customer wants as surely as when a restaurant brings sake and tofu to a table that ordered beer 
and pizza. 
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If each unit of access is a different good, the growth of a network involves an enlargement of the 
product’s scope rather than an increase in scale. Economists have made similar arguments before.35   
With one recent exception,36 however, even economists who explicitly recognize that point tend to 
ignore or back away from its implications. For the sake of simplicity, they assume that access is 
homogeneous and get on with the business of normal economic analysis.37  To do so, however, 
assumes away the central problem in the economics of network interconnection and competition, as we 
shall see. Ignoring the heterogeneity of access is understandable (if not entirely justifiable) in an 
environment of widespread telephone penetration and interconnected competitors. It is particularly 
troublesome, however, when analyzing early telephone competition, in which differences in the access 
units supplied by the networks played a crucial role in the contest.  
 
Figure 3.1 is a simple but useful representation of network output. It is a matrix in which 
each member of the population (A-n) is assigned a row and column. Each cell in the matrix represents 
an access link or connection between a specific pair of users. Each cell is a separate output (Q), and 
thus has distinct supply characteristics and its own (downward sloping!) demand curve. Any 
combination of cells represents a distinct output scope. From the supply side, the efficiency of a 
network depends on how successfully its engineering can realize economies of scope by sharing 
facilities across cells. Economies of scale are meaningful only within one of the cells. From the 
demand side, the addition of new users to the network creates an economy of scope for existing 
users. Users obtain additional service capabilities without a proportional increase in their payments 
for access. 
Figure 3.1 
MATRIX REPRESENTATION OF NETWORK OUTPUT 
 
 A     
B Qab B    
C Qac Qbc C   
D Qad Qbd Qcd D  
n Qan Qbn Qcn Qdn n 
 
                                                 
35 Gerald Brock, Telephone Pricing to Promote Universal Service  and Economic Freedom, Federal 
Communications Commission Office of Plans and Policies, Working Paper #18 (1985). A telephone network is described as 
N(N-1)/2 different products, where N is the number of persons and N(N-1)/2  is the number of potential conversations. 
36 Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, One Way Networks, Two Way Networks, Compatibility  and 
Antitrust, ms., EC-93-14 July 1993. This paper characterizes networks as complementary components. Customers tend to be 
identified with a particular component (e.g., an access line in telephone service). Service is a composite good. The addition of 
users to a network creates economies of scope in consumption. 
37 A typical example the testimony of Nina Cornell, former economist for the Federal Communications Commission, 
in a 1992 court case regarding telephone interconnection in New Zealand. Cornell wrote: “it could be argued that each 
potential connection from customer A to customer B is in a separate market from a customer’s perspective” but later adds 
that “looking at each potential as a separate market…is commercially unrealistic. Most customers, when offered a choice 
among several carriers, select a single carrier to supply a group of such potential connections, rather than selecting a separate 
carrier for each.” The testimony goes on to state that “as long as all local exchange providers are interconnected, duplicate 
access facilities only raise the cost to consumers with no added benefits.” Thus, the heterogeneity problem is passed over by 
assuming that local carriers will be interconnected and hence that competition involves no choice among imperfect 
substitutes. Brief of Evidence of Nina W. Cornell, p. 9, Clear v. Telecom, Before the High Court of New Zealand, March 
1992. 
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The author is aware of the fact that some deviation from standard usage is involved in that 
application of the term “economies of scope.” Traditionally, economists have considered the joint 
provision of local and long distance service, and ancillary services such as security alarms or 
telegraph service, as an example of scope economies in a telephone network.38 At risk of being 
repetitive, it is important to stress that I am applying the concept of scope economies to 
communications networks in a far more thoroughgoing sense than is usual. That framework views 
every pairwise connection between telephone stations as a separate and distinct output. Hence the term 
radical heterogeneity. 
Access Competition 
I have stressed the heterogeneity of communications access because the concept neatly 
explains many of the unique features of competition in the supply of communications access. When 
competing networks are interconnected, it is easy to ignore the heterogeneity of access because the 
bundle of connections offered by each network appears to be the same. Heterogeneity becomes 
particularly important and noticeable, however, when competing networks are not interconnected or 
compatible. That, of course, was the case in the early era of telephone competition. 
 
Access competition occurs when two or more networks supply access services which could be 
used as substitutes for each other, but do not provide access to each other. In that type of competition, 
the scope of the networks becomes one of the most important dimensions of rivalry. Each network offers 
consumers a different bundle of access units. Networks increase their value to consumers by attracting 
more users or supplying more access than their rival. The competitive process is complex, however, 
because users face inherently imperfect substitution choices, and the choices one user makes are affected 
by the choices other users make. That process differs greatly from the type of competition economists 
normally consider. It is worthwhile to make that distinction in more formal terms. 
 
In the competition models of neoclassical theory, the quantity of a good demanded by society 
(Q) is divided up among numerous competing firms (q1 , q2   ••• q.J. The output of each firm is 
assumed to be homogeneous. Once that assumption is made, two corollaries follow:  l) each unit 
produced by the competing firms is a perfect substitute for every other unit; and 2) each supplier’s 
output comprises an additive share of the total output Q that would be produced by a single firm 
supplying the entire market; thus,  Q = (q1  + q2   + ... + qn). An economist interested in industrial 
organization can then ask whether the amount Q is produced more efficiently under competitive or 
monopolistic conditions, or whether firm A or firm B has lower costs in producing amount q. 
Those assumptions simply do not work when the output represents communications access. 
Networks are combinations of many different Q’s (communications access units). When competition 
exists, the market is not divided into additive “shares” of a homogeneous quantity Q; instead, different 
users join different networks. Assuming that the networks are not interconnected, a user who joins one 
network is not accessible to the users of the other-unless she purchases access from both. A form of 
rivalry exists, in that users can choose the combination and price they prefer. But the combinations 
offered are not identical and therefore are imperfect substitutes. Moreover, the “shares” of 
                                                 
38 More technically, economies of scope tend to mean supply-side cost subadditivity for the special case of 
orthogonal outputs. 
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communications access units offered by competing networks do not sum to constant quantities in 
different conditions. 
 
Figures 3.2 through 3.5 are Venn diagrams illustrating the possible structures of the market 
for access. (The sets should be interpreted as groups of users, not as representations of geographic 
territories.)  Figure 3.2 represents a monopoly; a single network connects all N users. Figures 3.3, 3.4, 
and 3.5 represent the three logically conceivable ways in which the market for access could be divided 
among two unconnected telephone systems, assuming that network 1 attracts some portion p of the 
available users. 
 
In Figure 3.3, networks 1 and 2 attract two separate and mutually exclusive groups of users, 
representing a scope of s1 and s2, respectively. By definition, the two networks offer completely different 
combinations of communications access units and cannot be used as substitutes. If the users of the two 
networks are geographically separated and/or have no interest in obtaining access to each other, then 
figure 3.3 really represents two cases of figure 3.2 above. If not, then the situation in figure 3.3 would 
rapidly turn into the one represented by figure 3.4, below. 
 
In Figure 3.4, there are D duplicate users who purchase access from both systems, but D < N. 
In that case, the two networks can be used as perfect substitutes only in the supply of access to group 
D. Overall substitution is still imperfect, as each network has exclusive control of access to a 
specific group of users. Indeed, the willingness of some users to purchase access from both systems 
proves that they are not perfect substitutes.  
 
In Figure 3.5, all subscribers purchase access from both systems (D = N). That alternative, 
universal duplication, makes the substitution choice perfect but creates an intriguing paradox. To be 
perfect substitutes, every user must join both competing networks. Readers will recognize that as the 
situation described by Alfred Kahn earlier in the chapter. Kahn stressed its inefficiency; I want to 
emphasize its practical impossibility. If all users joined two or more competing networks, any user 
would be able to access all other users on any one of the networks and therefore would have no 
incentive to duplicate.39 That is a paradoxical feature of access competition: the greater the percentage 
of duplication, the closer the combinations of access units offered by competing networks come to being 
perfect substitutes; but the closer the networks' sets of users come to being identical, the less need there 
is for duplication. 
 
Taken  together,  the diagrams  prove that: 1) separate networks or incompatible standards are 
never perfect substitutes; and 2) access competition almost always looks like the model in Figure 3.4 – 
some users are exclusive to one of the competing networks or standards, while others, who desire more 
extensive access, purchase access from both systems; 3) the combinations of access units offered  by  
competing  networks do not sum to a constant quantity when the same number of users is divided among 
competing  networks. 
  
                                                 
39 Such a situation could only come about if the capabilities or services of the network were so different technically 
as to make them non-competitors (e.g. voice vs. data). But that leads us back to a situation in which the networks are not 
substitutes. 
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FIGURE 3.2 
Monopoly (Single network) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3 
Dual Networks with no Duplication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.4 
Competing Networks with Partial duplication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
 
 
Np 
 
 
 
N(1-p) 
 
 
Np+D 
 
 
N(1-p)+D 
 
 
25 
 
FIGURE 3.5 
Dual Networks, Universal Duplication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imperfect substitution choices give the competitive process a special dynamic. On the demand 
side, they set in motion a coordination game in which users try to assure themselves of access to all 
desired parties through joint consumption of the same network. The theoretical literature on network 
externalities has greatly expanded our understanding of that process, generating a colorful set of terms to 
describe the unique properties of access competition. Formal models have shown that at any given price 
for access there can be multiple equilibria. The equilibrium achieved is path dependent; i.e., it can be 
influenced by the sequence in which users join and other small, random events. There is the problem 
of achieving the “critical mass” of users required to make joining the network worthwhile. 
“ Bandwagon effects” arise when users who have been “fence sitting” flock to a particular standard 
or network once critical mass is achieved. There is the danger that users who have committed 
themselves to a losing standard or network can become technological “orphans.” The demand for access 
and compatibility can also exhibit what Farrell and Saloner call “inertia,” or what Arthur and David call 
“lock-in” effects; users who have converged on a particular network become unwilling to risk sacrificing 
the benefits of joint consumption by moving to a new network, even when the new alternative is 
technically more efficient.40 By making themselves accessible to users of both systems, duplicate 
subscribers play an important role in stabilizing that process.41 
 
On the supply side, access competition puts a premium on universality. Networks with a larger 
scope are more likely to attract users. More specifically, three incentives to enlarge the scope of a 
network are created when competing networks are not interconnected: 
 
                                                 
40 Theoretical work began with Rohlfs (1974), a game-theoretic model of interdependent demand for 
communications access. See also Brock (1981); Farrell and Saloner, (1987, 1989); Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1987); David 
(1985); Arthur (1989); Greenstein (1993). One problem with that literature is its failure to identify the expansion of networks 
and compatibility as an increase in scope rather than scale. Katz and Shapiro, David, and others erroneously refer to 
standardization as a product of “demand-side economies of scale.” With the exception of Rohlfs, the models tend to treat 
users as homogeneous and communication patterns as uniform, and thus to overstate the tendencies to converge. 
41 A modified urn model developed by Mueller (1989) showed that convergence on a single network may not 
happen when there are non-uniform communication probabilities and there is the possibility of duplication by high-volume 
users. 
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l) The incentive to be the first to serve unserved areas or markets. The inertia associated 
with joint consumption makes it more difficult to attract existing users away from an established 
network. New competitors are most likely to gain ground by identifying and attracting new user 
groups. Thus, access competition is more likely to take place when a market is relatively 
undeveloped. As a corollary, it is difficult if not impossible to initiate access competition when an 
incumbent network is near-universal in scope. 
 
2) The incentive to lower the price of access. The demand for telecommunications consists of 
two parts, access and usage. A regime of access competition encourages producers to reduce the 
cost of, and perhaps even temporarily cross-subsidize, access relative to usage. It also encourages the 
development of technologies which reduce the cost of access. 
 
3) The incentive to interconnect users in noncompeting networks. The quickest way to expand 
an access universe is to establish connections with an existing network that has already attracted a 
critical mass of users (assuming, of course, that the existing network is not one's competitor). Competing 
networks will thus bid for interconnection rights to unaffiliated and noncompeting systems. 
 
All three of those incentives are clearly visible in the historical data developed in subsequent 
chapters. Together, those three incentives form the basis of my argument that access competition 
promoted universal service. 
 
Of course, there are corresponding disadvantages to access competition. It is often a transitory 
process; someone wins the competition and ends up with a monopoly, posing problems of inertia and 
regulation. Once a certain level of development has been achieved, the existence of separate networks 
can restrict rather than expand the scope of the system.  Duplicate users may be saddled with significant 
demand-side diseconomies. The fragmentation can be irritating and inconvenient to users. Choosing one 
network over the other necessarily involves losing access to some potential communication partners.  
My intention is not to argue that access competition represents the ideal state of affairs. It is, rather, the 
more limited argument that it played an indispensable part in providing telephone companies the 
impetus to expand their scope, and that incentive bears the major responsibility for the achievement of 
universal service. 
Access Competition and Appropriability 
Economists typically frown upon exploitation of exclusive control of access for competitive 
advantage. They view the leverage derived from control of access as an exercise of monopoly 
power.42  Assuming that there are no insurmountable barriers to the duplication of access facilities, 
however, it is more accurate to say that access competition represents a qualitatively different kind of 
competition rather than a perversion or suppression of competition.  In access competition, rivalry 
takes place over the scope of the product, not just its price. Competition on that dimension is not 
necessarily socially undesirable because widespread scope is one of the most important determinants 
of a network’s social utility. 
                                                 
42 See John T. Wenders, The Economics of Telecommunications 171-90 (Ballinger  1987), where a telephone 
company’s use of its control of local exchange subscribers to exert  leverage over the long distance market is described as an 
abuse of monopoly power. See also Evans & Heckman, 1983. 
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In the absence of interconnection or compatibility, a network with a superior scope is able to 
fully appropriate the economic value of its bundle of access units. Connecting rival networks can 
eliminate or undermine their ability to appropriate the value of their particular combination of access 
units. Once again the root of the problem is the network externality, or the interdependence of demand. 
If the value of the network increases as new users are added, it may be socially efficient to charge some 
users a price below access costs, and make up the difference by charging higher access rates for users 
who value the addition of the new users more than the increase in their rates. As Gerald Brock has 
demonstrated, an access pricing scheme which discriminates among users will be more efficient than 
one which is uniform, or is based entirely upon cost.43 A discriminatory pricing scheme which optimizes 
the scope of a network can only be sustained, however, when free interconnection with a competitor is 
not required. If interconnection is required, a competitor  can undercut the higher access prices and rely 
on the incumbent to supply access to the users that could only be induced to join the network at a lower 
price (perhaps even below cost).44 Thus the incumbent network's ability to appropriate the value of its 
access bundle deteriorates. The issue of appropriability played a major role in the historical drama. Both 
the Bell and independent telephone interests argued against compulsory interconnection of their 
networks on those grounds.  
Demand-Side Economies of Scope 
Understanding the heterogeneity of network output does more than clarify the unique nature of 
competition among networks; it also improves our understanding of the economic basis for monopoly. 
The framework established above can be applied to show that imperfect substitution choices can result 
in user convergence on a single network. The economic gains driving that process come from the 
demand side rather than the supply side. That framework can also be used to analyze which users have 
an interest in a monopoly network and who the winners and losers from convergence might be. 
 
As long ago as the 1880s, the promoters of the telephone business remarked that the value of a 
telephone exchange increased as more people joined it and that the demand for telephone service by one 
person depended on who else subscribed.45 That observation, in fact, formed an important part of 
Theodore Vail’s argument for universal service.46 That insight has been followed up by modern 
economists, who have given that phenomenon a label (“network externalities”) and who have, as noted 
before, developed formal models of interdependent demand and competition between standards or 
networks. In what follows, I give that phenomenon a slightly different construction. 
 
The increasing value of networks with a broader scope can be explained as a product of demand-
side economies of scope. A user acquires access to a network by buying, building or leasing facilities, 
                                                 
43 Gerald Brock, Telecommunications Policy for the Information Age 72-3 (Harvard University Press, 1994). 
44 Ibid. A two-person network connecting A and B charges each $1 for access. Assume that one unit of access costs 
$1 to supply. A third person, C, is added. Assume that A and B both value access to C at $0.4, and that C values access to A 
and B at $0.4 each also. C would therefore only be willing to pay $0.8 to join the network. A and B, on the other hand, would 
be willing to pay up to $1.4.  Brock shows that a price vector of $1.3, $1.3, $0.4 will induce all three to subscribe, exactly 
cover total costs, and make each person better off. If a unit of access costs $1 to supply, however, a competitor could 
undercut the incumbent’s price of $1.3 and offer service to C via interconnection. 
45 George Bartlett Prescott, The Electric Telephone 236 (Appleton 1890). 
46 Theodore N. Vail, AT&T Annual Report 17 (1907); Vail's views are discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
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such as a telephone set and a local line. Those investments supply a gateway or entry point into a 
network, allowing the user to consume a specific set of access services. As additional users join the 
same network, the number of access services available through those gateway facilities expands. That 
expansion of service may take place without any increase in the user's investment. Even if the rate paid 
for access goes up, the increase is likely to be less than what the user would have paid if access to the 
additional users was purchased separately. Thus, a demand-side economy of scope is realized: additional 
access units are acquired for a less than proportional increase in user payment. 
  
Conversely, the division of the market into fragmented competing networks can create demand-
side diseconomies of scope. Users whose desired calling partners are divided among two or more 
networks must invest in two or more gateway facilities and subscriptions if they want to maintain access 
to all of them. Those duplicate investments in access facilities may not be utilized as efficiently as they 
would be in an integrated system. Returning to the matrix model (Figure 3.1), imagine the costs a user 
would incur if each pairwise connection, each cell in the matrix, required a separate transaction between 
the two users involved, a separate pair of instruments, and a separate line. Even with comparatively 
small networks, the multiplication of access facilities would quickly become monstrously inefficient. 
Users achieve economies when access units are bundled together. 
 
Integrated networks almost certainly create some supply-side scope economies as well. But 
demand-side economies of scope can produce efficient user convergence on a single network even when 
the supply-side costs increase as users are added. That can be illustrated with a simple model (Figure 
3.6). In a population of N people, assume the cost per subscriber of supplying telephone service 
increases as the number of users approaches N. The population is evenly divided among two competing, 
incompatible networks. Both networks charge $5 per month for telephone service. Under those 
conditions, a user who wants access to every other user must purchase access to both systems. Thus, 
universal access costs $10 per month. Now suppose that the city convinces the two systems to 
consolidate their exchanges into a unified system. The additional costs created by enlarging the 
integrated system’s scope raise the monthly rate by 20 percent, to $6 per month. Although the rate goes 
up, the duplicate users have still realized a significant demand- side economy of scope. They now pay 
$4 less for universal access. Moreover, all users who wanted universal access but were unwilling to pay 
more than $6 for it have also benefitted from the consolidation. 
 
What was a paradox in natural monopoly theory is now easily explained: one telephone system 
can be more efficient than two, even when the per-user supply-side cost of one large system exceeds that 
of two or more smaller, competing systems. The model may make it appear as if a monopoly or a fully 
interconnected system is prima facie more efficient than the alternative. Not so; the realization of 
demand-side economies of scope in that simple example depended on two assumptions: 1) subscribers 
had to value access to all other subscribers more than the additional cost created by expanding the scope 
of the network; and 2) consolidation had to allow duplicate users to reduce the number of access lines 
they paid for. 
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FIGURE 3.5 
DEMAND-SIDE SCOPE ECONOMIES 
 
 
 
Empirically, either one of those assumptions may be untrue. With respect to 1), not everyone 
wants or needs a system that is universal in scope. Each individual's orders from the ‘menu’ offered by 
a universal telecommunications network are different, some being highly extended and others localized 
and restricted. Under those conditions the elimination of dual service may save money for some groups 
while raising the costs for many others. The model makes it clear that the distribution of the demand for 
access among users and the politics of the transition are important empirical is- sues. (Those questions 
will be explored in chapter 11, when the major urban consolidations of telephone exchanges are 
examined.) As for assumption 2), large businesses almost always require multiple access lines from the 
telephone company. Buying access from two competing networks would not necessarily constitute a 
waste under such circumstances, although it might be an inconvenience due to uncertainty about which 
one to use to reach specific parties. A company that ordered six access lines under dual service (say, two 
from one network and four from another) may still need six access lines from a consolidated system. 
Unless monopoly reduces the number of access lines needed, there is no demand-side economy of 
scope. (Empirical evidence about subscriber fragmentation and duplication patterns is explored in 
chapter 7.) 
 
It should also be noted that the existence of a monopoly can restrict the scope of communication 
as much as, if not more than, the fragmentation caused by competition. The monopoly can charge higher 
prices for access than it would if faced with competition. It may be unwilling or unable to raise the 
capital needed to expand as fast as the market demands, or unwilling to risk its money on marginal 
markets. In general, a system exempt from competitive pressures can be indifferent about increasing 
the scope of its service. 
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Interconnection of Competing Networks 
Thus far the analysis has assumed that competing networks are not interconnected. To 
contemporary readers, especially those familiar with current telecommunications policy, that perspective 
may seem strange, if not downright perverse. Contemporary regulations routinely require open 
interconnection and equal access. The obvious solution to the problems of access competition, so it 
would seem, is simply to interconnect the competing networks. That appears to retain the advantages of 
rivalry while eliminating the problems of imperfect substitution, diseconomies of scope for users, and 
the danger of eventual convergence on a monopoly. A reader familiar with that modem vantage point 
will immediately raise two pressing questions about the historical episode: 1) Why didn’t public officials 
mandate interconnection of the competitors rather than permitting access competition to proceed? 2) 
Why didn't they choose to achieve universal service by interconnecting the independents and Bell, 
instead of by consolidating the system into a monopoly? 
 
Those empirical questions can only be answered properly in the course of the historical 
exposition. The issue of how interconnection affects the competitive process is, however, relevant to the 
theoretical issues raised by that chapter, and are taken up now. 
 
Interconnection homogenizes access. It makes the scope of rival networks appear to users as 
identical, even though they are not. Thus, a firm can offer a substitute for one unit of access without 
offering a substitute for the entire network. To the customer, the access universe offered is the same, 
regardless. Users can choose, for example, the local access service of one company and the long-
distance service of another. By the same token, a competing network can benefit from the customer 
access created by a larger network’s facilities while invading only those markets that look profitable.  
Interconnected networks thus have a dual status: they are both complements and competitors. Part of 
their value is derived from their links to the other network, yet they present themselves to users as 
substitutes for each other. The long term effects of that process are still unknown, but theory would 
suggest that it encourages unbundling of the combination of access units making up the network, and 
discourages rate averaging and cross-subsidization among the units. It also – and that is the critical point 
– seriously undermines a network’s ability to appropriate the value of its scope. A network no longer 
gains a competitive advantage by maximizing its scope, nor can it maintain that price discrimination 
that will optimize the scope of the network. 
 
Far from being ignorant of that issue, the telephone companies, users, and municipal and state 
officials of the early competitive era showed an appreciation of the economic consequences of 
interconnection that was in many respects more sophisticated than today's reflexive support for it. 
The main reason access competition persisted was that both competing telephone interests supported 
it. Their reasoning is described in chapter 5 and chapter 8. Essentially, both wanted to appropriate the 
value of their networks, and both thought they had a chance to win the competition. Is their attitude 
any different from the current promoters of incompatible wireless telephone technologies, computer 
operating systems, or software applications? Clearly, in the developmental stages of a technology, 
different approaches to compatibility and interconnection seem appropriate. Also, at that period in 
history, the courts were more willing to accept appropriability-based arguments regarding the property 
rights of the telephone interests. 
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Aside from the legal barriers to compulsory interconnection, access competition was often 
supported or tolerated by the users and public officials because, at that time, access competition was 
synonymous with competition. Eliminating it via interconnection, they feared, would lead to a state of 
complementarity between the networks rather than true competition.47 Access competition was not an 
accident or a blunder. City councils deliberated for weeks or months before authorizing dual service 
competition. They were aware of the alternative of a single system. In the later stages of the competitive 
period, there were also experiments with interconnection of competing exchanges. The experiments 
tended to confirm the suspicion that competition would cease if rivalry over the scope of the network 
was eliminated (see chapter 9). 
 
Another important factor was the supply-side cost of interconnection. The network of the early 
1900s was not electronic and digital but a mixture of manual and electromechanical analogue. 
Interconnecting exchanges could not be accomplished automatically, by programming switches, but 
involved intricate coordination of the procedures of armies of operators. That cooperation would have to 
take place between business interests with a twenty-year history of hostility and cutthroat competition. 
Both interests expressed skepticism about the feasibility of such cooperation. Cities balked at its cost in 
large urban systems. Rather than imposing present-day preconceptions onto the past, that book takes 
access competition seriously as a historical phenomenon and attempts to explore its characteristics 
objectively. 
 
To conclude, I have argued that the output of a communication network is radically 
heterogeneous; i.e., that each connection between users must be considered a separate output, a distinct 
service. Increases in the number of users attached to a network increase its scope and generally its value 
to users. Competition over the scope of a network leads to an entirely different kind of business rivalry 
than competition between firms with outputs that are homogeneous and substitutable. The analysis 
explored some of the properties of that peculiar form of rivalry and gave it the label access competition. 
The concept of rivalry over the scope of two non-connected networks provides the theoretical 
infrastructure for the historical narrative. The Bell-independent rivalry is framed as a history of access 
competition. Many aspects of the outcome, including the achievement of a ubiquitous telephone 
infrastructure in the United States, can be attributed to the peculiar incentives generated by competition 
over the scope of a network. Likewise, the convergence of users on a single network or standard can be 
seen as a product of demand-side economies of scope. 
                                                 
47 Stehman, for example, knew that competing companies could be required to interconnect and exchange traffic. 
But he rejected that as an adequate solution to the problem of service unification. While it eliminated the barriers to 
communication created by competition, interconnection required the competing companies to make joint financial 
arrangements and to work so closely together that the result was tantamount to monopoly anyway. Stehman 234 (1925). 
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PROLOGUE: TELEPHONE DEVELOPMENT BEFORE COMPETITION 
 
 
COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT of the telephone business began in 1877. From 1878 to 
1880, there was a brief bout of competition when the Western Union telegraph company 
attempted to enter the business using instruments invented by Thomas Edison and Elisha Gray. 
Bell sued Western Union for patent infringement, however, and won a settlement from the 
powerful telegraph firm. The agreement cemented Bell's control of the business from 1880 until 
1894, when the last patent protecting Bell's original invention expired.48 
 
Fourteen years of monopoly set the stage for the superheated rivalry that followed in three 
distinct ways. First, the Bell organization fought an unrelenting legal battle to preserve its patent 
monopoly, despite numerous indications that the demand for telephones was not being met. 
Second, growth of the system led to rate increases, leading to continual conflict with the public. 
Finally, the Bell interests, with Vail as the chief articulator of strategy, took a nationwide systems 
approach to telephone development, an approach modeled after its historical predecessor, the 
telegraph. That particular vision of universal service left huge pockets of demand unmet. 
                                                 
48 In the out-of-court settlement of November 1879, Western Union agreed to withdraw from the telephone 
business for seventeen years, to sell its exchanges to the Bell Co., to transfer all telephone-related patents to Bell, and to 
pay 20 percent of the cost of any new Bell telephone patents for seventeen years. Bell agreed to stay out of the 
telegraph business, and to forward to Western Union all requests for telegraph service that came through its exchanges, 
and to pay Western Union 20 percent of its rental on telephones. FCC Telephone Investigation 124 (1939). 
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A  Legacy of Suppression 
The Bell patents did not automatically give it a monopoly. Alternative companies sprang 
up like crabgrass all through the 1880s, and Bell had to actively suppress them. The usurpers could 
be small, local enterprises or nationally organized stock promotions. Any inventor, backyard 
mechanic or charlatan who claimed to have invented a telephone could and did serve as the front 
men for entrepreneurs who needed a patent to enter the business. 49  The telephone instrument 
was a fairly simple and inexpensive device to make once the principle of voice transmission by 
electrical analogue was under- stood. 
 
The real subject of that litigation was not who invented the telephone but who would get to 
profit from its commercial development. The high price of Bell telephones aroused the enmity of 
many subscribers and the avarice of many a potential competitor. A rival patent claim, no matter 
how spurious, gave promoters the pretext they needed to organize a company, sell stock, and begin 
to install lines and phones.50  And there was always the chance that their claims might be sustained 
by the courts. Not until 1887, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the controlling nature of Bell’s 
patents in a case combining many challenges to his rights, was the issue clearly settled. In the 
interim, the electrical journals of the 1880s routinely published notices of non-Bell telephone 
companies being formed-and of their closure after a few months for infringing the Bell patents.51 
 
Two specific cases from the mid-1880s illustrate the nature and consequences of that 
strategy of suppression.  In May, 1884, two promoters paid $15,000 for the telephone patents of 
one Dr. Myron L. Baxter and formed the Baxter Overland Telephone and Telegraph Company in 
the city of Utica, New York. By October of that year the Baxter Company was operating a 
telephone exchange with 300 subscribers, and had built up the physical capacity to serve 800. 
Whatever the merits of Dr. Baxter’s patent, the operating company was not a fly-by-night stock 
promotion scheme but a serious effort to provide telephone exchange service.52 When the Bell 
exchange began to lose subscribers the Baxter exchange was shut down by an infringement suit. 
 
At about the same time, an Indiana fanner named John Crump obtained non-Bell telephones 
from Canada and set up a private line between his house and the home of one of his tenants on an 
adjoining farm.53 Crump was not selling telephones or telephone service – the line was for his own 
personal use. There was no Bell line or exchange anywhere near him. Had he gone to the nearest 
Bell licensee for his phones he would have had to pay $100 a year to lease them, and he still would 
                                                 
49 The conflicting patent claims are covered in detail in Robert Bruce, BELL: Alexander Graham Bell and the 
Conquest of Solitude (Little, Brown 1973). 
50 The importance of making and defending patent claims is clarified by George Smith’s observation: “Typical 
of  the organization of  all  the major firms in the electrical  industries, telegraph and telephone company organization 
crystallized around patent rights, and so whoever desired to enter or sustain business in either field had to come to 
terms with the holders of significant patents… Survival (in this as well as in most emerging high-technology businesses 
of the era) required almost obsessive attention to patent claims wherever they arose.”  Smith, The Anatomy of a 
Business Strategy, 9 (Jolms Hopkins AT&T Series in Telephone History 1985). 
51 Harry B. MacMeal, The Story of Independent Telephony 27-29 (Independent Pioneer Telephone Association 
1934). 
52 The construction and service quality of the new Company were reputed to be exceptional. and its rates were 
less than half those charged by Bell. Ibid at 43. 
53 13 Telephony 92 (Feb. 1907). 
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have had to set up the line at his own expense. Nevertheless, Crump was soon visited by Bell 
agents who warned him that he was in violation of the law and confiscated his telephones. 
 
Examples such as those could be multiplied. Throughout the 1880s, scores of local and 
national business interests had been willing and able to compete with Bell in the supply of 
telephone equipment and service. Farmers had always been eager to take the technology into 
their own hands. For fourteen years those forces of spontaneous development were held in check 
by injunctions, fines, and confiscations. The expiration of the Bell patents should not be viewed as 
the beginning of the competitive movement; it was more like the disintegration of a dike that for 
many years had protected the Boston corporation from a raging flood. 
 
The suppression of independent activity prior to patent expiration also helps to explain the 
ideologically charged character of the later rivalry. Here was a distant, impersonal corporation 
growing rich by maintaining a legal stranglehold on a popular, useful device. The scenario could 
not have corresponded better with the archetypes of Evil promoted by populism. The publicity 
organs of the independent movement ceaselessly reminded their readers of what it was like in the 
bad old days of monopoly. Even the names of the early legal independents often mirrored those of 
the suppressed companies of the 1880s: the Peoples Telephone Co., the Citizens Co., etc. 
 
The experience also deeply impressed itself upon the attitudes of the national Bell 
Company. As one independent propagandist put it,  after fifteen years of skirmishes with patent 
violators, Bell management “had  come to believe, and believe honestly, that anyone who 
attempted to enter the telephone field, no matter through what gate, was a lawbreaker – an infringer 
– an interloper.”54 Bell's refusal to interconnect with the independents in the 1890s, and the 
independents’ response in kind, was in part a reflection of that hostility. 
Rate Wars 
Bell's successful defense of its patent gave it the power to make monopoly profits on its 
telephones. The national company was not bashful about exploiting that power. It required its 
licensees to lease rather than buy the telephones manufactured by its Western Electric subsidiary at 
an annual charge of $14 for each set. Since the machinery itself cost about $4 to make, American 
Bell guaranteed itself large profits on every telephone in service. As protected monopolies, the 
operating companies were able to recover those costs in their subscription rates. The instrument 
lease price paid to American Bell accounted for one-fourth to one-half of the subscription price in 
small and medium-sized exchanges. 
 
Bell's attempt to reap monopoly profits on telephones fueled public suspicions that the 
company was gouging its captive market. But the price of the telephones themselves was only one 
source of discontent over rates. Far more important in the long run was that the licensee companies' 
operating costs steadily increased through- out the 1880s. The resulting rate increases were not 
abuses of monopoly power but were legitimately rooted in the economic and technical 
characteristics of the telephone exchange. 
                                                 
54 Paul A. Latzke. A Fight with an Octopus (Telephony Press 1906). 
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In 1877 Bell managers had assumed that the local companies were basically in the business 
of leasing telephones. The telephone did not catch on, however, until the development of exchange 
service. As switching became more important, the licensees' functions changed. They became 
operating companies with a large labor force and huge investments in switchboards and outside 
wires and cables. As the business underwent that transition, Bell managers made a disturbing 
discovery: the average costs of telephone exchanges increased as they grew. Most companies 
charged flat yearly rates of $20 to $40. Like their subscribers, Bell managers had expected their 
operations to realize economies of scope as more sub- scribers joined the exchange. In fact, the 
reverse was true.55 
 
By 1881, Bell managers had come to a rather grim conclusion: expansion had to be 
accompanied by rate increases. Only three or four of the more than 300 exchanges in operation in 
1881 were able to pay for themselves at then-existing rates.56 Rates would have to be raised “for 
our self-preservation, even though it places us in the light of a monopoly taking advantage of its 
position.”57 In noting that it would probably be necessary to raise rates $5 for every 100 new 
subscribers, one Bell exchange manager warned: “any system which does not provide for that 
expansion is going to be involved in continual conflict with the public.”58 
 
What was intended to be a warning turned out to be a prophecy. The need for growth-
induced rate increases did involve the Bell companies in “continual conflict with the public” 
throughout the 1880s. Users responded to higher prices with outrage and frustration.  They 
expected a bigger exchange to offer lower rates, as in any other normal business endeavor. With no 
alternative to the Bell Company, they felt helpless and exploited as rates went up. 
 
The public responded first with boycotts, then with attempts to control rates by legislation. 
Neither technique gave the telephone-using public the kind of redress it desired. Boycotts were a 
costly and ultimately ineffective weapon. Legislation was too clumsy, arbitrary and drastic. In that 
context, the idea of starting an alternative telephone company backed by local capital and managed 
by local businesspeople looked very attractive. As noted earlier, hundreds of localities chose that 
option during the 1880s in flagrant disregard of its illegality. Most, however, were forced to 
acknowledge that any conceivable form of competition would infringe the Bell patents. So the local 
telephone users swallowed their frustration, paid their bills, and looked ahead to a time when 
challenges to the monopoly would be legal. 
 
The link between exchange growth and rising costs would return to haunt Bell’s 
competitors. Independent exchanges found it easy to undercut Bell rates when they first entered the 
field. They soon attracted so many customers, however, that their unit costs increased. Because 
many localities conceived of competition as a method of rate regulation, they wrote provisions 
fixing rates into the new company's franchise. As the independent grew, it was forced either to lose 
                                                 
55 National Telephone Exchange Association Convention Number 3 (1881), Minutes, 46. AT&T-BLA. 
56 National Telephone Exchange Association Convention Number 2 (1880), Minutes, 137, AT&T-BLA. 
57 Edward J. Hall, Minutes of the National Telephone Exchange Association Convention Number 2 (1880), p. 
119. 
58 Ibid. 
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money or to ask for a rate increase, thus reneging on its promises and calling into question what 
many citizens saw as the justification for its existence. 
One System, One Policy… 
Conflicts over rates, service, and patent infringement all contributed to the simmering 
public resentment on which the independent movement capitalized. But two other factors, 
pertaining to the organization and goals of the Bell system itself, were equally important in setting 
the stage for the competitive struggle. Those were, first, the national Company’s contractual 
relations with its local operating companies, which were consciously designed to protect its control 
of the business by weaving its members into an integrated system; and second, the Bell Company’s 
vision of the telephone system as a substitute for the telegraph system-a network of voice 
communication designed to serve business users in the principal towns and cities. The development 
plan that flowed from that vision left most of America without telephones or exchanges. 
 
Theodore Vail was the general manager of the national Bell Telephone organization from 
1878 to 1887. He later returned as the president of AT&T from 1907 to 1919. Looking back on 
those early years of the Bell System after it had weathered fifteen years of competition Vail 
claimed that the Bell System had been organized to achieve universal service all along. “The Bell 
System was founded on the broad lines of ‘One System,’ ‘One Policy,’ ‘Universal Service,’” he 
wrote in AT&T's 1909 Annual Report.59 Around 1918 he made the same claim even more 
emphatically. “From the commencement of the business,” he wrote, “one system, one policy, 
universal service is branded on the business in the most distinctive terms.”60 
 
What did Vail mean by that claim? Did he mean, as some modern observers might think, 
that the Bell system intended to put a telephone in every home and an exchange in every 
community? That question can be answered in a way that leaves little room for doubt. The behavior 
of the Bell system during the monopoly period defeats any attempt to read a modern conception of 
universal service into Vail’s pronouncements. By ‘One System, One Policy,’ Vail meant that Bell 
intended to establish a centrally coordinated monopoly. By ‘Universal Service’ he meant that Bell 
aimed at a nationally integrated system whose subscribers could all talk to each other.61 The model 
for that concept was the telegraph industry, which was also both monopolistic and nationally 
integrated at the time, although far from universal in the sense of reaching into every household. 
As general manager, Vail consciously pursued a vision of a nationwide, fully interconnected 
system.  Vail's intentions were clearly revealed during his involvement in the negotiation of the 
patent settlement with Western Union. Which company would control toll lines was a major source 
of contention between the two parties. Western Union wanted Bell to confine itself to the local 
exchange business and allow the telegraph company to control all interexchange connections. 
Vail’s biographer credits him with adamantly rejecting that proposition and insisting on Bell’s right 
to construct and operate long distance lines.62  The contracts defining the relationship between the 
national Bell organization and its licensed operating companies provide even stronger evidence of 
                                                 
59 Theodore Vail, AT&T Annual Report 18 (1909). 
60 Gerald Brock, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, 102 (Harvard University Press 1981). 
61 Chapter 8 contains a more extensive discussion of Vail's usage of those terms and their meaning. 
62 Albert Bigelow Paine, IN ONE MAN'S LIFE (Prentice Hall 1920). 
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the nature of Vail’s vision. The Boston headquarters did not have the capital or the ability to 
construct and operate exchanges directly throughout a country as vast as the United States. It relied 
instead on franchise-like agreements to develop the business. Local operating companies were 
licensed to lease telephones, raise capital and build and operate exchanges in an exclusive territory. 
Those contracts were drawn up under Vail’s direction and constitute his most important 
accomplishment as general manager. 63 
 
Vail’s license contracts were shrewd attempts to reconcile the need for integrated 
development with the fact that the system’s actual operations were being conducted by many 
separate, semi-autonomous companies.64 The controlling nature of the Bell patents was of course 
the bedrock on which Vail's system of organization rested, for there was no other legal supplier of 
telephones. In return for the right to lease telephones, the exclusive Bell licensee in a territory 
agreed to certain conditions, the intent of which was to bind them to the national Bell organization 
far beyond the life of the patents themselves. One of the key features of that contract was the parent 
company’s reservation of long-distance interconnection rights. As Vail said in 1918, “it gave us 
control of the connection of every exchange under license with the outside…. [W]e believed that no 
exchange could exist without being more or less tied up with the others…”65 Any licensee 
company that attempted to break away from the Bell system could be isolated by its inability to 
connect with any of the surrounding Bell exchanges. That was in fact the same method Western 
Union had used to achieve its dominance of the industry, as Vail certainly knew. 
 
Vail’s organization, in short, was designed to create a unified system, impervious to 
fragmentation and competition, and capable of providing an end-to-end communications pathway 
between all of its customers. Monopoly control and universal interconnection were strongly linked, 
mutually reinforcing categories in his mind: the conditions which led to one necessarily led to the 
other. The supply of systemic interconnection required centralized control. Systemic 
interconnection, however, was not merely a product to be offered to customers-it was itself a 
powerful lever by which Bell’s control of the telephone business could be maintained against 
centrifugal or competitive forces. 
 
Universal service, in the sense of service everywhere, to everyone, is not the same as 
universal interconnection within a system. A system can be universal in the latter sense while being 
very restricted in scope. In fact, the phrase “universal service” never appeared in any Bell 
documents until 1907, the peak of the independents’ strength, and by that time the scope and usage 
of the telephone had been transformed so profoundly that the concept of a universal system had 
taken on a meaning far different from what Vail had meant when he spoke of a “grand telephonic 
system” in 1878. 
 
                                                 
63 See Robert Garnet, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE (Johns Hopkins AT&T Series in Telephone History 
1985) for a detailed history of the license contracts. 
64 “...the Bell policy was to establish the business on the same lines as if it was done direct by the company 
with its own lines, only substituting a corporation with its Manager ... performing the duties of a District Manager.” 
Theodore Vail. cited in BROCK, supra note  21, at 102. See also Garnet, supra note 24, at 70. 
65 Testimony of Theodore N. Vail, Read et al v. Central Union Telephone Co., Superior Court of Cook 
County, Illinois, Chancery General No. 299,689, p.l086. 
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What Vail had in mind during those early years was not the ‘universal service’ of 1907, 
much less the ubiquitous network of 1990. The closest model was the telegraph system of the 
1870s – a nationwide, business-oriented message communications network linking terminals in all 
the principal commercial centers.66 The telephone would reach largely the same people and places, 
but improve the efficiency and speed of communication by relying on direct conversation instead of 
written messages and the mediation of telegraph operators. As K. Lipartito observed, Bell 
managers’ idea of what telephone users wanted was based on an “image of a world of businessmen, 
engineers, and professionals communicating about technical matters with peers with whom they 
were not intimately acquainted. Such a world demanded a high-quality long-distance system 
because its residents had many and distant correspondents and contacts.”67 
 
That this was the model on which his vision was based is, to borrow Vail’s words, “branded 
on the business in the most distinctive terms” if one looks at the pattern of development taken by 
the system in its first two decades. In 1894 after seventeen years of commercial development, the 
Bell Company had installed only 240,000 telephones, one for every 225 people in the United 
States. 85 to 90 percent of those phones were in businesses.68 The remaining telephones were 
generally in the homes of businesspeople who wanted to be able to communicate with their offices 
from their residences. A noted Bell agent often assessed the demand for ex- changes in smaller 
towns by examining its commercial register.69 
 
Of course, many new technologies “trickle down” from business to the home as their costs 
decrease. But in the case of the Bell system, the overwhelming predominance of business users 
reflected a deliberate policy, a specific vision of what the telephone was for and who would be 
interested in using it. From the beginning, Vail was committed to matching the telegraph network 
in geographic scope, even though voice transmission over long distances posed enormous, 
unprecedented technical challenges. (The goal of transcontinental voice transmission was not 
reached until 1915.) Most of the money in telegraphy was made in intercity communication. If the 
telephone could supersede district telegraphy in local communications, would it not be even more 
profitable to replace telegraphy's hold over long-distance business communications? 
 
                                                 
66 The telephone operated in an environment dominated by telegraphy for its first twenty years, fulfilling the 
role of adjunct to, complement of, or substitute for its predecessor. History of Engineering and Science in the Bell 
System, Vol. I, 489 (M.D. Fagen, ed. AT&T 1975). See also Joel Tarr, Thomas Finholt & David Goodman, The City 
and the Telegraph: Urban Telecommunications in the Pre-telephone Era, 14 Journal of Urban History 38-80 (Nov. 
l987). 
67 Kenneth Lipartito, The Bell System and Regional Business 92 (Johns Hopkins AT&T Series on Telephone 
History 1989). 
68 A detailed breakdown of subscriber categories in the Buffalo, New York exchange in 1892 is contained in 
the transcript of the Third AT&T Switchboard Committee Meeting, New York, March 15-18, 1892, p.276-77. 
Residential telephones make up 289 of the total 1,850 stations in the city. The rest are in business offices of various 
types. By 1907, in contrast, residential telephones comprised 50 to 60 percent of the total in the cities, and a larger 
portion in the rural areas. 
69 In describing his methods for assessing the most promising places for small exchanges, Thomas Doolittle of 
AT&T wrote, “Reference was had to Bradstreet or Dun's Commercial Registers, which disclosed the invested capital or 
what might be called the commercial standing of each place.” Doolittle, 1906 Annual Report, 17, Box 2020, AT&T-
BLA. 
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Until 1889, local and long-distance telephone services were literally two separate, stand-
alone systems. Local exchanges relied on cheaper Blake transmitters and iron, grounded circuits, 
equipment with a speaking range of about 50 miles. The toll network used circuits of copper 
twisted pair (known at the time as “metallic” circuits, to distinguish them from grounded circuits) 
and a more powerful transmitter capable of transmitting speech 800 miles. A subscription to the 
long-distance service, which was always purchased separately, cost about 35 percent more than the 
local service. AT&T soon discovered, however, that the development of the toll business was being 
retarded by its separation from the local exchange business. Most customers did not subscribe to 
the more expensive long-distance service and therefore were largely inaccessible to the users of the 
toll network in other cities. In order to increase the utility of the system as a long-distance network, 
Bell in 1889 decided to integrate local and long-distance telephony.70  That was to be accomplished 
by upgrading the local exchanges to the transmission standards of the long-distance system. 
Henceforth, all circuits would be metallic and only the high-quality instruments would be used. In 
that case, the goal of complete system interconnection conflicted with the goal of encouraging 
local telephone use by larger numbers of people. The decision encouraged intercity 
communication at the expense of local use.71 
 
The model of intercity business communications is also implicit in the Bell System’s 
decisions about where to put exchanges. The United States in 1890 was still a predominantly rural 
nation. Over 60 percent of its population lived in towns with less than 2,500 people, or on farms. 
The Bell network unambiguously ignored that majority and cast its lot in with urban America. 
There were more than 7,000 incorporated towns with populations under 10,000 in 1884, and the 
Bell system had established exchanges in only 52 of them. By 1895, rural penetration had 
improved, but the urban bias was still marked.  The 346 largest cities, representing only 27 percent 
of the U.S. population, possessed 83 percent of the nation’s telephones (see table 3-1). In that, Bell 
was simply following the developmental trajectory of the telegraph system, which began by linking 
urban centers and gradually extended itself to smaller and smaller towns. 
 
Table 4.1 
Telephone Penetration by Community Size, 1895 
 
Population level # of places % with telephone 
exchanges 
% of Bell 
subscribers 
% of US 
population 
50,000 + 52 100% 50% 18% 
10-50,000 294 98% 33% 9% 
2,500-10,000 1150 49% 14% 9% 
Rural -- -- 3% 63% 
Source: 1900 Census, Exchange Statistics, AT&T-Bell Labs Archives 
 
Apologists for the Bell system often claim that rural areas were ignored because they were 
more expensive to serve. But in the 1880s and 1890s, the truth was almost the opposite of that. The 
                                                 
70 Hibbard, Pickernell & Carty, AT&T, “The New Era in Telephony.” Address before the National Telephone 
Exchange Association Convention No. 9, 1889, 35. AT&T-BLA. 
71 David Gabel, Technological Change, Contracting and the First Divestiture of AT&T (unpublished ms, Jan. 
12, 1989). 
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cheapest and least technically demanding course of action would have been to establish many 
small, local exchanges in the small and medium-sized towns. The equipment needed to provide that 
kind of service was fully developed and easy to mass produce. By contrast, the growth of 
exchanges in urban centers constantly posed new technical problems in switching, signaling, 
operation, and maintenance. Also, because of the diseconomies of growth associated with large 
exchanges, small-scale development would have required less capital investment and fewer 
workers per subscriber and less complex management practices. 
 
Bell was clearly bent on another task. It was responding to a specific kind of demand for 
telephone service: the demand of urban businesses for voice telephony as a substitute for, and 
improvement upon, the nationwide telegraph infrastructure. It therefore left untapped a huge 
reservoir of public demand for local exchange service. Thousands of farm communities and small 
towns had no telephone exchange, and those communities embodied precisely those conditions 
which made entry into the telephone business easiest. The small, local exchanges they wanted 
required only modest levels of capital investment and technical expertise. There were also hundreds 
of larger cities in which the demand for purely local telephone service had been retarded, partly by 
Bell’s monopoly prices and partly by its preoccupation with a grander vision of what telephone 
service could be. 
 
Vail was at least partially right; a peculiar vision of universal service had informed the Bell 
system almost from its inception. But that was not universal service as we know it today, implying 
widespread household penetration and an effort to make telephone access available everywhere, to 
everyone. It meant, instead, a commitment to provide nationwide voice communication to business, 
even if that meant completely neglecting service to rural areas, local exchange service to 
households and short-distance toll connections. The Bell managers would soon discover, however, 
that their attempt to cultivate one grand system had left open enormous, fertile expanses where 
hundreds of smaller ones could grow. 
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ACCESS COMPETITION BEGINS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
RATIONALES FOR NON-CONNECTION 
 
 
ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL'S patent on the telephone receiver lapsed on January 30, 1894. 
Almost immediately, an independent telephone movement with its own operating companies, 
equipment manufacturers, publications and trade associations took shape.  By 1897, both the 
Bell and the organized independent interests had decided to conduct their rivalry as separate, 
closed systems, with the subscribers of one unable to place calls to the subscribers of the other. 
 
Although price competition was often foremost in the minds of contemporaries, it was 
access competition that established the distinctive economic, political and social parameters of 
the contest and had the most far-reaching effects. One cannot understand the business strategies of 
the two interests, the rate policies and practices that were adopted, the reasons for the growth 
and eventual decline of competition, or the problems that ultimately had to be addressed by 
regulators without reference to the fact that two mutually exclusive networks were at war with 
each other. 
 
Surprisingly, not a single published work on the history of the telephone in the United 
States investigates the reasoning behind either sides’ decision to pursue access competition or the 
legal context in which that decision was made. Why weren't the two interests required to connect, 
and how was the decision not to exchange traffic justified? This chapter attempts to fill that gap 
in the literature. 
 
The eruption of access competition was the cumulative product of three factors. One was 
the business policy of the Bell system. The Bell organization had always intended to maintain 
absolute control over its own system and thus resisted any attempts to make it cooperate with 
outsiders. A second factor was the prevailing interpretation of common carrier law, which 
militated against legislative attempts to compel interconnection. Third, and equally important, was 
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the development of a consensus among the independents themselves that interconnection was not 
a desirable goal. The independents came to see themselves as a mutually exclusive enterprise, a 
nationwide movement bent on displacing the Bell monopoly rather than coexisting with it. 
Bell policy on interconnection 
From 1893 to 1897, some independent exchange operators requested physical connections 
with Bell toll lines so that their subscribers could speak to telephone users in other cities.72  The 
early demands for interconnection took two distinct forms. First, there were formal requests for 
the installation of a trunk line connection between Bell and independent exchanges. The 
independent might propose to extend a line into a Bell exchange at its own expense, and offer to 
pay a toll or some division of toll revenue for  each incoming or outgoing call.73   In other 
cases, a competing independent exchange would simply subscribe to the Bell exchange and 
install the telephone in its own central office. 74 Then it would either orally relay messages 
between independent and Bell subscribers or, what was more significant and dangerous from 
Bell's point of view, physically connect the subscriber line into its own switchboard. In the first 
case, the demand was for  a joint operating agreement that would enable Bell and the 
independent to exchange traffic at prescribed rates. The second tactic effectively erased the 
boundaries between the Bell and independent exchanges, allowing the independent to offer 
access to Bell subscribers without paying anything more than the regular subscription price. 
 
A typical request for trunk line interconnection was made late in 1894 in Mt.  Sterling, 
Kentucky, a small town about thirty miles from Lexington.  The manager of the independent 
exchange there wrote a cordial letter to the manager of the Bell licensee in that area proposing 
to build a line to the nearest Bell exchange so that his subscribers would be able to call 
Lexington over Bell toll lines. If necessary, the independent manager would build his own toll 
line to Lexington, but he preferred that the Bell Company "run a line right into our central 
office, and let us transmit your business for you and increase your business here.”75 
 
When the operating companies referred those requests to the national organization, they 
were invariably informed that licensee companies were not permitted to connect with 
"opposition" companies, nor could they permit opposition companies to forward messages over 
their lines.76 That  blunt dismissal was both predictable and logical. While joint operating 
agreements with the independents might have been mutually beneficial in isolated instances, their 
                                                 
72 "We are frequently asked by parties who have organized opposition companies what arrangements they could make to connect with 
our toll lines." O.E. Noel, President and General Manager, East Tennessee Telephone Co.,  to C. Jay French, General Manager, 
ABT Co., Dec. 10, 1894. Box 1066, AT&T-BLA. 
 
73 The Mt. Sterling independent operator offered to let Bell build a line into his exchange and pay a small toll for the use of the 
line by his subscribers. Letter reproduced in Noel to French, Dec. 10, 1894. Box 1066, AT&T-BLA. 
74 See, for example, C.A.  Nicholson, General Manager, Central New York Telephone Co., to C. Jay French, ABT Co., 
Apr. 6, 1898: "Application is made to us by the opposition at Baldwinsville and Oneida for exchange connection, telephones to be 
placed in the Central Offices of the opposition companies at these points . . . . Under [the Bell] Exchange Contract can we 
discriminate against their customers forwarding messages to points on our trunk lines?" Box 1166, AT&T-BLA. 
75 Ibid. 
76 C. Jay French to O.E.  Noel, "Business in connection with opposition enterprises," undated draft, Box 1066, AT&T-
BLA. 
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overall effect would have been to completely unravel Vail's plan of organization. In effect, 
interconnection would have made independent companies part of the Bell system without their 
having to sign a license contract. Thus, Bell would have been helping to build up telephone 
companies over which it had no financial, managerial or technical control.  Independent 
connecting companies could not be required to buy Western Electric equipment; nothing could 
guarantee that they would route their toll traffic over Bell lines; nothing could prevent them 
from later building their own, competing toll lines or competing exchanges. Later on, the task of 
technically integrating and organizing long-distance connections would have been greatly 
complicated. American Bell saw the license contract as the  only  way  to  maintain  an  integrated  
system  under  its  control-and integration was also the bulwark of its strategy to control the 
telephone business itself. Now that the patents had expired, interconnection was the only way to 
induce operating companies to become Bell licensees. Bell management really had no choice but 
to resist these early, casual attempts to integrate its operations with independent companies. To do 
otherwise would have corroded the foundations on which its whole organization was based. 
 
The Kentucky case, moreover, demonstrates clearly the economic consequences of the two 
approaches to interconnection. Had the independent been allowed to interconnect, it would have 
had no need to build an additional, competing toll line to Lexington. The two companies would 
have settled into a pattern of complementarity rather than competition. With interconnection 
denied, the opposition companies had to build their own facilities in order to match the scope 
of telephone access available through Bell. Refusal to interconnect was "anti-competitive" only 
in the sense that it prevented new companies from benefitting from the access facilities of the 
incumbent. In a far more meaningful sense, however, it was the refusal to connect that 
encouraged robust competition, because it impelled Bell's  rivals to set up lines and exchanges 
that duplicated or,  when possible, surpassed Bell's,  and thereby allowed for more complete 
competition for subscribers and traffic. 
Interconnection and common carrier law 
When it became clear that overtures for voluntary interconnection would be spurned, some 
independents turned to the courts and the legislatures. Legal maneuvering over interconnection 
rights peaked in March of 1896, when three separate lawsuits pertaining to interconnection 
consumed the attention of the national Bell management. 
 
The telephone was already regarded as a common carrier cast in the same general mold 
as the telegraph and railroad companies. The law regarding the relations between competing 
telephone companies was still unclear, however. The technical characteristics of the business 
differed enough to make the application of statutes and case law based on railroad and 
telegraph precedents less than obvious. It was true, for example, that state laws required 
telegraph companies to accept and deliver messages brought to them by other telegraph 
companies.77 Early telephone interconnection bills in Michigan (1893), Ohio (1895), Indiana 
(1895), Illinois (1897), and Wisconsin (1897) seemed to have been drafted with those precedents 
                                                 
77 A typical nondiscrimination statute, Section 103 of the New York state Transportation Corporations Law read: “Every 
such [telephone] corporation shall receive dispatches from and for other...telephone lines or corporations…and on payment of the 
usual charges by individuals for transmitting dispatches as established by the rules and regulations of such corporation transmit the 
same.” The use of the terms “dispatches” or “ messages” in these laws shows the extent to which the telephone business was 
viewed as an extension of the telegraph business. In reality, telephone companies were in the business of providing circuits for real-
time voice communication rather than discrete "messages.” 
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in mind.78  But the transfer of telegraph messages did not necessitate physically linking and 
jointly operating the competing companies' wires. All it required was a willingness to accept a 
hard copy message from one company for transmission at the second company's convenience. 
Telephonic communication, on the other hand, involved a real-time link between two parties 
and thus would have necessitated integrating the facilities and operations of rival companies. 
 
Some proponents of interconnection sought to base their claims on the common carrier 
status of railroad, telegraph, and telephone companies. Common carriers  were required to serve 
all members of  the public without discrimination. If the concept of nondiscrimination could be 
stretched to include service to competing companies, it could form the legal rationale for 
interconnection. Rivalry between separate systems had existed for some time in both the telegraph 
and railroad industries, however, and the courts had drawn a fairly sharp distinction between 
nondiscriminatory service to the general public, an obligation which was clearly imposed by the 
law, and contracts with connecting companies, where special arrangements favoring one company 
over another were considered normal prerogatives of business management. 
 
The most salient precedent was provided by the railroad Express cases, a decision made 
by the U.S.  Supreme Court in 1886. The case involved “express” services, companies which 
contracted with railroads to provide intermediary shipping services.  The express companies 
assembled components of the various rail networks to provide through service to shippers. In an 
attempt to obtain what might today be called "equal access" to competing railroad facilities, 
various express companies sued the railroads, and the cases were tried together. The express 
companies were unsuccessful. In denying their attempt to compel the railroads to give them 
throughline facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis, Chief Justice Waite distinguished between 
common carriers and a “common carrier of common carriers.”79 The railroads were required to 
be the former but not the latter; that is, they had an obligation to provide nondiscriminatory 
service to the public, but not necessarily to other common carriers. In a case based on the 
Express precedent, Judge Waite's opinion held: 
 
Now while the rule is well settled that a common carrier must serve its public 
impartially, still it must be borne in mind that its duty is to the public, and not to 
other and competing common carriers.  One common carrier cannot demand as a 
right that it be permitted to use a rival common carrier's property for the benefit of 
its own business.80 
 
The Supreme Court applied a similar distinction to the telegraph industry in 1887. 
Compulsory connections that allowed one company's facilities to be occupied or used for the 
commercial benefit of a rival company were rejected as a "taking" of private property, prohibited 
by the Fifth Amendment.  Nondiscrimination, the court ruled, 
                                                 
78 None of the physical connection bills listed in the text passed. 
79 “The constitution and the laws of the states in which the [rail]roads are situated place the companies that own and 
operate them on the footing of common carriers, but there is nothing which in positive terms requires a railroad company to carry 
all express companies in the way that under some circumstances they may be able, without inconvenience, to carry one company.” 
The Express Cases, 117 U.S. 601 (1886). 
80 Postal Telegraph Cable Co.  v. Hudson River Telephone Co., 467 Supreme Court (1887). 
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Does not authorize [the plaintiff] to transmit its own messages over defendant's 
wires, on payment of the merely nominal sum required of its ordinary subscribers. 
Such a rule would result unjustly to the defendant, as it would enable the [plaintiff] 
to enter into competition with the defendant in the transmission of messages over 
its own wires.”81 
 
Despite these favorable legal precedents, the Bell Company had no guarantees as to how the 
law would be interpreted in the case of telephone interconnection. 
 
The first legal challenge came from a financially shaky independent, the National 
Telephone Construction Co. of Waukesha, Wisconsin. The National Co. exchange had attracted 
about 75 subscribers.82 In the f all of 1895, the Wisconsin Telephone Company discovered that 
the independent, which subscribed to Bell’s long distance service, had linked the Bell line to its 
switchboard so as to allow its exchange subscribers to be patched into the Bell toll network.83 
When Wisconsin Telephone threatened to remove its phone and discontinue service, the National 
Company filed suit and succeeded in obtaining an injunction. "This will evidently be a test 
case,” a Wisconsin Telephone official wrote to American Bell, “and will have great weight in 
similar proceedings which must arise elsewhere.”84 
 
While the Waukesha case was pending, the Norwalk Telephone Company, an 
independent exchange competing with the Bell Company in Norwalk, an Ohio town of 7,000, 
submitted a notice to the Central Union Company (the Bell licensee in the Midwest) requesting 
permission to build a trunk line connecting its exchange with the Central Union's. The letter was 
“carefully and formally drafted, with legal skill for its purpose,” Central Union's lawyer 
observed. “It is of value in showing on what lines the attack on us in Ohio may be expected to 
come.”85 News that this gauntlet had been thrown down soon reached President Hudson in 
Boston, who went about securing the best legal assistance available.86 
 
Simultaneous to the Norwalk case, an independent exchange in Madison, Wisconsin, sued 
the Western Union telegraph company in an attempt to compel it to place one of its telephones in 
the Madison telegraph office.87 Wisconsin Telephone (the Bell licensee) already had a telephone 
in the Western Union office, allowing it to call in messages to be sent over telegraph lines. The 
cooperative arrangement between Bell and Western Union was a product of the 1879 patent 
settlement.  Because telegraphy was still a far more prominent mode of communication than the 
telephone at that time, the Madison independent’s inability to place calls to the Western Union 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 The telephones of the Waukesha independent were reputed to be of poor quality and its service unreliable. W.A. 
Jackson, Wisconsin Telephone Co., to John Hudson, President, ABT Co., Nov. 13, 1895. Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
83 Miller, Noyes, Miller & Wahl to ABT Co., Nov.  12, 1895, Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
84 W.A. Jackson to C.J. French, Oct. 7, 1895, Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
85 A.A. Thomas, Solicitor, to H.B. Stone, President, Central Union Telephone Co., Jan. 2, 1896. Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
86 Melville Egleston, AT&T Legal Department, to John E. Hudson, President, ABT Co., Mar. 16, 1896. 
Egleston took charge of the litigation and on his recommendation Bell retained the Cleveland law firm of Squire,  
Sanders & Dempsey. Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
87 Dane County Telephone Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court of Dane County.  
Petition of the plaintiff, Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
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office limited its value to potential subscribers. Twice the independent company asked Western 
Union to allow it to put one of its phones in the office at no charge to Western Union. Both times 
it was ignored. Charging discrimination and injury, it filed suit in the State Circuit court 
February 20, 1896.  
 
It was already well established in law that telephone companies were required to supply 
service to all telegraph companies who requested it. The Madison case, however, was an 
attempt to invert that doctrine, demanding in effect that telegraph companies be required to 
accept telephone service without discrimination. The AT&T counsel working on the Norwalk, 
Ohio, case recognized that the principle at stake was closely related to the right to compel 
physical connection of telephone companies: 
The telegraph company is threatened with the establishment of a rule of law 
which might enable not only telephone companies, but also district messenger 
companies, and other similar companies, to compel the furnishing of facilities for 
delivering messages to a telegraph company on the premises of the latter, different 
from those allowed to the general public; and, going further, might enable other 
telegraph companies to compel a rival telegraph company to at least allow [their] 
wires… to be carried into the office of the defendant company, so that messages 
could be there repeated and forwarded; and the next step, of course, is to compel 
actual physical connection of the lines of the two companies.88 
 
American Bell was not optimistic about the outcome of the Wisconsin cases. In 1882 the 
Wisconsin legislature had passed a law requiring telephone companies to "receive and transmit 
without discrimination messages from and for any other company…upon tender or payment of 
the usual or customary charges therefor.”89 That was a straightforward application of telegraph 
precedents to the telephone system. An unfavorable decision might lead other states to pass similar 
laws. Bell looked for a way to avoid taking the case to its conclusion. It uncovered rumors that 
the Waukesha independent was eager to sell out, and began to make overtures to its 
management.90 When  the  interconnection  issue  threatened to  erupt  into litigation in Wausau, 
another Wisconsin town, Bell offered to put its own long-distance instruments into the offices of 
independent long distance users for free in order to preempt the demand for linking the two 
systems.91 
 
Attempts to avoid the issue notwithstanding, Bell's lawyers prepared a strong legal 
defense against compulsory interconnection. They asserted, first, that its status as a common 
carrier required it to serve the general public without discrimination, but not other telephone 
companies. 92 That reasoning had been upheld by the courts in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v.  
                                                 
88 Egleston to Hudson, Mar. 9, 1896. Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
89 1882 LAW OF WISCONSIN,   Chapter 196. Cited in Gabel, 1987, p. 341. 
90 Fuller to Hudson, Nov. 16, 1895.  AT&T-BLA, Box 1298. 
91 Fuller to Hudson, Nov. 30, 1895. AT&T-BLA, Box 1298. 
92 “[The Bell Company] only undertakes to do business on its own lines and through its own instruments. It does not 
offer to connect generally with other companies. It does not undertake business of that character, and a common carrier is only 
bound to do the kind of business it holds itself out to the public as doing." Legal memorandum, Miller, Noyes, Miller & Wahl, 
Nov. 12, 1895, p.5.    AT&T-BLA, Box 1298. 
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Hudson River Telephone Co., as noted before. That defense, however, relied on the interpretation 
of statute law and thus could be superseded by new legislation. A more fundamental argument 
was that the requirement to connect with a rival company was an unconstitutional “ taking” of 
private property. That argument had two separate nuances. Connection involved physically 
entering the premises of the company, attaching wires to its switchboard, and engaging its 
workforce in the operations required to connect subscribers. Such intrusions seemed an invasion 
of one company's property rights by another. But there was another element to the argument 
more directly related to the unique circumstances of the telephone business. The telephone 
company, its lawyers asserted, had expended large sums of money and energy on the 
construction of a telephone system linking subscribers all over the state. Its competitors had built 
only small, local exchanges. If the two exchanges were interconnected, the small exchange would 
be able to profit from the sale of widespread access without running the risks or assuming the 
burdens of building a large-scope system. To allow a competitor to benefit from the involuntary 
use of those facilities was nothing more than the expropriation of its property. In that argument, 
the “property” at issue was not so much the physical facilities of the telephone company, but 
the access to subscribers it had created by constructing those facilities. 
 
In the middle of 1896, that view of the interconnection issue scored some important 
victories.  In Waukesha, Bell mooted the issue by buying out its competitor. In the Madison 
lawsuit, the case for compelling the telegraph company to accept service from an independent 
telephone company was rejected. Relying on the precedent of the Express cases, the Judge ruled 
that a common carrier who makes special cooperative business arrangements with another 
company need not extend the same arrangement indiscriminately to all other companies. The 
principle of nondiscrimination applied to consumers only, not to business rivals.93 The same 
reasoning was used two years later in a case involving telephone interconnection in New York 
state.94 
Independent opposition to interconnection 
In Norwalk, Ohio, the independents themselves suspended the litigation –  not because 
they feared losing, but because they feared they might win.  According to an intelligence 
report gathered by F.R. Colvin, a Bell agent working undercover in the independent ranks, most 
independent exchange operators in Ohio opposed compulsory interconnection.95 The Norwalk 
case was the first item of business when the Ohio Independent Association met in March of 
1896. The Ohio meeting was also attended by a delegation from Indiana. According to Colvin's 
sources, “every delegate at the meeting rose one after the other and roasted Mr.  Graham [the 
Norwalk Co.  representative] alive for commencing the litigation.”96 Already, the Ohio 
independents had exchanges in seventy five small towns.  Bell, in contrast, had only 31 
                                                 
93 Opinion of Judge Siebecker, Dane County Telephone Co. v. Western  Union Telegraph Co. (document undated-
decision made Mar.  18, 1896), AT&T-BLA, Box 1298. 
94 The Judge held that a reasonable construction of the common  carrier  statute in New  York  did  not  require  one 
telephone system to supply  connections  with  its system to another company enabling the latter to utilize the connected 
system as part of its own on payment of  the nominal sum required of ordinary  subscribers.  Syracuse Standard, July 2, 1898. 
Box 1166, AT&T-BLA. 
95 F.R.  Colvin to President Hudson, Apr. 8, 1896. Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
96 Ibid. 
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exchanges in Ohio towns with populations under 10,000.  Most of the towns with non-Bell 
exchanges were connected, or were in the process of being connected, with independent toll 
lines. If the Norwalk Company won its case, they feared, the Bell Company would be able to 
demand and get access to those lines. That would increase the scope of Bell's access in the state 
and undermine the incentive for telephone users to subscribe to an independent exchange. 
According to Colvin, “the whole convention to a man then entreated Graham to have Judge 
Wickham withdraw the suit.”97 After some soul-searching, Graham returned to Norwalk and 
became a dues-paying member of the state independent association. The Ohio independents 
pursued a strategy of building exchanges and toll lines in areas not served by the Central Union 
Company.98 Nothing more was heard of the Norwalk Company's lawsuit. 
 
The Ohio meeting was not an isolated incident but came to typify the attitudes of the 
organized independent movement. In the years to follow, numerous state independent 
associations passed resolutions against interconnection with the Bell system.99 In later attempts 
to compel interconnection by legislation, Bell and independent forces were usually united in their 
opposition.100  
 
Proposals to interconnect Bell and independent telephone exchanges continued to surface 
sporadically in various states throughout the 1890s and early 1900s. They failed because the 
weight of legal precedent was against them and because of the political opposition of the Bell and 
independent interests. From the skirmishes of 1894 to 1996 emerged a common doctrine 
regarding the effects of connecting competing telephone companies. Its essential tenets were 
accepted by both the Bell companies and by most of the organized independent movement and 
were bolstered by the U.S.  Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Access competition as property rights doctrine 
The basis of that doctrine was a distinct way of applying the concept of property rights 
to the telephone business. The telephone companies were asserting ownership over the relations 
of access created by their toll lines and exchanges. For both Bell and independent, "competition" 
meant separate systems supplying different subscriber universes, each vying with the other to 
attract customers. The subscriber universe itself was their most important product-the valuable 
resource they offered to sell to the public. Competition was a matter of making that resource 
better than one’s rival’s, which in that case meant more universal. Interconnection destroyed that 
form of rivalry by eliminating the differences in their access universes. It thoroughly undermined 
the competitive advantage to be gained by attracting new subscribers, building competing 
exchanges, and constructing toll lines. J.W. Gleed of Bell's Missouri and Kansas Co., speaking 
against a physical connection law proposed to the Missouri legislature in 1907, put it that way: 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 The Secretary of the Ohio Association wrote a letter to every independent exchange "particularly  touching the 
necessity of hurrying the construction of toll lines connecting towns so small as not to be reached by the Central  Union Co."  
Colvin, Ibid, at 8. 
99 C.A. Pleasance, The Spirit of Independent Telephony 81 (Independent Telephone Books 1989). 
100 Telephony Magazine, the voice of the independent interests, actually reprinted in full the testimony of a Texas Bell 
manager against compulsory interconnection. 
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My opponent has built up a telephone system of 1,001 subscribers. I  have an 
exchange in which each subscriber has access to 6,000 other persons. Now assume 
this [physical connection] law to have taken effect. Where before my competitor 
owned an exchange which gave each of his subscribers access to 1,000 persons only, 
now my competitor owns an exchange in which each subscriber has access to 7,000 
persons. What I may call the 'access value' of my competitor's exchange has simply 
been multiplied by seven…without a penny of expense or a particle of increase in his 
rate.101 
The Ohio independents' reaction to the Norwalk case makes it clear that they too 
conceived of telephone competition in those terms. Their plan was to control telephone 
connections to towns neglected by Bell and eventually to attract subscribers away from Bell in 
other areas through its control of these connections.  Even the independents who supported 
compulsory interconnection comprehended the issue in the same terms. Bell, they reasoned, was 
politically unpopular. It won subscribers because its lines reached places and subscribers that 
the independents' did not. If telephone subscribers did not have to choose between two mutually 
exclusive subscriber universes, one controlled by Bell and the other controlled by the 
independents, but could instead obtain access to Bell toll lines and subscribers while subscribing 
to an independent exchange, Bell would lose most of its customers. One independent spokesman 
predicted that with interconnection, “we can obtain at once every one of their exchange 
subscribers.”102 
 
American Bell felt the same way about its toll network linking exchanges in the larger 
cities. Giving independents access to its more extensive toll network would eliminate its 
leverage over the subscription decisions of telephone users in the local exchange. As a commodity 
around which property boundaries could be drawn, however, access had an unusual feature. 
When independent companies subscribed to a Bell exchange and then connected the Bell line into 
their own switchboard, they acquired the ability to sell access to Bell subscribers.  Technically, 
there was no distinction between Bell's sale of access to a normal customer of the exchange and 
the sale of exchange access to a competing telephone company, which could then profit from the 
resale of the subscriber set Bell had created. In order to maintain system boundaries, a legally 
enforceable distinction between those two classes of users had to be drawn. From a property 
rights standpoint, the situation was analogous to copyright and patent protection. Patent and 
copyright laws allow the creators of new information to sell access to it without losing their 
proprietary control of it. In prohibiting unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material or 
unlicensed use of patented inventions, intellectual property law distinguishes between buyers who 
benefit from the use of the information itself and those who use the access to information created 
by the initial sale to profit from its resale. Both sides' unwillingness to interconnect stemmed in 
part from their recognition of that unique economic characteristic of telephone access. Merging 
the subscriber universes of competing telephone companies via interconnection, in their view, 
                                                 
101 J. W. Gleed, Missouri and Kansas Telephone Company, “ Argument Against the Proposed Law Compelling the 
Physical Connection of Telephone Systems,” 22 pp., printed, submitted to the Missouri Legislature 1907. AT&T-BLA. 
102 David Gabel, The Evolution of a Market, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan 346 (1987). 
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undermined their control of the basic resource on which their business was founded: 
communications access.  
To the Bell interests, interconnection would encourage “all sorts of small, parasitic 
companies [to] spring up to sap the revenues of large companies already established.103 The 
independent opponents of interconnection emphasized not parasitism by small companies, but 
interconnection's deleterious effects on their own attempts to construct an alternative system. If 
Bell subscribers could obtain access to independent exchanges through Bell toll lines, who would 
invest in and who would subscribe to an independent long distance system? If a large city 
occupied by a Bell exchange was enabled to gain access to the surrounding towns dominated 
by the independents, why would the city franchise a competing exchange? By the end of 1897, 
most of the organized independent operators were willing to take up the gauntlet thrown down 
by Bell’s refusal to connect with them. They confidently looked upon the thousands of small 
communities lacking Bell exchanges and the hundreds of new independent exchanges springing 
up in them. In the two hundred cities with dual service, they saw independent exchanges 
undercharging Bell companies and attracting as many subscribers in six months as the Bell 
exchange had gathered in the previous seventeen years. They knew they were up against a 
powerful foe; their public pronouncements and trade publications exhibit that blend of strident 
defiance and paranoia typical of an underdog unsure of its success. By embracing access 
competition as their modus operandi, however, the independents signaled their willingness to 
make it an all-or-nothing battle. By 1897, the course of telephone rivalry was set for the next 
fifteen years. 
  
                                                 
103 J.W. Gleed, supra note 30. 
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THE DYNAMICS OF ACCESS COMPETITION 
 
 
THE REFUSAL OF THE BELL and independent telephone interests to interconnect gave 
the ensuing business rivalry a specific form. Competition became a matter of whose network 
provided access to the most people within a particular user’s community of interest. In the more 
technical language of chapter 3, the networks competed on the basis of their scope, or the size of 
their bundle of access units.  That kind of competition gave the networks strong incentives to tap 
new user groups, enter undeveloped areas, lower access prices, and interconnect with non-
competing networks. Caught up in that dynamic, Bell and the independents were propelled into a 
race to achieve universality. The dramatic expansion of telephone service did not occur because of 
altruistic motives, grand social visions, or government policy, but was literally forced upon the 
contestants by the dynamics of access competition. 
  
This chapter recounts the progress of telephone exchange competition from 1894 until 
1907. Its object is to document the linkage between access competition and the pursuit of 
universality. In accordance with the book’s thematic emphasis, the growth of dual service is 
quantified by counting the number of communities with competing exchanges, as well as the gross 
number of Bell and independent exchanges and telephones. That data has not been published in 
prior accounts of the competitive period.104 The presence or absence of competing exchanges in 
American cities is the best indicator of the growth and decline of competition. Only in cities served 
by both Bell and independent telephone exchanges did consumers actually have a choice of 
suppliers. Moreover, some independent companies connected with Bell, and therefore their 
telephones, though independent in manufacture, actually were united with the Bell system in the 
access competition. 
Phase 1: Filling the gaps, 1894-1898 
In the first phase of the competition, the independents achieved a quick and ultimately 
unbreakable foothold in the marketplace by filling the vacuums left by Bell's development strategy. 
The geographic distribution of independent telephony, and the market segments in which they 
succeeded, faithfully reflected the gaps between supply and demand left by the Bell system. 
                                                 
104 Telephone Census, 1902, 1907, 1912; FCC Telephone Investigation, 1939; Brock, 1981; Lipartito, 1989. 
Those sources typically use the number of Bell and independent telephones in operation as the index of competition 
and market share. 
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From 1894 to 1898, 1,074 commercial, independent telephone companies began operation 
in the United States.105 Hundreds more were started but never survived long enough to be counted 
by the 1902 census. Although they are often stereotyped as rural, mom-and-pop operations, the first 
wave of independents were a heterogeneous lot. They were formed in major urban areas,106 in 
small towns, in mid-sized cities, and in rural areas. Competition developed in the industrialized 
East, the rural Midwest and South, and the West. The fate of those different approaches to 
competition differed markedly, however. Early attempts to occupy major cities were notably 
unsuccessful.107 Most of the tiny rural farmer lines, on the other hand, came into existence five to 
seven years later.108 The success and longevity of independents varied greatly by region as well. 
 
The first wave of independents were concentrated in what the Census Bureau labeled the 
North Central part of the United States, which included the states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, 
Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota. Of the 740 commercial independent systems that were started between 1894 and 1897 and 
that survived until 1902, 424 (57.3 percent) were concentrated in those eleven states.109 By way of 
contrast, only six surviving independent systems had been started in the states of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and Rhode Island, the more urbanized, industrialized areas of the East. 
 
The North Central region had been neglected by the Bell system for three reasons. One was 
its aversion to rural small towns and its concentration on cities. In the three New England states 
dominated by Bell, 90 percent of the population lived in areas classified by the U.S. Census as 
“urban;” i.e., with a population of 2,500 or greater. In the North Central states, on the other hand, 
only 30 to 50 percent lived in cities of that size or greater.  Bell’s bias was regional as well as 
urban. Although its grand plan was to become a national network, in actuality Bell was still rooted 
in the northeast. Its network had started in New England and gradually spread south and west. In 
1894 about 35 percent of all the telephones in the United States could be found within a 300-mile 
                                                 
105 Bureau of the Census, ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES CENSUS, Table 10, 9 (1902). That statistic 
understates the amount of entry because it only counts telephone systems which remained in operation until 1902. 
Depending on the size of the community, the failure rate of independent exchanges ranged from 15 percent to 40 
percent. 
106 The Mercantile Electric Co. announced plans to establish a telephone exchange for bankers and brokers in 
downtown New York City. The New York and Eastern Telephone Co. applied for franchises in Brooklyn and New 
York. See 24 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 175 (Apr. 11, 1894). The Drawbaugh Telephone and Telegraph Company, the 
Mutual Automatic Telephone Company and the Clamond Telephone Co. all took steps to establish themselves in 
Philadelphia. Between 1893 and 1898 four companies were organized to gain a competing franchise in Chicago. 
107 For more on the fate of dual service in the cities, see the section entitled Dual Service in the Cities of this 
chapter. 
108 Independent telephony is often associated with the small mutual companies and farmer lines that brought 
the telephone to rural America during the early 1900s. Although both movements were predicated on the expiration of 
the Bell patents and their interests often converged, their identities should not be confused. According to the 1902 
Census of telephones and telegraphs, 774 of the new telephone systems that began operation from 1893 to 1897 were 
commercial independents, while only 84 were mutual companies. After 1900, in contrast, new mutual systems sprang 
up at the rate of 200-300 per year. Most of the 100,000 or so independent telephones in operation by the end of 1897 
were in small towns and cities, not in the rural areas per se. 
109 Bureau of the Census, ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES CENSUS, Table 10, 9 (1902). 
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radius of Boston.110 When the patents expired, AT&T’s long distance lines were just beginning to 
extend into Missouri, Michigan, Kentucky, and the South. 
 
The geographic bias was also an inadvertent product of the Bell organization’s management 
structure. Most of the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa were included in the territory of the 
Bell licensee company known as the Central Union Company (see figure 6-1). The population in 
Central Union territory was dispersed into thousands of farms and small and medium-sized market 
towns. But it also included major cities such as Columbus, Toledo, and Indianapolis. Only one 
licensee company was responsible for developing what the Bell organization apparently thought of 
as an undifferentiated hinterland. By way of contrast, the Bell organization had given each of the 
metropolitan areas centered on Chicago, Cleveland, and Cincinnati their own individual licensee 
company. Serious underdevelopment in Central Union territory was the result.111 Not 
coincidentally, the Central Union territory became the stronghold of the independent telephone 
movement. The strongest state associations and most ambitious operating companies originated in 
that region. Dual service competition and the independent share of telephones reached their highest 
levels in Central Union territory. 
 
                                                 
110 EXCHANGE STATISTICS 1894, AT&T-BLA. 
111 One AT&T manager, Thomas Doolittle, recommended dividing the Central Union territory into three or 
four territories. A. R. Chappelka, History of Independent Telephone Operating  Companies in the United States, 
Memorandum for Mssrs. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer, and Wood, Affirmative Topic #10, Civil Action 
#17-49 (1956). 
 
54 
 
Just as important as Bell’s uneven geographical coverage was the huge gap in the market 
for local and regional connections left by Bell’s pursuit of a national system modeled on the 
telegraph. Bell’s licensee companies had concentrated their attention on exchange development in 
major urban areas, while AT&T had concentrated on supplying intercity long-distance 
communications. The most successful independents, in contrast, concentrated on providing broader 
coverage of a county or a multi-county market area. They built exchanges in small towns where 
there were no Bell exchanges, then tied them together with short-haul toll lines. Or, they built 
exchanges in mid-sized cities with an established Bell exchange, and supplied superior telephone 
access to the surrounding areas, which had been ignored by Bell. As table 6-1 shows, most of the 
dual service cities in Phase 1 were smaller cities (pop. 5,000-20,000) that served as communication 
nodes for the agricultural economy. While Bell had been laboring to make it possible for New York 
to talk to Chicago, for Boston to talk to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, the independents were 
connecting towns like Massillon, Ohio, with the nearby tributary towns of Dalton, Beach Grove, 
Canal Fulton, and Navarre. 
 
TABLE 6-1 
DUAL SERVICE BY CITY SIZE, 1894-1901 
 
Entry date Large 
>50,000 pop. 
Medium 
20-50,000 pop. 
Small 
5-20,000 pop. 
Total 
1894  # cities 
 
% Surviving  
after 5 yrs: 
2 
 
0 
4 
 
50% 
23 
 
74% 
28 
 
68% 
1895-1897  # cities 
% Surviving  
after 5 yrs: 
16 
 
81% 
43 
 
86% 
161 
 
87% 
220 
 
86% 
1899-1901  # cities 
% Surviving  
after 5 yrs: 
20 
 
95% 
29 
 
97% 
136 
 
96% 
185 
 
96% 
Source: Chappelka, 1956 
 
A typical example can be drawn from West Virginia, where new companies started 
exchanges in the rapidly growing towns of Grafton, Fairmont, Clarksburg, and Morgantown in 
1895. The population of those cities in 1900 was 5,650, 5,655, 4,050, and 1,895, respectively.112 
The towns were situated in a thirty-square mile area, each one being about ten to fifteen miles 
apart. Although Bell exchanges had been started recently in all of those locales, the independents 
were able to attract subscribers, according to the Bell manager, “by reason of their [the 
independents] great extension of toll lines.” “We cannot afford to cover that territory with toll lines 
of the character of construction which we have adopted as a standard,” the manager wrote. He 
concluded: “I must confess to a feeling of discouragement, and am at a loss to determine what we 
can do ... to break down the opposition in our territory.”113 The much-vaunted superiority of the 
                                                 
112 1900 Census. By 1910 they had all grown substantially: to 7,563, 9,711, 9,201 and 9,150. 
113 J. King Goodrich to C. J. French, August 26, 1896. AT&T-BLA. 
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Bell long-distance system was of little help here. What was needed most, from the point of view of 
average telephone subscribers, were local and regional connections to the places with which they 
had regular commerce. 
 
That this kind of development had the capacity to make serious inroads into Bell’s business 
had become obvious by the end of 1896. Companies such as The Western Electric Telephone 
Company of Britt, Iowa, the Western Illinois Telephone Co., and The Farmer’s Telephone Co. of 
Massillon, Ohio, constructed extensive networks of grounded iron toll lines connecting rural 
subscribers to city and town exchanges. The Farmer’s Company used its control of access to rural 
telephone users in Stark County to establish a successful exchange in Massillon (pop. 12,000), the 
county’s second largest city.114 The Home Telephone Company of Ft. Wayne, Indiana, a 
substantial city of 45,000, was connected with independent exchanges in over fifty towns by the 
middle of 1896.115 That it was access competition which provided the incentive to reach those areas 
is clear. In 1896, for example, the Secretary of the Ohio Independent Telephone Association wrote 
a letter to every independent exchange owner urging them to “hasten the construction of toll lines 
connecting towns so small as not to be reached by the Central Union [Bell licensee] Company.”116 
 
Aside from undersupplying regional connections in the country, Bell had often neglected 
connections between large cities and their own suburbs and tributaries. Believing that small 
exchanges in less populous communities could not support themselves, Bell usually just ran long-
distance circuits out from a larger city and cut in one public station in each small town along the 
way. Such perfunctory service made telephone communication less than convenient. Users in those 
locations had to leave their office and go to the public station; and while they could place calls to 
other cities on the Bell network, it was not possible for people in other cities to call them. Worse, a 
single circuit serving public stations in five to ten towns was technically the equivalent of a gigantic 
party line. A call in any one of the towns along the way tied up the line for all of the towns along 
the circuit. Anyone talking on the line had to contend with constant interruptions from people in 
other towns who picked up the phone and tried to signal the central office.117 In the New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania suburbs of Philadelphia, lines of ten, fifteen, or twenty people waited an hour for a 
connection to Philadelphia and two and a half hours for an open circuit to New York.118 Bell's 
competitors thrived on the inadequacy of toll facilities and organization. Many suburban cities in 
New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania fell into the hands of the independents as a result. 
 
The state of Michigan affords an example of independent development compressed into an 
unusually short period of time. By 1895, competing exchanges had been established in thirteen of 
the state’s thirty-nine cities with a population in excess of 5,000. All but one of the cities 
(Kalamazoo, pop. 24,000) were mid-sized towns with populations between 5,000 and 20,000. 
Fueled by lower rates, better rural connections, and public hostility to Bell, those exchanges met 
with quick success in attracting subscribers. In Cadillac (pop. 5,000), Bell held on to only fifteen 
subscribers, compared to the independent’s 120. In Ispheming (pop. 13,000), Bell had 100 
                                                 
114 24 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 293 (June 13, 1894). 
115 26 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 35 (July 15, 1896). 
116 F. R. Colvin to President Hudson, Apr. 8, 1896, Box 1298, AT&T-BLA. 
117 Thomas Doolittle to President Hudson, June 27, 1899. Box 1330, AT&T- BLA. 
118 Thomas Doolittle, Report on toll matters, to President Hudson, Sept. 11, 1899. 
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subscribers at the end of 1897, the independent 400. Encouraged by the success of smaller cities, 
independent entrepreneurs organized new companies to serve the state’s two largest cities, Grand 
Rapids and Detroit. The Citizens Co. of Grand Rapids grew from 400 subscribers at its opening in 
mid-1896 to 2,300 by the end of 1897, surpassing the number of Bell subscribers by 1,000. The 
path to a Detroit franchise was opened by a reform mayor.119 The independent Detroit Telephone 
Co., which began operating in December 1896, quickly attracted 5,000 customers by offering 
monthly flat rates half the size of the Bell company’s. (Those rates proved troublesome, however, 
as the exchange faced bankruptcy only three years later.) 
 
Then, early in 1897, the New State Telephone Co. was organized to “spread low-rate 
telephone service to all parts of the state,” beginning with the towns surrounding Detroit.120 Both 
the New State Co. and the Citizens Co. eventually assumed the role of a long-distance company, 
connecting their dispersed exchange holdings in the state with high-grade, metallic circuits. 
Although independents usually entered the business using lower quality grounded iron circuits, 
successful commercial companies such as the New State upgraded to higher quality metallic 
circuits at the first opportunity. By 1898, New State Co. lines connected Port Huron, Grand Rapids, 
Lansing, Grand Ledge, and Lake Odessa.121 By 1899, thirty-six of the thirty-nine Bell exchanges 
(92 percent) faced direct competition. The Detroit independent exchange failed in 1900, and, along 
with the Kalamazoo exchange, was sold to the Bell interests. A new competing exchange was 
established in Detroit only two years later, however. Never financially healthy, it struggled along 
with about 20 percent of the market but was nevertheless maintained by the independent interests in 
order to provide termination in the state’s largest city. The Grand Rapids-based Citizens Company, 
on the other hand, dominated its section of the state until its merger with the Bell system in 1916. 
From 1900 to 1907, the number of Michigan communities over 5,000 in population with dual 
service stayed at 70 percent or above. 
 
The independents did not suffer much from their lack of connections to the Bell system-not 
yet. On the contrary, their exclusion from Bell exchanges and toll lines encouraged them to develop 
a critical mass of users by constructing toll lines and new exchanges in areas underserved by Bell 
and organizing themselves in ways that would facilitate the interconnection of all anti-Bell users. 
The supply of telephone facilities was so far below the demand for them that there was plenty of 
room for carving out new subscriber universes. During the 1894-1898 period, the number of 
independent subscribers doubled every eighteen months. Much of that torrid rate of increase 
stemmed from the establishment of new exchanges. Independent exchanges that already existed, 
however, usually doubled in size each year for the first few years of their existence. When 
independent exchanges failed, and many did, it was rarely for want of subscribers. By 1902 there 
were 1.3 million Bell telephone subscribers, more than five times the number that had existed in 
1894. But there were nearly a million users of independent telephones. 
  
                                                 
119 The mayor declared that since telephone service cost $25 per year in Canada and $65 per year in Detroit, he 
would drive rates down or drive the telephone company out of the city. 25 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 118 (Sept. 5, 
1894). 
120 30 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 87 (Feb. 24, 1897). 
121 31 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 64 (Aug. 8, 1897); 31 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 146 (Sept. 22, 1897). 
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TABLE 6-2 
GROWTH OF DUAL SERVICE COMPETITION, 1894-1907 
#Public Exchanges #Telephone Dual Service^ 
  
Bell 
 
Independent 
Bell+ 
Independent 
connecting 
Independent 
non- 
connecting 
#Places 
>5k 
(%) 
Jan 1,  1894  
1,409 
 
*98 
 
266,000 
 
*15,000 
 
28 
 
2% 
1897 1,799 *1,700 415,000 *100,000 220 23% 
1902 3,005 3,400 1,401,021 969,845 449 55% 
1904 3,365 *4,400 2,399,213 1,348,000 483 60% 
1907 4,889 5,400 3,958,489 2,279,578 466 57% 
Sources: Telephone Censuses, 1902, 1907; Chappelka, 1956, Telephony, misc issues; ABT Co. and 
AT&T Annual Reports. 
 
* Estimates based on 1902 Telephone Census. Independent exchanges do not count rural farm lines 
or exchanges with incomes less than $5,000. 
^ Note: dual service points counted only in communities with population of 5,000 or more. 
Percentages = percentage of cities with population of 5,000 or more. 
 
Phase 2: System overlap, 1898-1907 
In the second phase of the competition, from 1898 to 1907, dual service competition was 
pushed from its stronghold in the middle-sized towns and previously undeveloped areas to the 
extremes of urban and rural America. Although, as noted in chapter 3, access competition makes 
perfect duplication of service impossible, it nevertheless gives the competing networks an incentive 
to match each other’s scope as closely as possible. Thus, Bell and the independents entered a period 
of growing system overlap. In order to remain competitive with the independents, the Bell system 
extended its presence to small towns and rural areas, partly through new construction and partly by 
interconnecting with noncompeting independents. At the same time, the independents attempted to 
extend their access to major cities with established Bell exchanges. 
 
From 1897-1904 the number of communities greater than 5,000 in population with 
competing exchanges shot up from 23 percent to 60 percent, and stayed over 55 percent until 1912. 
As dual service competition spread, price competition and service improvements in the affected 
cities typically doubled telephone users within a year. As that occurred, both sides raced to extend 
connecting service to new user groups, such as farmers and residences. Technologies which 
lowered the cost of access, such as party lines and automatic switches, were rushed into operation. 
Dual Service in the Cities 
Early independent efforts to compete in large cities had almost always failed. A variety of 
snares and pitfalls awaited those who ventured directly into Bell’s urban strongholds. The political 
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maneuvering required to obtain a franchise in a major city was complicated and expensive.122 
Heavy capital investment was required to match the facilities of the Bell system. In New York and 
Boston, where Bell had lavished most of its corporate attention, service was reasonably good. If 
there were complaints about the telephone company, they were limited to the high price of service. 
Under those circumstances the incumbent could undermine the demand for a new company by 
making rate concessions. The introduction of measured service in New York city in 1894 decreased 
the charges for most users, making telephone service available to small users for as little as $8 a 
month. The number of subscribers in New York city more than doubled, going from 9,000 to 
21,000, in the four years following the introduction of measured service.123 
 
When the first wave of independents did manage to establish a presence in a major city they 
were usually ill-prepared to handle the complex financial and management practices and rate 
structures required of a large exchange. Both of the independent exchanges started in 1894 in cities 
with populations greater than 50,000 failed within five years. The Home Telephone Company of 
Baltimore, organized in 1896, offered rates less than half those of Bell but became insolvent after 
three years. It was sold to a new company which had to rebuild the plant and raise rates by 57 
percent.124 The same fate befell the independent exchange in Detroit. 
 
In contrast, large urban exchanges that were the culmination of four or five years of prior 
development in the surrounding areas generally turned out to be the financially strongest and 
longest-lasting independent operating companies. Buffalo, St. Louis, Indianapolis, Kansas City, 
Louisville, and Minneapolis-St. Paul all followed that pattern. A competing exchange was not 
established in Buffalo, New York, until 1901, but by mid-1896 the Electrical Review reported that 
all of the principal towns surrounding that city were connected by independent systems.125 Kansas 
City did not admit an independent exchange until 1902, but by 1897 independents were thriving in 
Leavenworth, Topeka, and Ft. Scott, Kansas; and St. Joseph, Carthage, Webb City, Joplin, and 
Nevada, Missouri; and many other smaller towns within 150 miles for whom Kansas City served as 
the regional  center. 
 
Thus, from 1898 to 1903 a wave of new competition swept into the urban centers. It was the 
Bell strategy in reverse-a case of the periphery advancing on the center.126 In the intervening years 
the independents had gained more than access leverage in the country- side; they had also gained 
management and technical experience. Table 6-3 shows the starting dates of independent 
exchanges in cities over 50,000 in population. Of the cities over 100,000 in population, only 
Boston, New York, Washington D.C., Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and Denver managed to retain a 
                                                 
122 In Philadelphia, the franchising of the Mutual Automatic Telephone Company was quashed when 
politicians were accused of exchanging their influence for stock in the company. In Brooklyn, the city council 
franchised an independent company three times only to have it vetoed by the mayor each time.  29 ELECTRICAL 
WORLD (Aug. 
19, 1894). 
123 A residential user paid $8 to $10 per month and 15 cents for the first 600 calls. EXCHANGE STATISTICS 
1894, AT&T-BLA. 
124 34 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 26 (Jan. 11, 1899). 
125 29 ELECTRICAL REVIEW 36 (July 15, 1896). 
126 As an independent spokesman put it, where Bell had worked from the top down, the independents 
developed from the bottom up. Harry MacMeal, THE STORY OF INDEPENDENT TELEPHONY 26 (1934). 
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single telephone system throughout the competitive period. Of those, only Washington and 
Cincinnati refused to franchise a competitor; the other cities authorized a new entrant but the 
independent failed to raise the capital needed to build a competing exchange. 
 
TABLE 6-3 
STARTING DATES OF DUAL SERVICE IN CITIES OVER 50,000 IN POPULATION 
Numbers in Parentheses indicate city’s population rank in 1900 census. 
1898 
(7) Cleveland, OH (52) Wilmington, DE 
1899 
(43) Atlanta, GA 
(21) Indianapolis, IN  
(12) New Orleans, LA  
(4) St. Louis, MO 
(2) Chicago, IL 
(19) Minneapolis, MN  
(11) Pittsburgh, PA  
(68) Wilkes-Barre, PA 
1900 
(27) Allegheny, PA  
(65) Duluth, MN  
(24) Rochester, NY  
(62) Savannah, GA 
(30) Syracuse, NY 
(28) Columbus, OH 
(55) New Bedford, MA  
(64) San Antonio, TX  
(23) St. Paul, MN 
1901 
(8) Buffalo, NY  
(45) Dayton, OH  
(38) Scranton, PA 
(51) Camden, NJ  
(33) Fall River, MA 
1902 
(40) Albany, NY  
(69) Harrisburg, PA  
(18) Louisville, KY  
(50) Reading, PA  
(26) Toledo, OH 
(13) Detroit, MI 
(22) Kansas City, MO  
(3) Philadelphia, PA  
(48) Seattle, WA 
(56) Troy, NY 
1903 
(36) Los Angeles, CA  
(54) Oakland, CA 
(60) Utica, NY 
(37) Memphis, TN  
(61) Peoria, IL 
1904 
(55) New Bedford, MA  
(63) Salt Lake City, UT 
(70) Portland, ME 
 
 
Quincy, Illinois, typified some of the causes behind the independents’ advance into the 
cities. A city of 36,000 in 1900, Quincy sits on the western edge of Illinois on the bank of the 
Mississippi river. At the time of patent expiration, the 500 subscribers of the Bell exchange there 
could call Springfield (102 miles away) and Peoria (132 miles away), but no other places within the 
city’s own county of Adams, nor any exchanges in neighboring Brown, Hancock, and Pike 
counties. New, independent exchanges grew up in those areas very rapidly after 1894. They 
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remained isolated for only a year, as in 1895 the Western Illinois Telephone Company of Augusta 
began to construct toll lines connecting the independents in the region. In January of 1896 the 
Western Illinois Co. obtained the city’s permission to bring its lines into the building of a grocery 
supply company in Quincy, where a toll telephone was set up. From contemporary newspaper 
accounts it is clear that the line served small town merchants in the farm counties who ordered 
supplies from wholesalers in Quincy.127 That short-distance service was very popular with the local 
merchants and farmers. 
 
The convenience of the Quincy telephone line was noticed immediately by the wholesale 
merchants of Newark, Missouri (pop.400), a town 40 miles to the west. They began to raise money 
to construct a line crossing the Mississippi river linking Quincy, Newark, and thirty other points in 
Lewis, Knox, and Marion counties, Missouri. Word of the proposed new telephone line spread 
through the county newspapers and was received with great enthusiasm.128 
 
The money was raised by local stock subscriptions and by advance purchases of toll tickets. 
A submarine cable was laid before the end of the year. By March, 1899, the Western Illinois Co. 
owned exchanges at Macomb, Rushville, and Carthage, Illinois. It operated 700 miles of toll line in 
six counties and maintained toll stations at fifty-nine towns. Through its submarine cable across the 
Mississippi river it connected with points in Missouri and Iowa; another cable across the Illinois 
river at Beardstown linked users to the farming areas around Springfield.129 
 
Still, there was no independent exchange in Quincy itself, the largest city within 100 miles. 
As the Bell exchange there was closed to independent connections, the only way to obtain access to 
the independent systems surrounding the city was to install a private line and toll station on private 
business premises. The number of those private, independent toll stations in Quincy grew from one 
in 1896 to at least eight in 1903, illustrating the growing demand for independent connections.130 
Those private lines were more expensive than a subscription to an exchange, and were becoming 
increasingly difficult to set up because the lines had to pass over private property in order to avoid 
the need for a franchise. The burgeoning independent presence outside the city lent support to the 
idea of establishing a competing exchange. Several began to approach the city for a franchise. Soon 
Quincy was forced to debate the merits of dual service. 
 
Independent control of a majority of telephone users outside a city did not guarantee that it 
would franchise a competing company. In cities where public sentiment was overwhelmingly 
against Bell (as in Indianapolis or Detroit), or where state laws made it possible to enter the city 
without a municipal franchise (as in St. Louis), there was little debate and only a year or  two of 
preparation was needed. In other cities, (e.g. Chicago and Milwaukee) public debates about 
franchising a new company dragged on for years. Quincy was one of the latter cases. 
 
                                                 
127 QUINCY HERALD, Jan. 10, 1896. 
128 QUINCY HERALD, Feb. 10, 1896. 
129 THE WESTERN ELECTRICIAN, Mar. 11, 1899, at__. 
130 Theodore Vail, Telephone Pioneers of America, in THE STORY OF THE TELEPHONE IN QUINCY 
(AT&T L&R). 
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Public discussion of dual service seems to have begun in 1899. Opponents praised Bell’s 
“excellent service” and complained about the inconvenience of duplicating subscriptions for 
businesses.131 Supporters asserted the need to obtain access to “country lines.”132 After five and a 
half years and at least three separate applications to establish competing exchanges, Quincy’s City 
Council franchised the Quincy Home Telephone Co. on September 19, 1904. Quincy Home was 
the brainchild of Charles Wheat, a local promoter who managed to win the support of several 
prominent citizens. The company opened an automatic exchange system in the summer of 1906. It 
replaced many of the older independent toll lines with copper metallic circuits and arranged 
interconnection with the association of small independents. In the fall of 1906 it organized a 
separate company, the County Home Telephone Co., to acquire and connect independent lines in 
the farm areas. In the first year after the entry of the Quincy Home Co., the presence of a competing 
exchange did more to stimulate new users than to take subscribers away from Bell. The Bell 
exchange, which had been growing by about 300 a year since 1902, canvassed for new subscribers 
and grew at the same rate. 
 
In larger cities, the dual service debate centered on rates. City councils approached 
competition as a way of controlling or reducing charges, often contrasting it with municipal rate 
regulation or measured service as a means to that end. Cities also used the threat of a new franchise 
to attempt to extract rate concessions from the Bell company. To the independent movement, of 
course, building an access universe comparable to Bell’s was the paramount consideration. The 
state associations lobbied city governments to open their inhabitants to an independent exchange 
with the argument that businesses in the city would benefit from the availability of connections to 
their subscribers. In Oregon and Washington, independent promoters who had been blocked by city 
governments obtained franchises by means of the public initiative and referendum.133 Still, an 
independent company attempting to enter a city was forced to make rates the basis of their 
franchise pitch, promising prices half that of Bell's and a variety of free services to the city 
government. The outcome depended on how satisfied the local business community was with the 
Bell service. 
 
Between 1893 and 1906, nine different companies were organized to provide competing 
telephone service in the city of Chicago.134 The early applicants (1893-1898) vanished with little to 
show for their efforts. After 1898, however, the prospect of competition could hardly be ignored. 
There were more than 300 exchanges unconnected to the Bell system in Illinois and Indiana 
                                                 
131 QUINCY HERALD, Mar. 20, 1899 (reprinted editorial from the Chicago Evening Post: “Of what 
advantage will a telephone rate half as large as the present be, if one  has to have two telephones in order to keep in 
touch with the business world? That is a problem which is troubling a good many people just now. Of course the 
answer is that in time one company or the other would be forced out.” 
132 “An exchange at Quincy with 200 or more of the principal business houses…would be of immense benefit 
to Quincy merchants, besides a matter of greatest convenience to the country merchants and farmers who do their 
trading almost exclusively in Quincy.” Letter to the editor, QUINCY WEEKLY HERALD, Dec. 12, 1902, at 134 
133 12 TELEPHONY 15-17 (July 1906). 
134 The Chicago Twin Wire Long Distance Telephone Company, 1893; the Cosmopolitan Electric Company, 
1895; the Commonwealth Electric Company, 1897; the Independent  Telephone Company, 1898; S. J. Heafield, 1898; 
Illinois Telephone and Telegraph, 1899; the Hyde Park District Telegraph and Electric Company, 1901; the United 
Telegraph, Telephone, and Electric Company, 1901; and the Manufacturer’s Telephone Company, 1906.  Illinois file, 
AT&T L&R. 
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clamoring for connections to the city.135 There is also evidence that the business community 
thought Bell's telephone service was too expensive. A bill that slashed telephone rates in Chicago 
by more than half passed the Illinois House unanimously in 1899.136 As the newspapers pointed 
out, the bill was a little more than a public relations gesture by the legislators; its rate reductions 
were so extreme that it was certain to be invalidated by the courts. But it did allow the politicians to 
appear as if they were doing something about telephone rates, which evidently were the source of 
widespread discontent in Chicago. 
 
Three well-organized independent attempts to enter Chicago were mounted between 1899 
and 1906. They resulted in one partial victory and two defeats. The Illinois Telephone and 
Telegraph Co. was franchised Feb. 20, 1899. ITT was the owner of the Automatic Electric 
manufacturing company. Using the slogan “Prompt, Private, Perfect,” it offered automatic 
switching of the Strowger type and all single-line metallic circuit service. The company’s rates 
were usage-sensitive, charging for each switch up to a maximum of $85 for businesses and $50 for 
residences, well below the Bell rates. Those rates were fixed as the maximum in its franchise. It is 
not clear when its service actually began, but by August 1906 it had about 6,000 subscribers. 
 
ITT never lived up to its potential as a competitor of Bell, however. The financial interests 
backing the project were really interested in developing an underground subway system to transport 
mail and parcels. The telephone business was seen as an easier way to get the underground tunnel 
privileges needed for that purpose.137 In 1905 it changed its name to the Illinois Tunnel Company. 
The Tunnel Co. had to keep up its telephone business to prevent its franchise from being 
invalidated, but never aggressively developed it. It also failed to connect with the independent toll 
lines and ex- changes outside Chicago until 1911. 
 
The United Telegraph, Telephone, and Electric Co. was franchised to serve Hyde Park 
before that neighborhood was absorbed by the city of Chicago. Its exchange at 47th and Cottage 
Grove operated 600 telephones. In December 1900 an ordinance allowing the United Co. to extend 
facilities throughout Chicago was introduced in the City Council.138 In 1906 another new company 
with solid backing from the independent movement, the Manufacturers Telephone Company, 
sought a franchise. In both cases the proposals led to lengthy hearings before the city council 
committee on gas, oil, and electric light. 
 
The reports that emerged from those hearings tended to support the view that it was better to 
reduce rates through municipal regulation or by introducing measured service than by 
competition.139 Both competing franchises were denied. An ordinance imposing detailed regulation 
of rates and service upon Bell’s Chicago Telephone Co. was passed November 6, 1907.140 The 
                                                 
135 S. P. Sheerin, quoted in the CHICAGO RECORD-HERALD, June 27, 1901. 
136 The Western Electrician, Mar. 25, 1899, at 174; THE WESTERN ELECTRI- CIAN, Apr. 8, 1899, at 201. 
137 Illinois Tunnel Co, memorandum dated Dec. 20, 1902, Boxes 65 and 1357, AT&T-BLA. 
138 Hot Telephone Talk, CHICAGO RECORD-HERALD, June 27, 1901. 
139 Report of the Special Committee on Telephone Rates and Service.   Presented to the City Council of the 
City of Chicago,  Mar.  2,  1903; Hugo S.  Grosser,  Tele- phone Service and Rates, Report of the Committee on Gas, 
Oil, and Electric Light to the City Council of Chicago (Sept. 3, 1907). 
140 Chicago City Ordinance of  Nov. 6 1907, text in Box 65, AT&T-BLA. 
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prevailing attitude was summed up by a Chicago Daily News editorial of 1903, which opposed dual 
service as a “scheme to fool the weak-minded” but supported action to reduce rates. “There is no 
reason why [the Chicago Telephone Co.] cannot be compelled to give fair rates to the people when 
it comes asking for a renewal of its franchise [in 1909]. If that company will not consent to be 
reasonable let the city go into the telephone business itself. ”141 
 
Indianapolis, on the other hand, authorized a competing telephone company very quickly. In 
1898 there were only 2,286 subscribers in the city of 169,000, and the service of the Bell company 
in that city was generally considered to be poor. A long history of disputes over rates had marred 
relations between the telephone company and the state’s citizens; yet the company’s franchise 
made no provisions for rate control and contained no expiration date. In March 1898 the New 
Telephone Company obtained a franchise, but the city Board of Public Works compensated for its 
lack of control over the Bell exchange by attaching important restrictions to it. The New Company 
franchise fixed maximum rates at $40 for business and $24 for residences, 55 percent and 50 
percent of the respective Bell rates. The franchise expired after twenty-five years and became void 
if the new company was consolidated with or purchased by a competitor.142   That competition was 
conceived as a method of rate control is clear from the franchise itself, which stated that “the 
principal consideration for the granting of the franchise... is and will be the securing of a reduction 
of telephone rates to the citizens.”143 By January 1906, the New Company was serving 9,354 
subscribers while the Bell exchange had grown to 7,670 subscribers. Thus, despite user 
fragmentation, a telephone subscriber in Indianapolis had access to four times more users after 
competition than before it. 
 
Contrary to the trend in the rest of the country, dual service declined in the South after 
1898. Due to cheap construction, unrealistically low rates, and a lack of regional cooperation and 
interconnection, independents in Mississippi, Louisiana, and parts of Virginia, Alabama, and 
Kentucky were decimated by bankruptcy and Bell acquisition after 1900.144 The Cumberland Co. 
was particularly active in gobbling up financially exhausted independents, acquiring twenty 
noncompeting exchanges and six competing systems in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Kentucky 
between January 1900 and April 1901. The competing New Orleans exchange was one of the 
properties acquired.145 
 
Those failures portended financial problems that were to haunt the urban independent 
systems. In large exchanges, the independent promoter’s calculation of the profits that could be 
made at lower rates had overlooked two critical considerations: depreciation and the diseconomies 
of growth. In the first year or two of operation, the new exchange performed well and appeared to 
make profits and even pay dividends. After four or five years, the company learned that the 
“profits” and “dividends” of the preceding years had not been profits at all, but should have been 
                                                 
141 CHICAGO DAILY  NEWS, June 8, 1903. 
142 Patrick O'Neill, Franchising the New Telephone Company, paper delivered at the Midwest Journalism 
Association Conference, 7 (1988). 
143 /d. 
144 Lipartito 129-34 (1989). 
145 Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., acquisition of independent telephone companies, Box 1336, 
AT&T-BLA. 
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retained to renew the exchange’s physical facilities.146 They also learned that their costs increased 
as they added subscribers, making their initial rates inadequate. Compounding the problem, low 
rates were often locked into the franchise. By 1906 the independents in St. Louis, Cleveland, 
Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, Toledo, Madison, and many other cities had been forced to swallow their 
rhetoric and ask for rate increases of 20 to 50 percent.147 Others began to engage in acts of financial 
legerdemain, such as issuing new bonds to pay for the old ones before they matured, in a desperate 
attempt to raise the capital needed to renew and expand. Access competition demanded that they 
expand and become more universal to remain competitive, and as the Bell system had learned a 
decade before, expansion demanded huge amounts of investment capital. 
Access Competition and Rates 
Telephone prices generally consist of two parts: a charge for access and a charge for usage. 
Pricing after 1894 was deliberately constructed to minimize the access cost barrier in order to 
encourage large numbers of new subscribers to join (or, in the case of Bell, to retain existing 
subscribers). From 1894 to 1900, the average monthly rate for local exchange service dropped by 
more than half. It was not unusual for Bell operating companies to temporarily set their rates at $1 
per month, or even to provide service for free, in cities where an independent exchange had taken 
away many of their subscribers.148 Rate reductions occurred in part because competition from 
independent manufacturers forced the national Bell organization to lower royalty payments on 
Western Electric manufactured telephone sets from $11.48 per telephone to $2.18 from 1893 to 
1899.149 But reduced royalties accounted for only 42 percent of the cost reductions per 
subscriber.150 The companies also were forced to operate more efficiently and to offer new classes 
of service which made a telephone subscription more affordable. 
 
In nearly all cases the independents positioned themselves as the low-cost provider. A 
comparison of rates in over 471 competing exchanges by the Bell system in 1913 found that Bell’s 
exchange rates exceeded the independents’ in 9 percent of the cases.151 In the early years that did 
not necessarily mean that the independent’s equipment was lower quality and their service inferior. 
A memo from the president of the New York Telephone Company in 1902 noted that the amount of 
capital invested per Bell telephone was $328.20, whereas for independents the capital per phone 
was only $192.30. He concluded: 
 
…in nearly every instance the independent plants are new and represent the latest 
developments in telephone equipment, while in most cases the Bell plants are old. 
The Bell companies also have a larger number of phones on party lines while the 
independent phones are almost all on complete metallic circuits.152 
                                                 
146 The Financial Side of Independent Telephony, 11 TELEPHONY 14-18 (Jan.1906) (review of FREDERICK 
DICKSON, TELEPHONE INVESTMENTS, AND OTHERS). Dickson, President of the Cleveland-based Cuyahoga 
Telephone Company, actually argued in defense of the absence of depreciation charges. 
147 12 CUMBERLAND TELEPHONE JOURNAL (1906), AT&T-BLA; O'Neill, supra note 40, at__. 
148 Lipartito 120 (1989); Gabel 88-97 (1987). 
149 Weiman and Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894-1912, 
102 J. POL. ECON. 113 (1994). 
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151 Bell and Independent Exchange Rates, 1912-13, Box 29, AT&T-BLA. 
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In 1909 AT&T conducted a study that compared telephone penetration levels and rates in 
twelve cities without competition and twenty-seven cities with competition.153 The study found that 
the average development in non-competitive cities was only 8.2 telephones per 100 population, 
compared to 11.2 stations per 100 in cities with competition. The cover letter transmitting the 
report to President Vail concluded “it seems that with competition development is somewhat 
greater than without. Of course part of that greater development is to be ascribed to the lower rates 
prevailing under competition. ”154 
 
The need to maintain a large subscriber universe also affected the structure of the 
technology. Both contestants began to offer inexpensive two-party, four-party, and sometimes even 
eight and ten-party lines to increase their subscriber universe.155 The object was to get as many 
subscribers onto the system as quickly and as cheaply as possible. From 1894 to 1906 the ratio of 
subscribers to exchange circuits in the Bell licensee companies plummeted from one to one-half; in 
some cities the ratio was as low as one-third. One particularly novel attempt to respond to 
competition by broadening access was the development of the “Kitchen Telephone” by the 
California Bell licensee. The kitchen telephone was a very low-priced, compact instrument capable 
of making outward calls only. Unlike other residential telephones at the time, which were placed 
only in halls or dining rooms, they would be placed in the kitchen, “conveniently located for the 
use of the servants ... through which to order supplies from the butcher, grocer, coal dealer, and 
other tradespeople.”156 Though the model in mind here is clearly one of an upper class home, by 
the end of the competitive period, the telephone had become commonplace among the middle class, 
reaching 70% penetration in some parts of the country (see chapter 12). 
 
Dual Service in the Country 
Around 1900 a new force entered the telephone competition, a development as important in 
its own way as the initial wave of independent competition. Huge numbers of farmers began to buy 
their own telephones and wire and set up country telephone systems. Farmer lines were basically 
party lines which passed through five to twenty houses. Many were built by cooperative 
organizations which drew on their own member-subscribers for capital and operating labor. 
Subscribers were expected to maintain their own part of the line, the poles on their property, and 
their own phone. Advice on how to construct them was disseminated to millions of farmers through 
periodical publications such as the Farm Journal. To the large number of Americans who lived on 
farms, those neighborhood party lines provided welcome relief from isolation. According to one 
source, “from the day the second telephone is put on [the line] for about two months there is never 
a time when the line is not busy.”157 Once one line was established in a farming area, “telephone 
                                                 
153 Walter S. Gifford, AT&T Statistician, Aug. 10, 1909, Statement Showing Growth in “Bell” and 
Independent Telephone Development Together With Changes in Exchange Rates in Various Cities of the United States 
Arranged by Five Year Periods from 1894 to 1909, AT&T-BLA. 
154 Effect of Competition on Development and Rates, C.G. DuBois, Comptroller, AT&T, to Theodore Vail, 
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155 Party Line Development, 1898-99, Box 1258, AT&T-BLA. 
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contagion” struck the whole community. Nearby farms, hearing tales of its success, decided to 
build one of their own. 
 
Initially, each small farm line had its own organization. Its business had to be submitted to a 
vote of all of the members. As the lines proliferated throughout a region, those organizations made 
arrangements to interconnect their lines at someone’s house. Farmhouse “nodes” usually were not 
exchanges with switchboards but simple serial connections. They were run by farm wives or 
daughters who could be relied on to stay nearby to listen for the signal bell. If a person on one farm 
line wanted to talk to someone four farm lines away, he or she had to signal and make a connection 
through four different homes. Making a connection could become a long and socially interesting 
process. “I know men ... who cannot communicate with people in their neighborhood because the 
people that keep up the home exchange don’t like some of the people in the other neighborhood,” 
complained one telephone company employee.158 As the use of the telephone in the area spread, 
those small cooperatives often combined and adopted a corporate, commercial form of 
organization.159 Commercial rural systems averaged about eight telephones to a line; the mutual 
and farmer systems averaged about twenty-four telephones to a line. 
 
The telephone Census of 1902 documents the initial phases of a massive increase in the 
number of rural telephones. According to the census, there were 5,979 tiny farmer lines and rural 
mutual systems in 1902, and another 15,598 rural lines run on a commercial basis.160 Rural lines 
accounted for more than a quarter of a million telephones in the United States, about 11 percent of 
the total. As the social historian Claude Fischer has shown, during the next ten years telephone 
penetration in the farm areas caught up with and surpassed that of the urban areas.161 The growth of 
farm lines had begun to alter the long-standing rural/urban imbalance in the distribution of 
telephones. 
 
As the farm lines blossomed, they were drawn into the access competition. Farmers wanted 
connections to markets and merchants in the cities; the telephone companies wanted to obtain a 
competitive edge by controlling access to rural subscribers. Independent and Bell alike took note of 
what came to be known as “the farm line proposition.” That referred to the negotiations over which 
system the farm lines would choose to interconnect with. The once-neglected farmer became a 
highly sought after prize. One Bell manager who was particularly active in urging his local 
managers to go after the farmers said, “I say to you managers that whenever you have the farmers 
tied on to your exchange you have got the merchants where you want them.”162 Another Bell 
manager, decrying the lack of rural development of the Bell system in the Rocky mountain area, 
warned that if the independent got the farmers, “he has anchored his exchange.”163 
 
Those rural lines are generally counted by economic historians as part of the independents’ 
“market share,” but a large percentage of them-perhaps half-had no vested interest in competing 
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with Bell. Their goal was to bring the benefits of the telephone to their areas at the lowest possible 
rate. They would agree to connect with whoever offered the best terms, which might be Bell, the 
independent, or neither. Rural telephone systems proved to be as independent of the Independents 
as they were of Bell. When they became dissatisfied with the toll charges imposed on them by a 
connecting exchange, they would frequently disconnect their line and set up their own terminus in 
the same town. Whereas the organized independents almost never entered into direct competition 
with each other, the farmer lines didn’t care who they competed with. In some cases four different 
switchboards operated in the same community due to disagreements over connecting charges.164 
That type of competition so exasperated the organized independent movement that their 
associations tried to get manufacturers to refuse to sell equipment to independent companies that 
initiated competition when another independent was already adequately serving the community.165 
From a competitive standpoint, the farmers were not part of the organized independent movement, 
but truly independent “swing voters” who had to be courted by both sides. 
 
It was the presence of access competition that gave the farmers their leverage over the 
telephone companies. Dealing with the farmers was extraordinarily difficult for both telephone 
interests because there were no standard terms of trade. Each farm line had to be negotiated with on 
an individual basis, and the farmers were very demanding. Bell and many urban-based 
independents probably would have preferred to ignore them. The competition for subscribers, 
however, forced both Bell and the independents to seek out the farmers and offer favorable terms 
for interconnection. In 1900, for example, the New York and Pennsylvania Telephone Co., a Bell 
licensee, issued a general order announcing that “during the current year it is the intention of the 
company to push the development of telephone service in the rural districts.”166 The New York and 
Pennsylvania Telephone Co. also developed two special rural line contracts, one to establish a 
small switching station in farm houses, the other to connect farm lines to a toll station along the 
Bell lines. Not coincidentally, the Company’s territory in western New York and northern 
Pennsylvania was overrun with competing independents. The (Bell) Cumberland Company was 
also active in courting rural areas in response to competition. To farmers who built and maintained 
their own lines, the Cumberland Co. offered connections to its exchanges for only $2 per year.167 
That low rate prompted the Mississippi Independent Telephone Association to charge Bell with 
predatory pricing before the state Railroad Commission.168 
 
In addition to expanding the access universe of the telephone companies, interconnection 
agreements sometimes provided capital or maintenance for farmer lines that had grown beyond the 
capacity of the local organization to manage. Farm lines were easy and inexpensive to establish, but 
once they grew and achieved a wider scope of interconnection, the farmers rarely had the time to 
maintain them or the capital to upgrade them to higher technical standards. When it became 
necessary to consolidate the management of many small, separate lines into an integrated system, a 
shift from a mutual to a corporate form of organization usually had to be effected. That could 
                                                 
164 3-31 Chappelka 78 (1956). 
165 Id. 
166 General order #34, Feb. 14, 1900, Box 1330 AT&T-BLA. 
167 Report on Tennessee, 11 CUMBERLAND TEL. J. (Mar. 15, 1905). 
168 10 CUMBERLAND TEL. J. (Oct. 15, 1904). 
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involve some form of capital assistance from one of the two telephone interests. In other cases, the 
farmers would simply sell their lines to Bell. 
 
Bell’s response to competition 
Bell embraced a variety of tactics in response to independent competition. Correspondence 
between the national organization and the licensee companies reveals that five basic methods were 
employed: 1) the adoption of “fighting” rates, i.e., temporarily lower prices for local exchange 
access in order to drive the independent from the field;169 2) buying out competitors; 3) improving 
and extending service; 4) interfering with the franchising of independent companies; and 5) 
spreading unfavorable publicity about independent companies in order to scare away customers and 
financiers.170 
 
Although evidence can be found that each of those tactics did some damage to the 
independents in isolated circumstances, ultimately national and local Bell management came to 
understand that improving and extending service was the most powerful response to competition. 
Price wars produced nothing but financial losses for the licensee companies.171 Rate cuts were 
more expensive for Bell than for its rivals because the independents’ costs were generally lower.172 
Besides, rate cuts from Bell were utterly lacking in credibility, as people would not easily forget 
seventeen years of monopoly prices. Buying out competitors was a highly expensive proposition, 
too, although it was employed in a few strategic circumstances. Successful independents, however, 
had little incentive to sell, and by 1898 there were far too many of such for Bell purchases to make 
much of an impact. Blocking franchises worked in a few large cities,173 some of them of great 
strategic importance, but the growth of independent-controlled exchanges in the surrounding areas 
                                                 
169 For typical correspondence of that sort see C.E. Yost, President, Iowa Union Telephone Company, to C. J. 
French, American Bell, Apr. 18, 1899, AT&T-BLA; E. B. Field, General Manager, Colorado Telephone Company, to 
C. J. French, Aug. 28, 1895, AT&T-BLA. French, the national organization’s person in charge of competitive tactics, 
advocated “fighting” rates lower than the opposition’s as a temporary expedient. 
170 Chappelka (1956) 195 discusses the variety of competitive tactics used by ABT in the early years of 
competition. 
171 American Bell’s Annual Reports from 1899-1907 note repeatedly that competition had forced many 
licensee companies to reduce their rates to unremunerative levels and adversely affected their financial condition. See 
ABT ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1902); ABT ANNUAL REPORT 12 (1906). In 1902, President Fish wrote to C. E. Yost, 
“the plans of meeting the opposition by reducing rates has, I believe, rarely if ever succeeded.” Cited in Chappelka 
(1956). 
172 Mr. Jackson, President of the Central Union Company, wrote to President Hudson, ABT, in 1899 
complaining that in medium-sized towns of 10-20,000 population the independents were charging annual flat rates of 
$24 (Business) and $12 (residence) for single-party metallic circuit lines. “We cannot meet these rates, and cannot sell 
our metallic service at the present rate of $60-66 per annum in exchanges of that size.” Cited in Chappelka (1956). 
173 Bell lobbied city governments to prevent franchising of competing companies, and when that failed they 
loaded the franchises with restrictive provisions that made life difficult for the competitor. Bell’s political efforts paid 
off most heavily in Washington D.C., where the influence of the Chesapeake and Potomac Company on Congress was 
strong enough to ensure that authority for competition was shelved in 1900. Lobbying efforts by the General Manager 
of Bell’s Colorado Telephone Company prevented a competing Denver franchise in 1901, and in 1902 the Vice 
President of the Colorado Company helped elect the Governor of the state. In Scranton, Pennsylvania, Bell interests 
defeated three pro-competition ordinances in four years. From 1896-1899 pro-Bell politicians in Kansas City buried 
several competing franchise authorizations. In Scranton and Kansas City, however, an independent company eventually 
was francised. 
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maintained constant pressure on cities to franchise an independent. The effort by Bell’s public 
relations agents to discredit the independents could only work in areas where people had no direct 
knowledge of independent telephony, such as New England and New York. In most areas, 
independents had a track record and support from local capital, local merchants, and local 
politicians. Bell’s survival as a system could not rely on any of those methods. 
Toll Line and Exchange Development 
As the other tactics failed, Bell managers increasingly came to understand that its own 
underdevelopment was the root of the problem of independent competition. Increasingly, Bell’s 
main competitive advantage came to be seen as its ability to offer comprehensive service within a 
given region. Although independent exchanges and telephones often outnumbered Bell in a given 
territory, Bell still had more exchanges than any individual independent company. With its 
coordinated business management and superior access to capital, it was in a better position than the 
independents to expand, interconnect, and integrate the operations of many dispersed exchanges. In 
effect, Bell began to try to beat the independents at their own game. The “opposition” had stolen a 
march on the Bell system by offering access to a larger number of local and regional points. Now 
Bell would expand and integrate its operations so that it could offer users an even larger bundle of 
regional connections than the independents. Expanding their toll lines to improve connectivity 
among Bell exchanges would “crush the opposition,” according to one licensee company 
manager.174 The President of AT&T, Frederick P. Fish, put it more delicately in 1903: “it is upon 
your toll facilities that you must depend for holding your own against the opposition.”175 
 
The renewed Bell emphasis on exchange and toll line development is often misunderstood 
as a strategy based on superior long-distance transmission technology.176 In that view, Bell 
exploited new technology such as loading coils177 to create ultra-long-distance connections which 
the independents lacked the technological wherewithal to match. That misconception is based on 
the ambiguity of the term “toll lines.” Contemporary usage referred to interexchange connections 
within the licensee companies’ territories as toll lines, and the longer distance, intercity lines of 
AT&T as long lines. The toll lines which the Bell managers saw as their salvation were not the long 
lines of the AT&T Company, but regional connections within a 100-mile radius, which were 
usually supplied by the local operating companies. Bell’s toll lines utilized the same basic 
technology that was available to the independents; AT&T had no controlling patents on the 
technology needed to make connections of that length.178 The real source of competitive advantage 
                                                 
174 C. J. Glidden, President, Michigan Telephone Company, to President Hudson, ABT Co., Jan. 28, 1899. 
AT&T-BLA. 
175 President Fish, ABT Company, to G. Y. Wallace, Rocky Mountain Bell, May 25, 1903. AT&T-BLA. 
176 FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 2-
3 (Ballinger 1987). Faulhaber stresses the technological advantage achieved by the loading coil and that “the linchpin 
of Vail’s strategy was to gain control of the technology.” 
177 See NEIL WASSERMAN, FROM INVENTION TO INNOVATION: LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE 
TRANSMISSION AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY _ (Johns Hopkins University Press 1985). Wasserman’s 
account of the application of loading coils makes it clear that it did not play a significant role in the competitive battle. 
178 In correspondence dated Apr. 3, 1903, President Fish of AT&T admitted that the company held “no 
controlling patents on long distance telephone apparatus or systems. [L]ong distance lines of some commercial value 
[could] be constructed and operated by anyone.” Fish to C. H. Cutting, Apr. 3, 1903. Cited in Chappelka (1956). See 
also Thomas Lockwood, AT&T, to Theodore Vail, Aug. 8, 1908. AT&T-BLA. 
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was comprehensive coverage of a particular region corresponding to the community of interest of 
the majority of telephone users. To be sure, the scope of access desired by different types of users 
varied greatly. But the best way to satisfy all possible users was to create a comprehensive, 
universal network. 
 
The demand for telephone connections between points over 200 miles apart was still 
restricted to a tiny minority of users. No more than 5 percent of all telephone calls were to points 
more than fifty miles away.179 For communication over long distances (say, 500-1,000 miles), the 
telegraph was still the dominant and by far the most economical service. As late as 1909, a 
telephone businessman wrote that while ultra-long-distance telephoning “appeals most strongly to 
the imagination,” it was still “occasional” and “of little commercial or social importance.”180 Long 
lines business was profitable, but it had always been in Bell’s control; in fact, Bell’s pursuit of that 
market to the exclusion of most others prior to 1894 was the reason it had left itself vulnerable to 
competitors. The new emphasis on intensive toll line development within the licensee companies’ 
territories was actually a sharp departure from the old Bell vision. It was, however, a logical and 
indeed unavoidable response to access competition. 
 
Prodded by competition, the Bell licensee companies opened approximately 3,500 new 
exchanges in cities with populations under 10,000 between 1894 and 1907.181 That was three times 
the number of public exchanges they had opened in the previous seventeen years. Between 1902 
and 1907, Bell’s wire mileage grew by 164 percent, which was actually a faster rate of expansion 
than the independents.182 Table 6-4 documents the bulge in the growth rates of Bell system physical 
plant during the competitive period. Between the year 1898, when the new strategy of expansion 
began, and the financial panic of 1907, which temporarily dried up capital resources, Bell plant 
grew by an average of more than 17 percent per year, double the earlier rate. In 1899, 1900, and 
1906, the annual rate of growth exceeded 22 percent. A 1909 statement by a Southwest Bell 
representative confirmed that the expansion was a product of access competition. “We have scraped 
along for the past ten years,” he said, “building exchanges and toll lines that we ought not to have 
constructed except for the purpose of causing the service to be more valuable than that of our 
adversary.”183 
  
                                                 
179 A graph showing the volume of toll calls as a function of distance was prepared by Doolittle for the New 
York and Pennsylvania Telephone Co. for 1900. For cities with exchanges, 98 percent of all calls were to points within 
50 miles. For toll stations in small towns, the percentage was somewhat smaller-about 95 percent. Box 1330, AT&T-
BLA. 
180 Gansey Johnson, Columbus Citizens Tel. Co., 17 TELEPHONY (Jan. 2, 1909). 
181 TELEPHONE CENSUS 1907. 
182 Id. 
183 14 TELEPHONY (Jan. 1909) emphasis added. 
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TABLE 6-4 
BELL SYSTEM PLANT EXPANSION, 1885-1912 
Year Total Bell Plant Increase % Increase 
1893 $73,136,242 --- ^8.20 
1894 $77,731,161 $4,594,919 6.28 
1895 $87,858,500 $10,127,339 13.03 
1896 $95,241,646 $7,383,146 8.40 
1897 $104,487,524 $9,245,878 9.71 
1898 $118,123,841 $13,636,317 13.05 
1899 $145,511,290 $27,387,449 23.19 
1900 $180,699,800 $35,188,510 24.18 
1901 $211,780,200 $31,080,400 17.20 
1902 $250,013,200 $38,233,000 18.05 
1903 $284,567,800 $34,554,600 13.82 
1904 $316,520,600 $31,952,800 11.23 
1905 $368,065,300 $51,544,700 16.28 
1906 $450,061,400 $81,996,100 22.28 
1907 $502,987,900 $52,926,500 11.76 
1908 $528,717,000 $25,729,100 5.12 
1909 $557,417,146 $28,700,146 5.43 
1910 $610,999,964 $53,582,818 9.61 
1911 $666,660,702 $55,660,738 9.11 
1912 $742,287,631 $75,626,929 10.19 
^average annual growth rate, 1885-1893 
Source: FCC Telephone Investigation Report, 1939 
 
Within the national Bell organization, Thomas B. Doolittle of AT&T was the most 
consistent, committed advocate of responding to competition with the development of systemic 
connectivity. Doolittle was the inventor of hard drawn-copper wire and opened one of the first 
commercial exchanges. Practically from the beginning of the Bell system, Doolittle had taken a 
special interest in the toll line business. His interest came not only for its potential earning power 
but as a means of protecting the business from the ‘dangers’ of competition. In 1891 he received 
permission from AT&T to devote all of his time to it and began to travel through the country 
studying the operating conditions of the licensee companies. As Doolittle and his staff passed 
through the territories, they studied traffic patterns and volume, rates, and the operating procedures 
used in making up toll connections. When Doolittle began his work, the toll facilities of the 
licensee companies generally were poorly developed and inefficiently run. The management of the 
national company and that of the licensee companies were not well coordinated. As one of his 
reports observed, operating company managers were suspicious of “the Boston influence.”184 
                                                 
184 Doolittle to Vail, January 29, 1908, AT&T-BLA. 
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Working patiently for fifteen years, Doolittle spearheaded the administrative rationalization of the 
interconnection process and the growth of toll connectivity in the Bell system. 
Doolittle’s arguments for toll line development were based on a clear, explicit grasp of the 
demand interdependence of telephone service. His records of toll calling receipts convinced him 
that the average revenue that could be expected from a place increased as it was connected to more 
places. That in turn enabled him to recommend extending toll lines to smaller and smaller towns.185 
In an effort to convince the Boston management to invest in exchange and toll line development, he 
prepared a diagram illustrating the increased traffic over a toll trunk line that would result from 
connecting groups of tributary towns.186 Doolittle’s grasp of demand interdependence made him an 
advocate of exchange as well as toll line development. When people were attached to an exchange 
they could receive incoming calls in addition to placing outgoing calls. That increased the scope of 
service that could be offered to users in other cities. His reports on the licensee companies from 
1896 to 1902 always contained long lists of towns where small exchanges should be placed. 
 
In promoting the development of small exchanges, Doolittle pioneered the theory and 
practice of “subsidizing” local exchange access with long-distance revenues. The company would 
gain by establishing inexpensive exchange service in small towns even if the exchange itself lost 
money on a “stand-alone” basis, he argued, because giving users in other locations access to 
subscribers in the smaller towns would stimulate increased use of the toll lines. Oftentimes the 
access rates for residences and small town exchanges were kept artificially low in order to create a 
larger subscriber universe which would stimulate long-distance usage. Doolittle’s reasoning must 
have influenced President Fish, who wrote in 1902: 
 
it is at least worth considering whether or not cheap exchanges in the small 
towns do not add enough to the toll business to make them a proper investment, 
even if there is no profit in the small exchanges.187 
 
That access competition produced “cross subsidies” from toll usage to exchange access is 
particularly noteworthy, since it is commonly assumed by economists that such practices are a 
product of governmental rate regulation and would not exist in a competitive market. 
 
But it was access competition, and not merely the desire to enhance toll traffic, that 
propelled the Bell system to extend access at lower rates in order to stimulate usage and expand its 
scope. The degree to which Bell expanded even to the most economically unattractive rural areas, 
was evident in 1907 correspondence between G.Y. Wallace, the President of Rocky Mountain Bell, 
and the national organization: 
 
“We opened a number of small exchanges in Utah-not remunerative-but 
helped us in our fight for supremacy. Our actions were the virtual undoing of Utah 
Independent Telephone Company.”188 
                                                 
185 Doolittle to Fish, March 22, 1904 Box 1330, AT&T-BLA. 
186 Doolittle to Davis, June 4, 1896, Box 1285, AT&T-BLA. 
187 President Fish to C.E. Yost, August 30, 1902. 
188 G.Y. Wallace, Rocky Mountain Bell, to T.N. Vail, AT&T, November 7, 1907, AT&T-BLA. 
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In the same letter, Wallace reported building twenty exchanges and “unremunerative” toll 
lines connecting them in Wyoming, and claimed that the superior access had forced the opposition 
to give up. Similarly, competition in the South was overcome when Edward J. Hall, the head of 
Southern Bell, managed to increase Southern Bell’s capital resources by thirty-fold between 1897 
and 1906 to invest in toll line construction and in upgrading local exchange circuits from grounded 
to metallic to make them more compatible with the toll network. 
 
The expansion of the network increased the complexity of making connections. AT&T 
responded to that challenge by pioneering a method of routing, handling, and accounting for calls 
known as “center checking.” Center checking centralized the responsibility for routing and 
accounting for toll calls at designated exchanges.189 When implemented, every operator in the 
region knew where to transfer toll calls headed to a specific destination, and the operators at the toll 
center knew how to get the call to its destination as directly and quickly as possible. Rationalizing 
the process of toll interconnection reduced the amount of time consumed by making a connection 
and resulted in great savings in plant facilities.190 The rationalization process also made it possible 
for the licensee companies to exploit “phantom circuits,” a method of creating a third voice circuit 
out of two metallic circuits. 
 
Rate rationalization was another important achievement of Doolittle’s. He went about 
systematically simplifying and reorganizing the licensee companies’ toll tariffs by replacing 
charges based on route mileage with a more uniform airline mileage basis for setting rates. Here 
again competition was the spur to efficiency. Doolittle’s reports identify the competitive losses 
caused by the “border problem,’ the inefficiencies in interexchange service caused by Bell’s 
division of the country into separate territories under different managements. He noted that if two 
towns were only fifty miles apart but were located on opposite sides of a border separating two 
licensee companies, a caller could end up paying the rate for a 150 mile call due to the way the call 
was transferred between the two Bell companies. Independent competitors were taking advantage 
of such rate discrepancies, offering more direct, cheaper service. In line with his drive to rationalize 
toll organization, facilities planning, and rates, Doolittle brought the managers of AT&T, the 
licensee companies, and independent connecting companies together at conferences which 
established how traffic should be routed and which company’s lines should be used. 
 
The competitive advantage derived from the Bell organization’s emphasis on toll 
connectivity can be appreciated by contrasting Bell’s systematic approach to that of the 
independents. Prior to their consolidation into regional systems, most independents relied on state 
associations to coordinate toll connectivity. The lack of a central management authority continually 
handicapped their attempts to coordinate toll service. In November 1904 Telephony Magazine 
observed that it was “the exception rather than the rule” that “we are able to offer competition on 
messages of over 100 miles.” In some cases the problem was poor construction, in other cases it 
was roundabout routing, in still others it was inconsistent or uncoordinated operating procedures. In 
a speech before the International Telephone Association, a prominent independent telephone 
operator summarized the independent movement’s managerial problems: 
                                                 
189 A complete ‘center-checking’ matrix for the city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania from 1903 can be found in 
Box 1330, AT&T-BLA. 
190 Doolittle, 1907 Annual Report, Box 2020, AT&T-BLA. 
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This is our strength ... we are better  able to give satisfactory local exchange and 
“short haul” long distance service than companies managed and owned by directors 
and stockholders hundreds of miles away. Long distance service, however, under 
this kind of management is not satisfactory. Here is where we are weak: one 
company believes in a three minute time limit, another in five. One says one half 
cent per mile is enough; another three-fifths cent. This company’s lines are of 
copper, that one’s mostly iron. This company uses a code designed by its own traffic 
manager, that one the code of its state association, and the next one no code at all, 
and so on. What is the result? Confusion, bad service and dissatisfied customers.191 
 
The problem, clearly, was organization rather than technology and in particular the 
comprehensiveness of toll interconnection within a region. 
 
Doolittle felt that his work was not appreciated or used appropriately by the licensee 
companies until about 1904. As he admitted in retrospect, “a vast amount of laborious work was 
performed, which resulted in a report that was not understood, and in many cases, not even read ...” 
By 1904, however, he felt that he had gained the confidence and cooperation of the licensee 
company managers. Competition had forced them to pay attention. Toll lines, Doolittle stressed 
again and again, were the Bell system’s most effective weapon against competition because they 
expanded the scope of the network. Doolittle’s efforts helped to reverse the independents’ 
incursions into the short-haul toll market. In 1902, independents handled 37 percent of the toll calls. 
By 1907 that had declined to 24 percent. 
 
Sublicensing independent exchanges 
As the wave of dual service competition continued to gather momentum, both Bell and the 
independents struggled to weave their exchange holdings into an integrated system offering access 
to as many cities and towns within a 200-mile radius as possible. As part of that process, the Bell 
system was forced to liberalize considerably its no-interconnection-with independents policy. It 
began to expand its access to rural areas by “sublicensing” or interconnecting with non-competing 
independent exchanges. 
 
Conventional histories present Bell’s refusal to connect with the independents as a harsh 
and powerful competitive tactic. More generally, theories developed by antitrust economists tend to 
classify such “refusals to deal” as inherently monopolistic. An established system which denies 
access to or makes itself incompatible with its competitors is, according to that doctrine, 
suppressing competition. Treatments of telephone history also tend to see the eventual 
interconnection of Bell and the independents as a product of regulatory intervention alone. In fact, 
the Bell system’s most powerful strategic ploy proved to be interconnecting with certain 
independents, and that policy change was made in response to market rather than political 
pressures. 
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Between 1894 and 1902, the national Bell organization adhered to a policy of strict 
exclusion. Independent companies could not be connected to Bell exchanges or toll lines, even 
when they occupied territory remote from any Bell exchange and were not competing with Bell. 
Bell refused to purchase equipment from independent manufacturers and refused to sell Western 
Electric equipment to the independents. The independents made their most rapid competitive gains 
in that period. Their growth occurred because of, rather than in spite of, the no-connection policy. 
Bell was simply unable to keep up with the demand for telephone service in thousands of small 
towns. In 1901 there were still 112 cities greater than 5,000 in population (12 percent of the total) 
with no Bell exchange; in smaller incorporated places with a population between 500 and 5,000 
there were Bell exchanges in only 1,775 of the 5,447 (32 percent of the total).192 In those 
conditions, the effect of the noninterconnection policy was to cut off Bell from the majority of 
telephone users in the undeveloped areas, and guarantee its competitors exclusive access to every 
exchange built independently of the Bell system. In the states of Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois, the 
independents greatly outnumbered Bell and were on the verge of achieving the kind of critical mass 
that could result in mass desertions of Bell exchanges. 
 
By 1901 it was clear even to the distant Boston managers that absolute exclusion of 
independent companies had been a costly mistake. Some managers of the licensee companies began 
to consider exchanging traffic with independent exchanges that did not directly compete with those 
of Bell. That policy was known as “sublicensing” because it involved a licensee company 
extending the connecting privileges of the Bell license contract to independent companies within its 
territory. Two licensee companies that had been particularly hard hit by competition actually had 
begun to implement that policy on their own. 
 
The national organization moved more slowly. Unlike other adjustments in Bell practices 
made in response to competition, sublicensing involved revising some of the fundamental 
assumptions underlying the license contract. The primary object of the license contract was to 
secure profits and control for the national organization while harnessing local initiative and capital. 
But how could the same level of control be maintained when interconnecting with independent 
companies? If Bell was to interconnect with noncompeting local exchanges, should it require them 
to lease Bell instruments, as it did of its traditional licensees? If so, what would induce those 
independents to lease Bell instruments when it could obtain independently manufactured 
telephones at a lower price? If not, how could it maintain the uniform technical standards it 
desired? Since Bell would have no ownership control over the connecting company, there was also 
the risk that sublicensed companies might break the connection contract later. On September 25, 
1901, President Fish sent out a letter to the top executives of AT&T and ABT soliciting their 
opinions on those questions. 
 
All of them agreed that the time for some form of sublicensing had come. AT&T Chief 
Engineer Joseph Davis admitted that the Bell Co. had had no idea how widespread the demand for 
telephone service would prove to be at the time the perpetual license contracts were drawn up in the 
early 1880s: 
 
                                                 
192 Joseph Davis to President Fish, October 23, 1901, AT&T-BLA. 
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[If] it could have been foreseen what an extensive development of the 
telephone business would be required to meet the needs of the people, and the 
amount of capital involved, it would have been good policy on the part of the ABT 
Co. to have encouraged its licensees to sublicense to local people the right to furnish 
service in country districts and villages and towns …, and to have supplied 
telephones for this purpose at very moderate rental. If this had been done the field 
for opposition companies would have been very much curtailed and we would now 
have friendly instead of hostile people in such places.193 
 
Davis’s comment underscores the fact that universal service in the modern sense was never 
part of AT&T’s original conception of the business. Never in their wildest dreams did the early 
Bell managers think that telephone service could be demanded by, and profitably extended to, as 
many people and places as turned out to be possible. 
 
E. J. Hall, Vice President and General Manager of AT&T, George Leverett, AT&T General 
Counsel, and Thomas Sherwin, the ABT Co. General Auditor, all agreed that Bell should insist on 
leasing its own telephones to sublicensees rather than selling them or permitting them to use 
independently manufactured telephones. Interconnection with users of other telephones was 
objectionable on three grounds. First, it reduced the Bell system’s control over its technical 
standards. Using only Bell phones promoted uniformity and compatibility, while leasing 
encouraged operating companies to turn in equipment as it became worn or obsolete, allowing the 
system to maintain better standards of communication. Second, the Bell system had publicly 
opposed physical interconnection laws on the grounds that independent phones were of lower 
quality than theirs, hence their use over the Bell system would impair the quality of the service. It 
seems fairly clear that President Fish and the others who made that argument  knew that it was 
untrue; the quality of the major independent brands was equal to Bell’s.194 The real reason for 
opposing physical interconnection was the property rights argument outlined in the previous 
chapter. But having used the other argument publicly, they knew that connecting with independent 
equipment now would obviously contradict it and make them look dishonest and might thereby 
lend support to compulsory interconnection. Last, but not least, Bell knew that leasing telephones 
was far more profitable than selling them outright.195 Leverett suggested that the requirement to use 
Bell phones could be made more acceptable to the independent companies if Bell offered to furnish 
them below cost, or even at a rate that was purely nominal.24 Davis, on the other hand, believed 
that while every effort should be made to induce independents to use Bell telephones, the benefits 
of “extending the field of the Bell interests” via interconnection more than compensated for any 
disadvantages that might accrue from  the use of non-Bell telephones.25 
 
What most impressed the Bell managers were the competitive advantages to be gained by 
sublicensing. Interconnection would allow Bell to gain access to small town and rural locations 
without building and operating what were likely to be unprofitable exchanges.  The small 
exchanges so connected could serve as feeders to the Bell toll system. As it extended Bell 
connections to unserved areas, it would also take connections away from the exclusive control of 
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194 President Fish to Kilgore, February 24, 1902, AT&T-BLA. 
195 Thomas Sherwin to President Fish, October 22, 1901, AT&T-BLA. 
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competing independents. Potential competitors, Leverett observed, would be coopted by the new 
policy: 
 
telephone companies established in regions which we do not occupy ... become 
starting points for attacks upon our system in other places where such opposition is 
extremely undesirable. [I]f people are willing to venture their own money and do 
business in a territory we have not occupied, we should regard them and endeavor to 
have them in fact as allies, and not as competitors. 
 
The new policy was ratified late in 1901; henceforth, licensee companies could sublicense 
independent exchanges under a standard form of contract with the blessings of the national 
corporation.196 The new sublicense contract demanded three conditions for interconnection: the 
independent exchange could not be in direct competition with a Bell exchange; it could use only 
Western Electric telephones; and it had to agree to connect with only Bell toll lines. Officially, Bell 
charged its sublicensees $2 per year per instrument. In actuality, the licensees deviated from those 
conditions according to the exigencies of the competitive situation.197 The beleaguered Central 
Union Co. connected with noncompeting independents from 1904 on regardless of what 
instruments they used.198 Wisconsin Telephone gave its sublicensees ten years free use of Western 
Electric telephones until pressure from the national organization forced it to conform to the 
standard contract.199 
 
Under the terms set by the national organization, sublicensing progressed, but slowly (see 
table 6-5) Some licensee companies unilaterally relaxed the contract terms in order to attract more 
independent users into their fold. The Central Union company, for example, liberalized its terms in 
1904, allowing sublicensed exchanges to keep using non-Bell telephones. The number of 
sublicensed exchanges doubled in one year. By 1907, the Central Union owned and operated 310 
exchanges and 188,000 telephones, while its sublicensees operated 777 exchanges representing 
192,000 telephones (see table 6-6) In other words, the majority of telephone users in that territory 
were connected into the Bell system through independent exchanges.200 
  
                                                 
196 General Managers Letter Book #632, October 31, 1901, AT&T-BLA. 
197 President Fish to G.W. Wallace, Rocky Mountain Bell, June 20, 1903, AT&T-BLA. 
198 Atwater, History of the Central Union Company, (1913) p. 136-7. 
199 R. Gabel, 1987.  
200 Central Union Co. Annual Report, 1907, AT&T-BLA. 
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TABLE 6-5 
SUBLICENSING: INDEPENDENT TELEPHONES 
CONNECTING WITH BELL, 1901-1906 
 Number of Independent telephones Percent 
Connectin
g 
Dec.31, Connectin
g 
Non-
connect 
Total 
1899 10,000 328,000 338,000 3 
1900 20,000 500,000 520,000 4 
1901 47,961 692,000 739,961 7 
1902 84,021 969,845 1,053,866 8 
1903 120,936 1,124,000 1,244,936 10 
1904 167,213 1,348,000 1,415,213 12 
1905 246,337 1,596,000 1,842,337 13 
1906 297,218 1,862,000 2,159,218 14 
Source: Chief Statistician’s Division, AT&T Co. 
 
TABLE 6-6 
SUBLICENSING IN THE CENTRAL UNION  
COMPANY TERRITORY, 1902-1907 
As of Dec.31, 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 
Sublicensed 
Exchange 
194 213 253 513 623 777 
Central Union 
Co. exchanges 
229 227 275 295 316 310 
# sublicensed 
phones (000) 
--- --- --- 130 160 192 
Source: Minutes of Central Union Co. Board meeting, March 11, 1907 
 
Sublicensing was a powerful weapon in a battle between exclusive networks. It not only 
provided Bell with connections to the small locations Bell was uninterested in serving, it also 
removed those exchanges from the independent orbit. Sublicensing could also be used to withdraw 
from dual service competition without losing access to the city’s telephone users. In mid-sized 
cities where the independent exchange had established a commanding lead in subscribers, Bell 
would offer to pull out if the independent would agree to become a sublicensee. If the independent 
agreed, Bell gained access to the preponderance of subscribers in the city while relieving itself of 
the need to maintain a facility under the rigors of competition. The independent gained access to 
Bell’s toll lines and respite from competition, a chance to raise its rates. Thus, what appeared to be 
an independent success suddenly became a setback; a whole group of subscribers was snatched out 
from under them. Such was the case in Middletown, New York, whose independent exchange had 
1,000 users to Bell’s ninety. The Middletown independent entered into a sublicense contract with 
Bell’s Hudson River Co. in January 1904.201 The same thing happened in Emporia, Kansas, whose 
                                                 
201 AMERICAN TELEPHONE JOURNAL (Jan. 28, 1905). 
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independent had 1200 subscribers to the Bell company’s 131. The Emporia independent was 
sublicensed and the Bell exchange closed down in 1905. 
 
The organized independents immediately recognized that sublicensing threatened to 
disintegrate their movement. Their publications and associations assailed the practice in the 
strongest terms. “You cannot be an Independent company and connect in any way with the Bell,” 
James Hoge, President of the National Independent Association wrote in the pages of Telephony. 
“You cannot serve two masters. You must choose between the people and a greedy corporation.”202 
 
In December 1902 the convention of the Interstate Independent Telephone Association in 
Chicago was forced to deal with the problem at length.203 A delegate from Illinois moved that 
companies using Bell telephones be disqualified from membership. An Iowa delegate opposed the 
participation of “anybody in any way connecting with the Bell companies under contract.” 
Connection with Bell lines destroyed the push for independent growth, added an Ohio delegate. In 
response, the owner of an exchange in Ashland, Kentucky, pointed out that his was the only 
telephone exchange in town. The steel mills and iron works there demanded long distance 
connections to New York and Chicago, which could only be obtained over Bell lines. He claimed 
that Bell did not enforce the exclusive connection feature of the contract in his territory; they 
allowed him to send traffic over their lines even though he was connected to other independent 
companies. His company, he claimed, was “independent from the ground up,” but if it could make 
an arrangement with the Bell companies for long-distance connections and thereby keep a 
competing Bell exchange out of the city, he believed it was good business policy. 
 
A committee was appointed and charged to make a report on the issue. Its recommendations 
made a slight concession to those independents facing circumstances like the Kentucky exchange, 
but basically came out strongly against any form of cooperation with Bell. Operating companies or 
individuals using Bell apparatus tend to “demoralize and destroy the independent movement” and 
should be barred from membership in the national, interstate, or state associations. Only companies 
that connect their toll lines and exchanges with independent companies should be eligible for 
membership.204 The resolution passed unanimously. 
 
The progress of sublicensing has been documented before by scholars such as Langdale 
(1978), but its significance in the context of access competition and its implications for standard 
accounts of universal service have not been fully appreciated. Despite Bell’s later claims that 
universal service in the modern sense was its policy from the beginning, Bell ultimately obtained 
most of its access to small town and rural America through interconnection agreements with 
independent companies. More importantly, its decision to “reach out and touch” the rural areas was 
not a product of its own commitment to universal coverage, but a policy forced upon it by the 
exigencies of access competition. 
                                                 
202 11 TELEPHONY 314 (May 1906). 
203 WESTERN ELECTRICIAN 426 (Dec. 13, 1902). 
204 “We deplore individuals or companies connecting lines and exchanges with Bell licensee companies, … as 
we believe that no such relation should be permitted, except, possibly, in isolated cases, which arrangement should be 
passed upon and authorized by the state association, …the executive committee of the interstate association, or the 
advisory board of the national association, the authority in each case to be granted only by a 2/3 vote.” Id. 
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Each of the preceding sections demonstrates how access competition promoted a universal 
telephone infrastructure by placing a premium on a network’s scope. Had the competitors been 
interconnected, on the other hand, the incentives to pursue universality would have been greatly 
weakened. Independent competitors would have found it much easier to establish service in the 
urban areas already developed by Bell, and could have concentrated on simply undercutting Bell’s 
price. The Bell System might never have undertaken the massive capital investments required to 
enlarge its exchanges in outlying areas and its network of toll lines, as those investments would not 
have given it a competitive advantage over the less extensive networks of the independents. 
Likewise, the independents would have had no incentive to construct alternative toll networks to 
connect independent exchanges. Incentives to restructure the technology to cheapen the cost of 
access would have been less powerful. Neither Bell nor the commercial independents would have 
needed to be in any hurry to reach out to the rural areas and smaller towns because with 
interconnection it would  not have mattered which system reached them first. 
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DUAL SERVICE: THE ANATOMY OF SUBSCRIBER 
FRAGMENTATION 
 
 
FOR THE TEN YEARS BETWEEN 1902 and 1912, competing telephone exchanges 
operated in more than half of all American cities over 5,000 in population. When dual service 
peaked in 1904, it existed in 483, or 60 percent, of the cities with a population greater than 5,000. 
In terms of the total number of competing exchanges in cities of all sizes, dual service reached its 
apogee in 1911, when it existed in 2,290 places. 
  
Because we are all familiar with universal interconnection and rely on it heavily in our 
everyday life, we tend to assume that its absence was simply a mistake – a problem crying out for a 
regulatory solution. But we are in no position to assess the significance of homogenized telephone 
access unless we know something about what things were like when it didn’t exist. This chapter 
attempts to portray the reality of dual service as it affected telephone users of the period. The first 
section examines the way subscribers divided themselves between the two systems in a single 
urban telephone exchange, that of Louisville, Kentucky, in 1910. The second section examines the 
fragmentation of intercity telephone access. Maps showing regional exchange access in the Los 
Angeles area, the state of Indiana, and the state of New York have been prepared to display 
graphically the extent to which dual service affected intercity telephone calling in a region. 
 
Dual service at the exchange  
The analysis of subscriber fragmentation patterns in a dual system is especially rewarding 
from the standpoint of social theory. Much like the language barriers in a bilingual community, 
dual service divided communities by communication. Some users were confined to one of the two 
systems, others were “bilingual” or duplicate users. Unlike language, however, the division of the 
public into two telephone systems reflected consumer choice rather than cultural inheritance. By 
heightening our awareness of who was connected to whom, by illuminating peoples choices about 
to whom it was and was not important to have telephone access, subscriber fragmentation patterns 
provide a fascinating road map to the organization of urban society. 
 
How did dual service work? In 1910 the telephone was not yet the dominant mode of 
communication for the majority of the people living in cities, although it was rapidly becoming so. 
Only 20 percent of the people in a large city had telephones in their homes. The rest of the public, if 
they used telephones at all, relied on public stations, which may or may not have been pay 
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telephones. Drug stores and saloons, for example, had a very high subscription rate because they 
were customarily telephones that could be used for free by the people in a neighborhood. Virtually 
all large businesses had telephones, especially if they were national or interstate in scope. About 50 
to 75 percent of the smaller businesses used the telephone, the rate varying widely depending on 
the type of business. All of those adoption patterns had changed radically since 1894 and were still 
in flux in 1910. In that context, the presence of two incompatible systems created inconveniences, 
but they were accepted as part of the process of growth and experimentation, just as incompatible 
bank cards and computer models seem unobjectionable today. 
 
To provide some historical perspective, it is useful to compare the telephone system with 
the city directories of the period as a communications medium. City directories listed the names, 
occupations, and street addresses of all the residents and also contained listings of the city’s 
businesses, services, and institutions. Like its successor, the telephone directory, those publications 
were both a source of useful information and an advertising medium. Their publishers made money 
by selling subscriptions to the public and display ads to businesses. City directories had been an 
established and profitable genre of publication for at least seventy years. Every major city had one; 
some of the bigger publishers, like Polk’s, supplied several cities. 
 
After 1920, the street directories of the 1800s and early 1900s were gradually displaced by 
telephone directories and yellow pages. Every function that the city directories had served was 
absorbed by “the phone book.” There was one important difference, though: the telephone and the 
automobile had radically redefined the nature of urban space. A directory that emphasized location 
was of little use when the bulk of urban commerce was organized around real-time 
telecommunications. The most important thing to know was not where people or businesses resided 
but how to get in touch with them by telephone. Communications access was primary; the street 
address, secondary. 
 
In 1910, city directories still sold more subscriptions than the telephone exchange. Many 
businesses (not all) listed their telephone numbers in their directory ads, but for most of the public 
the really important information was where things were located. Dual service was thus a 
characteristic of an urban communications system in transition. Although rapidly emerging as 
dominant, the telephone had not yet absorbed and eliminated older media such as the telegraph and 
the city directory. 
 
For many businesses, subscribing to both the Bell and independent exchanges was a simple 
way to get around the fragmentation caused by competition. As those advertisements from the 
Louisville, Kentucky, city directory of 1909205 show, duplicate subscriptions were treated as a 
routine part of doing business (see figure 7-1). Both numbers were listed in the advertisements, and 
many businesses arranged to have the same telephone number on both the “Home” (the 
independent) and the “Cumberland” (the Bell licensee company) exchanges. Their duplication, of 
course, made it unnecessary for many smaller subscribers to do so, for the latter were guaranteed 
access to those businesses regardless of whether they were Bell or Home Co. subscribers. 
 
                                                 
205 39 Caron’s Directory of the City of Louisville (1909). 
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FIGURE 7-1 
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The decision to duplicate or not can be taken as an indication of who did and did not value, 
and of who could and could not afford, universal telephone access. As one might expect, different 
categories of users show very different rates of duplication. Fortunately, the Bell Labs Archives 
possesses a document with detailed data about duplication and subscription patterns in one city. In 
1910, a lawyer for the independent competitor of Bell in Louisville and the surrounding region 
broke down all of the city of Louisville’s telephone subscribers into 214 categories and compiled a 
list showing how many members of each category were Bell subscribers, Home Co. subscribers, or 
duplicators.206 The tables which follow are based on the data in that list. They yield interesting 
insights into the way telephone communication patterns and social structures were related to the 
dual telephone systems. In some cases it was possible to determine the telephone penetration rate 
for a certain category of businesses by counting how many were listed in the city directory and 
relating that number to the number of telephone subscribers in that category. In many cases, 
however, that method proved unreliable because it was not clear that all of the businesses in a 
specific category were listed in the city directory. 
 
The city of Louisville was served by both The Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, a Bell licensee, and the Louisville Home Telephone Company, a subsidiary of the 
independent Central Home Telephone Company. In 1910, the city had 16,263 telephone 
subscribers. Sixty percent of the phones were residential and the rest were businesses. The 
independent company enjoyed a moderate advantage, with a thousand more users than the Bell 
Company. 2,923 users subscribed to both the Bell and independent exchange. The aggregate 
duplication rate was 18 percent. That number is not very meaningful by itself, however. A 
breakdown of the subscribers shows that the duplication rate follows a hierarchy, with some groups 
duplicating at very high rates and others hardly at all. That hierarchy of information flow appears in 
some form in all social organization. The demand for communication is concentrated among a 
small number of large users. Those users make up a disproportionate amount of the volume of 
calling and also tend to demand communication over a broader geographic scope. Thus, among 
banks, railroads, hotels, and the suppliers of wholesale farm supplies like plows, seed, and 
fertilizer, both the rate of telephone subscription and the rate of duplication were very high (see 
table 7-1). All of the businesses in that category had telephones, and 75 to 100 percent of them 
duplicated. Businesses with a duplication rate over 75 percent accounted for only 1.5 percent of the 
total telephones in the city of Louisville, but made up 7.5 percent of all duplicate subscriptions. As 
those enterprises were generally large, capital-intensive, and highly dependent upon widespread 
communications access, a duplicate subscription was just an additional cost associated with doing 
business, not much different from ordering an extra telephone extension or another line from a 
single system. 
 
In the middle of the hierarchy were smaller businesses who used the telephone frequently 
but whose markets and suppliers were more localized. Retail businesses and professional services, 
such as physicians, dentists, coal dealers, druggists, and attorneys, drew their customers from more 
than one neighborhood but were not really citywide in scope. That class of user duplicated at a 
fairly high rate, but not as often as the larger businesses (see table 7-2). Despite widely varying 
                                                 
206 Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Co., acquisition of Central Home Telephone and Telegraph, 
Kentucky. Box 39, AT&T-BLA. Letter of Thomas Tracy to U.N. Bethell, Vice President, AT&T., Feb. 11, 1911. 
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levels of telephone subscription there was a relatively consistent duplication rate in the range of 30 
to 50 percent. For those users, duplication was more of an economic burden than it was to the larger 
enterprises at the top of the communications hierarchy. Telephones in drug stores, it should be 
noted, functioned as free public telephones for the community, accounting for both the 100 percent 
subscription rate and the relatively high level of duplication. 
 
The relative dominance of the Home Co. in Louisville made it much more likely that middle 
level subscribers who used only one phone would be independent subscribers. There are, however, 
interesting exceptions to that rule, such as lawyers and insurance companies. Whereas single-phone 
businesses such as coal dealers, butchers, and plumbers favored the Home Co. by ratios of five or 
six to one, in the aforementioned professions the Bell Co. was almost even. The disparity could be 
explained in a number of ways-the data by itself being insufficient to rule out several options. One 
possibility is that those involved in law and finance had a greater need for long-distance 
connections to Cincinnati and other major cities controlled by Bell. Another explanation is that 
certain lawyers and insurance companies formed a community of interest with other Bell users and 
saw little need for connection with Home Co. subscribers. The lower rates of the independent 
company must also be kept in mind. 
 
The final class encompasses what might be called the neighborhood level of social 
organization (see table 7-3). Those users stood at the bottom of the communications hierarchy, in 
that there were large numbers of users with highly localized uses for the telephone and a relatively 
low volume of calling. In addition to residential users, it included smaller scale businesses-bakers, 
barber shops, tailors, and carpenters-and local recreational and cultural institutions, such as saloons, 
churches, and bowling alleys. Here the duplication rate is consistently low, averaging about 10 
percent. Many of the residential duplications were business-related; e.g., physicians and dentists 
who needed to maintain access to their clients at all times. On the whole, that class of subscribers 
used the telephone over a limited local area and had less interest in universal access. 
 
Once again, an uneven division of various subscriber categories suggests that subscription 
choices reflected other social boundaries. There is a marked bias toward the Home Co., for 
example, among “working class” institutions like bowling alleys, billiard halls, and saloons. The 
figures for residences and churches, on the other hand, are not so lopsided. That suggests that at the 
bottom of the hierarchy telephone users were divided by neighborhood and/or economic status. The 
wealthier sections of town went for the Bell system, which had higher rates and whose advertising 
tended to project an image of solidity and respectability. Those of more modest means responded to 
the independent's lower rates and, perhaps, its appeal to localism. 
 
Unfortunately, no statistical breakdown of residential subscribers by neighborhood or 
economic status exists with which to support that hypothesis. There is, however, an interesting 
document dated December 3, 1909, concerning the Bell and independent exchanges in Quincy, 
Illinois. It is a field report on the state of competition in Quincy written for the Central Union 
Telephone Co., a Bell licensee. It states: 
 
I find that the Central Union Co. is well thot [sic] of by the large majority of 
substantial business houses and of the better class of resident subscribers, while the 
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Quincy Home Telephone Co. receives their greatest support from the interest 
affiliated with the political and labor associations in Quincy. Our subscribers are of 
the better class, those more able to meet their bills promptly, while the Quincy 
Home Telephone Co. have the poor class and are running great chances on 
collecting their accounts.207 
 
A report out of St. Joseph, Missouri, also noted that the independent exchange had attracted 
a large number of subscribers considered undesirable by the Bell system. The Bell manager there 
went through the independent company’s directory and polled all of its subscribers by telephone. It 
discovered that eighty of the telephone users who claimed to have switched companies because of 
problems with Bell were listed as “No Good” on Bell’s cash ledger. The report also counted 102 
Home Co. subscribers as “undesirable” on account of their being “colored.”208 In other 
communities, the independent, backed by prominent local citizens, may have attracted the “better 
class.” Which telephone company attracted which group is not as important as the fact that the 
division of the telephone-using public followed other political, social and economic divisions. 
 
TABLE 7-1 
DUPLICATION RATES, LARGE-SCALE BUSINESSES 
 Both  
Phones 
Home  
only 
Bell  
only 
Duplic  
rate % 
Subscr.  
rate % 
Telegraph Cos. 4 0 0 100 100 
Mill Supplies 7 0 0 100 100 
Gas, Electric light 4 0 0 100 100 
Fast Freight Lines 11 1 0 92 100 
Railroads 21 2 2 87 100 
Banks, Trust Cos. 25 2 2 86 100 
Express Cos. 6 1 0 85 100 
Fertilizer Mfrs. 8 1 1 80 100 
Hotels 21 6 0 78 100 
Laundries 26 7 1 76 ? 
 
  
                                                 
207 Central Union Telephone Co., form dated Dec. 3, 1909: Quincy Home Telephone Co., AT&T Legal and 
Regulatory Dept. records, Regulatory History Project. 
208 Extract from the Monthly Narrative Report-St. Joseph, May 17, 1911, Box 17, AT&T-BLA. 
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TABLE 7-2 
DUPLICATION RATES, MEDIUM-SCALE BUSINESSES 
 Both  
Phones 
Home  
only 
Bell  
only 
Duplic  
rate % 
Subscr.  
rate % 
Hay, Grain, Feed 34 36 3 54 ? 
Druggists 83 69 3 53 100 
Coal Dealers 46 42 9 47 100 
Insurance 65 46 36 44 ? 
Dentists 35 44 3 42 63 
Liquor Dealers 43 56 18 37 ? 
Plumbers 25 45 1 35 74 
Attorneys 85 109 90 30 78 
Buchers 19 47 7 26 ? 
Dry Goods 15 36 6 26 21 
Groceries 182 466 62 25 ? 
 
TABLE 7-3 
DUPLICATION RATES, NEIGHBORHOOD LEVEL 
 Both  
Phones 
Home  
only 
Bell  
only 
Duplication  
rate % 
Subscription 
rate % 
Billiard Halls 1 5 0 16 ? 
Bowling Alleys 1 5 0 16 ? 
Carpenters 11 55 9 14 50 
Barber Shops 1 6 1 12 ? 
Bakers 9 61 9 11 39 
Saloons 64 487 19 11 87 
Tailors 8 60 9 10 ? 
Churches 3 12 14 10 ? 
Residences 900 5,449 3,971 9 20 
 
As a tool of citywide commerce and communication, then, dual service required large-scale, 
high-volume users to take out duplicate subscriptions. Business duplication gave both Home and 
Bell subscribers telephone access to a broad range of the city’s institutions and services. As one 
moved down the scale of social organization from the regional and metropolitan levels to the 
neighborhood and the home, the rate of duplication progressively declined. In the middle of the 
hierarchy, there were small businesses who wanted and often needed universal service, but for 
whom a duplicate subscription represented a significant additional cost. At the lower levels of that 
hierarchy, where there were large numbers of small users, dual service noticeably restricted the 
degree of social integration. But it did not do so arbitrarily or randomly. Different classes and 
neighborhoods divided themselves into communities of interest with a high degree of self-
contained communication. There was, of course, always a chance that one would not be able to call 
an acquaintance or a business.  Public telephones on streets and in drug stores and groceries, 
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however, gave people a chance to use the other system. The lack of interconnection between the 
two systems was less of an impediment to the telephone users of 1910 than it would be now, 
precisely because telephone usage patterns and urban organization had not adapted to the 
possibilities of universal service. 
 
If one of the two competing exchanges controlled less than 35 percent of a city’s 
subscribers, as many as half of its subscribers might be duplicators. In St. Joseph, Missouri, for 
example, Bell subscribers outnumbered Home Co. subscribers by three to one. The 1,048 duplicate 
subscribers represented only 12 percent of the Bell list, but accounted for 40 percent of the 
independent subscribers. In Philadelphia in 1907, where Bell had 95,000 subscribers and the 
independent only 15,000, 65 percent of the independent subscribers were duplicators.  A small 
market share was not necessarily fatal as long as new subscribers were joining the network at a 
rapid pace. If the smaller system had a significant pool of what were called “exclusives,” i.e. 
nonduplicating subscribers, it could attract new subscribers and make it worthwhile for business 
subscribers to duplicate. Once rapid growth in the overall number of subscribers stopped, however, 
large disparities tended to reinforce themselves over time. More and more subscribers gravitated to 
the dominant system and the minority exchange’s base of “exclusives” began to shrink. 
 
In smaller cities, access competition made it possible for organized groups of telephone 
users to boycott one service in favor of the other. Group decisions to patronize one system were 
sometimes motivated by a desire to achieve coordination economies but more commonly arose to 
protest and punish a rate increase. The instigators could be boards of trade, merchants associations, 
or groups of physicians, grocers, or druggists.209 Because their decision affected the calling habits 
of other users, the organizers placed notices in the newspapers advising readers “We only use the 
Home Telephone” or “Call us over the Home.” Or they issued cards with that message and 
distributed them to their customers.210 
 
A particularly effective mass shift of users to one system took place in Paducah, Kentucky, 
after a Bell rate increase. On June 1, 1911, virtually all of the city's retail merchants ordered their 
Bell phones taken out and the independent company’s phones installed. The grocers, lumbermen 
and coal dealers kept the Bell phone until July 1 only because the swamped independent exchange 
did not have the capacity to serve them until then. The number of Bell subscribers decreased by 700 
in two months.211 In an attempt to minimize the damage, Bell kept the names of many of the 
boycotters in its directory. Advertisements attacking the Home Company appeared in the paper, 
and five full-time salesmen were sent out to offer $1 a month service to residences. Groups of 
doctors and dentists responded with newspaper notices informing the public that they were no 
longer Bell subscribers and denying rumors that they planned to return to the Bell exchange (see 
figure 7-2). 
 
                                                 
209 In one Indiana town the President of Bell’s Central Union licensee attempted to break a boycott of its 
telephone system organized by local grocers by operating competing grocery stores. Sabin to Fish, May 19, 1902. Box 
1333, AT&T-BLA. 
210 13 TELEPHONY 109 (February 1907). 
211 Powers, Paducah Home Telephone Co, to Thomas Tracy, June 15, 1911. Box 39, AT&T-BLA. 
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Dual service at the inter-exchange level  
The presence of two nonconnected telephone exchanges had a more arbitrary effect on 
intercity calls. At the local level, the subscribers could gather a fairly accurate idea of to whom they 
were choosing access when they selected one system over the other. The need for toll connections 
was often less predictable and the factors determining whether Bell or the independent was 
dominant in a particular community were not necessarily the same as those in their own city. After 
1907, legislatures, courts, and utility commissions began to enforce interexchange connection of 
Bell and independent systems even when they tolerated dual service at the local level. 
 
The maps on the following pages are representations of telephone fragmentation patterns in 
three areas between 1894 and 1913. The cities selected for mapping were the State of Indiana in 
1989, 1907, and 1912; the Los Angeles area in 1898, 1907, and 1912; and the State of New York in 
1894, 1902, 1907, and 1912. Cities are represented by circles. The size of the circles is proportional 
to the number of telephone subscribers in the city. The circles are tone-coded to show which 
telephone interest controlled the city’s exchange. A gray circle shows that the city was controlled 
exclusively by Bell. A white circle indicates an independent exchange. A black circle indicates a 
Bell-connecting, sublicensed exchange. In dual service cities, pie charts indicate what share of the 
telephone subscribers were controlled by the Bell exchange (gray) and the independent exchange 
(white). 
 
The map does not represent which cities could be actually be called by a Bell or 
independent subscriber. In the Indiana and Los Angeles area maps, the area displayed is small 
enough that it is safe to assume that both Bell and independent subscribers in any exchange shown 
could call all or most of the other exchanges shown. That is not true of the New York State map, 
however. A subscriber to the independent exchange in Buffalo, New York, in 1911, for example, 
could make connections to the independent system in Utica, but probably could not make long-
distance connections to Albany, even though there was an independent exchange there. The access 
universe offered by today’s telephone system is perfectly homogeneous. A user in any city can call 
the same people and locations as a user in any other city. That was not the case between 1894 and 
1920. When a telephone system is imperfectly interconnected, the points accessible to a user are 
different for every city. The system had an individual “perspective,” as it were: which cities could 
be called depended on where one was calling from and the network to which one subscribed. That 
poses complex problems in data collection and mapping representation which have been avoided 
here. 
 
Another important limitation of the mapping is that with a few exceptions it does not extend 
to exchanges communities with populations less than 5,000. There were, of course, a huge number 
of such exchanges, but data about them was sparse and unreliable. For that reason, the maps 
drastically underrepresent the significance of sublicensing, an activity which tended to be 
concentrated on the smaller exchanges. 
 
With the exception of the independent exchange in Los Angeles, which did not make any 
interstate connections, the range of communication of both Bell and independent subscribers may 
have extended beyond the geographic area shown. A more extensive map, however, would have 
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imposed even more difficult data requirements. The limitation is justifiable, moreover, because the 
maps do show the area that would have been most important to subscribers in the selected cities. 
All the available evidence suggests that the ability to place calls to points more than 300 miles 
away was a negligible factor to telephone users at that time. 
 
The concept of “telephone access” is not unambiguous. Documents in the Bell archives 
show that around 1900 it was fairly common for Bell operators to manually repeat messages over 
long-distance circuits if the speakers’ voices were too faint to be heard unaided.212 In a purely 
technical sense, the speakers were inaccessible to each other, but the intervention of a human 
“repeater” allowed a conversation to take place. Both Bell and the independents often placed public 
toll stations in cities where they lacked exchanges; thus, although all the exchange subscribers in 
that city could not be reached by one of the two systems, residents were able to place outgoing calls 
on either system. It was also possible for independent exchanges to be connected physically by 
long-distance lines but still be inaccessible. If the call had to pass through an excessive number of 
switching offices to get to its destination, conversation may have been impossible. Each transfer 
increased attenuation and waiting time, and beyond a certain number of transfers placing a call was 
either physically impossible or so inconvenient as to be worthless. That was more of a problem 
with the independents than with Bell, for after 1900 the Bell system began to consciously organize 
the relationship between local feeder lines and through circuits in ways that avoided those 
problems. 
 
The maps graphically display developmental patterns that are described in greater detail in 
the narrative. It is apparent from the 1894 maps that prior to the expiration of the patents, the Bell 
system concentrated its development on major cities and neglected small towns. That pattern is 
particularly evident in the Indiana map. From 1894 to 1913 the Bell system dramatically extended 
its system. The maps show that many new exchanges were established in smaller towns and that 
Bell entered into interconnection arrangements with independents in other areas. The sublicensed 
independent exchanges are color-coded black. The maps show that after 1906 successful 
independent exchanges which had attained a dominant share of a city’s subscribers were induced to 
join the Bell system, thus decreasing the scope of independent access. The Utica independent 
exchange was cut off from connections to independents in and around Albany when the 
independent in Auburn was bought out by Bell, and other exchanges that once formed part of the 
independents’ link between Utica and the cities to the east were sublicensed. In the Los Angeles 
area, independent exchanges that had beaten their Bell rivals in exchange competition were 
sublicensed and brought into the Bell system. 
 
The maps provide some interesting clues about the extent to which user convergence on a 
single network affected the Bell- independent competition. The maps show clearly that when 
convergence did take place it was quite localized. Either it was confined to a single city, such as 
Fort Wayne and its immediate suburbs, or, when a major urban center such as New York was 
involved, it occurred over a radius of about fifty to eighty miles. It did not occur over the nation as 
a whole or even over an entire State. The Southern California map, for example, shows that despite 
                                                 
212 On the use of human repeaters, see Doolittle to Cochrane, Jan. 16, 1901, Hudson River Telephone Co.-Toll 
Requirements, Box 1330, AT&T-BLA, at 8. Doolittle observed that many of the cancelled calls were from “women 
who do not seem to talk loud enough and [who] declined to have the messages repeated.” 
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the Bell system’s connections to northern California and neighboring states, the independent 
exchange in Los Angeles was able to hold onto half of the city’s subscribers for an extended period 
of time. The Los Angeles independent did not make any interstate connections and for most of its 
existence had no access to San Francisco, Oakland, or points north. Telephone communication 
patterns may have been increasingly interdependent at the regional and local level, but long-
distance telephone connections over a 100-mile area did not seem to have a significant influence on 
the majority of local exchange subscribers. 
 
Prior to 1898, the Bell system had established very little presence in Indiana’s small towns. 
By 1898, the Fort Wayne independent exchange controlled the majority of that city’s subscribers. 
By 1913, that lead had become an overwhelming one. From 1906 to 1913, Bell sublicensed many 
of the independent exchanges in Fort Wayne’s vicinity, giving it access to those cities and denying 
it to the independents. While Bell’s lack of access to the surrounding territory made it possible for 
the Fort Wayne independent exchange to grow rapidly at Bell’s expense, once Bell improved its 
position in the surrounding areas it failed to erode the independent’s dominance in Fort Wayne. 
With the bulk of telephone communication being local, the expanded short and long-distance 
connections offered by the Bell system were not enough to overcome the inertia associated with the 
Fort Wayne independent’s near-monopoly control of local exchange service. 
 
The situation is quite different in the regions surrounding the major urban metropolis of 
New York. There convergence effects seem to have been felt over a fifty to 100 mile radius. Bell’s 
monopoly control of exchange service in New York city seems to have had a stultifying effect on 
independent exchanges over an eighty mile radius, affecting independents in Northern New Jersey 
(not shown on the map) and well into New York state. That can be interpreted as evidence that the 
formation of large urban centers created a regionally interdependent communication pattern. We 
will never know whether dual service would have been viable in the nation as a whole had there 
been a competing exchange in New York city. But it is clear that the absence of competition in 
New York thwarted dual service competition in the surrounding areas. 
 
The map data conflict with the common belief that Bell’s superior long-distance technology 
was instrumental in defeating the independents. The patented technologies would have given Bell 
an advantage in providing calls over 200 miles in length. Such ultra-long-distance connections were 
a negligible force in leading to convergence at the local level.  The demand for long-distance 
connections would be concentrated on a small number of users rather than evenly distributed over 
many users. That kind of demand structure can sustain dual systems. When the communication 
patterns of a minority group are strongly concentrated on a small number of users outside the 
majority network the tendency to converge on a single system can be nullified. The maps provide 
some empirical support for that viewpoint. In many cities one of the local exchanges controls 75 to 
90 percent of the subscribers. That did not, however, lead to total elimination of the competing 
exchange in all cases. A small sliver of the subscriber pie remained with the minority exchange. 
Those diehard subscribers were business users who wanted long-distance connections that the 
dominant system did not offer. In Fort Wayne, for example, the near-total dominance of the 
independent did not lead to the loss of all Bell subscribers. The demand of the Bell remnant was 
concentrated on long-distance points that could not be reached through the independent system. 
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For the majority of subscribers, however, making calls to places over 100 miles away was a 
rare event. If the Bell system had the only long-distance connections to a city and a subscriber was 
attached to the independent system, he went to the Bell central office, where there were special 
booths set up to handle toll calls, or to a public toll station somewhere in the city. Behavioral 
evidence from the early 1900s indicates that that fragmentation of toll calling was not then 
perceived as unthinkable as it would be now. A Mr. Schleicher, the Bell manager at Mt. Carmel, 
Illinois in 1904, noted that the only toll lines of the competing exchange in his city ran to a nearby 
farmer system: 
 
Supervisor: Are the patrons of the Home Company complaining of inability to get 
outside connections? 
Mr. Schleicher: Well, no, sir. 
Supervisor:  They inconvenience themselves by coming into our office? 
Mr. Schleicher: Yes, sir. I had toll business last month amounting to $250.  They will 
inconvenience themselves by walking three or four squares to our office.213 
 
A vivid (but probably not typical) account of that process is contained in the 
correspondence of Thomas Doolittle. On an inspection of the Bell facilities in Middletown, New 
York, in 1901, Doolittle observed that poor Bell service had left its exchange with only eighty-nine 
subscribers to the independent’s 400: 
 
It must be remembered that the 400 opposition subscribers have to come to our 
office to get long line service. At the time of my visit there were six people standing 
in a dark place less than six feet square, with no place to sit, and all waiting for a 
long distance connection. I entered the booth to make a call for Albany, and felt 
compelled to step outside pending the making up of the connection, on account of 
the offensive odor of the place.214 
 
Apparently, to merchants, farmers, and other businesspeople-to whom long-distance 
telephoning was necessary but not routine, going to the Bell office to place a call seemed no more 
unusual than going to the post office to mail a letter. 
 
  
                                                 
213 10 CUMBERLAND TEL. J. (Jan. 15, 1904). 
214 Hudson River Tel. Co.-Toll Requirements, supra note 8, at 14. 
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UNIVERSAL SERVICE: VAIL’S ANSWER TO DUAL SERVICE 
 
 
BY THE MIDDLE OF THE DECADE, both the telephone and competition had spread 
through American society widely enough to spark policy debates that transcended a particular 
locality. Discussions of telephone competition began to seep into national forums, much as the 
issue of railroad regulation had done twenty years earlier. In order to shape the debate to their 
advantage, Bell and the organized, commercial independents mounted nationwide public relations 
campaigns and found outlets for their views in magazine articles, advertisements, speeches, and 
books. 
  
It was at that juncture that Theodore Vail, newly re-installed as President of AT&T, began 
to promulgate the policy of “universal service.” The term never appeared explicitly before that 
time. Nor had anyone inside or outside of the Bell system publicly defined such a comprehensive 
vision of the telephone industry and the respective roles of Bell, the independents, and the 
government. That being said, it is important to resist the temptation to approach Vail’s universal 
service doctrine anachronistically. Universal service did not mean rate subsidies to make telephone 
service more affordable. It meant the elimination of fragmentation and the unification of telephone 
service under regulated local exchange monopolies. As such, it was first and foremost a response to 
the situation created by access competition, a response that provided the Bell system with a critique 
of dual service and an appealing alternative. This chapter explores Vail’s elaboration of the 
doctrine and the context from which it emerged. 
Dual service: The public debate 
Fragmentation of telephone users, particularly business users, had played a critical role in 
political defeats suffered by independents in large cities. In June 1905 the Merchants Association of 
New York issued a report to the city franchising authority expressing adamant opposition to 
franchising any independent telephone company. “The effect of two rival telephone systems in one 
 
94 
 
city is to divide the population into two parts, without means of telephone communication with 
each other except at excessive cost.” Dual service “compels a choice of two evils: either half 
service or a double price.”215 The New Orleans Board of Trade came to almost identical 
conclusions in its report of 1908.216 Similarly, an assortment of user groups in Chicago had 
opposed the franchising of a competing telephone company in 1907 because of the inconveniences 
of dual service. The Telephone Users Protective League, which described itself as a federation of 
“28 of the largest and most important business and commercial associations in Chicago,” sent a 
resolution opposing dual service to the Chicago City Council.217 The Chicago Federation of Labor, 
claiming to represent “large numbers of telephone users,” declared that “duplicate telephone 
systems in this city would be a calamity to all users.”218 
 
The independent trade press affirmed that business users in the top and middle of the 
communications hierarchy often opposed the introduction of dual service. “It is the merchants and 
business men of a community, newspapers, and other personal and impersonal leaders of public 
thought that are generally found in the forefront of the opposition to the ‘nuisance of two systems’ 
in towns where competition is first suggested,” noted the American Telephone Journal.219 
 
The Bell organization did everything it could to reinforce those complaints about 
fragmentation. One of the earliest entries in the national debate was an article in The Atlantic in 
1905 entitled “Telephone Development in the United States,” by F.W. Coburn.220 Although no 
direct proof that Coburn was Bell-funded is available, the magazine was published in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, near American Bell headquarters, and took an unambiguously pro-Bell stance. The 
author began by recounting the extraordinary growth of telephone usage and long-distance 
interconnection. Engineers, to whom he referred in tones approaching reverence, were projecting a 
telephone penetration rate of one telephone for every five households in the near future. In the not 
too distant future, Coburn claimed, the telephone would be within the reach of everyone and a 
“great national system” would “enable everybody to reach practically everybody else anywhere in 
the United States.” 
 
What Coburn refused to admit, or did not understand, was that the goal of universal 
telephone coverage had only been brought within reach because of access competition. Prior to the 
stunning progress in telephone penetration and the geographic scope of the network in the 
preceding ten years, an article such as his could never have been written. In the author’s 
presentation, however, those impressive advances were attributed to expert engineers, not to 
business rivalry. Indeed, the very existence of independent companies was denounced as an 
obstacle to “that orderly development of the telephone utility upon which the engineering experts 
are basing their estimates.” 
                                                 
215 DELOS F. WILCOX, MUNICIPAL FRANCHISES Vol. I 240 (The Gervaise Press 1910). 
216 Id. at 241. 
217 “The greatest possible inconvenience and unnecessary expense to telephone subscribers would result from 
the existence of two competing telephone systems in Chicago.” Chicago City Council, Committee on Gas. Oil and 
Electric Light. Communications, etc., 2023-24 (Nov. 4, 1907). AT&T-L&R. 
218 Id. at 2024-25. The Labor Federation also objected to the Bell policy of refusing to interconnect with 
independent exchanges outside of the city. 
219 AMERICAN TEL. J. 238 (1906). 
220 Telephone Development in the U.S., 96 THE ATLANTIC 644 (Nov. 1905). 
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The only “proper reason” for the independents’ existence was to occupy territories which no 
Bell company had ever preempted, and even then their presence was justifiable only when they 
agreed to restrict themselves to local service and rely exclusively on Bell to provide the long-
distance connections.221 The author condemned dual service as the cause of “manifold 
inconveniences” and “protracted irritation on the part of citizens:” 
 
If one is a user of the Bell telephone, while one’s correspondent is a user 
only of the service of an independent company, the two people are still as far apart 
as if Mr. Bell had not invented the telephone. The only remedy in such 
circumstances is expensive and cumbersome; each man must use the service of both 
companies. 
 
The Atlantic received so many outraged letters responding to the Coburn piece that it 
decided to give an independent spokesman equal time. The response, however, was poorly 
conceived.222 It devoted most of its argument to a plodding discussion of other inventors besides 
Bell who had, allegedly, devised a telephone-an irrelevant issue by 1905. 
 
A year later, the Bulletin of the League of American Municipalities began to carry articles 
by one H. J. Gondon condemning telephone competition.223 The League was an association of 
reform city officials based in Des Moines, Iowa. Its pages explored and advocated the new 
managerial techniques pioneered by the progressive movement: city government by commission, 
municipal ownership or regulation of public utilities, the elimination of bribery and corruption, etc. 
Its strongest ties were to city governments in Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa. 
 
The independent trade publication Telephony responded vigorously to the charges in the 
Bulletin, denouncing its author as a “Bell hireling.”224 Bowing to the pressure of the organized 
independents, the League’s Bulletin ceased its criticism of telephone competition and reprinted a 
speech by Francis Dagger, a Canadian advocate of competition, in the August 1906 issue. Dagger 
pointed out how competition had advanced the development of telephony, lowered rates, and 
improved service. The conflict probably made the midwestern urban reformers uncomfortable. All 
of their instincts led them toward expert planning: competition in utility services was wasteful and 
chaotic, regulated monopoly was the ideal. But they were also critical of big corporations and in 
favor of locally responsive government, which tended to make them sympathetic to independent, 
local companies. 
 
The independents did not have Bell’s nationwide public relations organization, but they did 
not do badly. They relied on the trade press to monitor the public dialogue and used spokesmen   
                                                 
221 That conception of the independents’ role in the industry mirrors so closely that of the Bell system itself 
that Coburn almost has to be viewed as a Bell propagandist. 
222 97 THE ATLANTIC 236 (Mar.1906). 
223 BULLETIN OF THE LEAGUE OF AMERICAN MUNICIPALITIES (Sept. 1904-July 1906). New York 
Public Library, Room 228. Group 10 document file Misc. #5. For TELEPHONY'S attack on the BULI.ETIN see 12 
TELEPHONY 130 (Aug. 1906) and 12 TELEPHONY 186 (Sept.  1906). 
224 12 TELEPHONY 130 (Aug. 1906). 
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from state and national associations to air their case in public hearings. Their national organization 
adopted a common symbol, “the shield,” to mark independent telephones and exhorted all its 
members to use it (see figure 8-1). In 1906, Telephony magazine published a propaganda book to 
present the independents’ side of the controversy. A Fight With an Octopus was written by Paul 
Latzke, author of popular magazine articles romanticizing industrial success. The essays making up 
Octopus first appeared in serial form in Success magazine. The book extolled the independent 
movement as a story of the triumph of honest, enterprising Americans over a greedy, distant trust. 
The publishers of Telephony took care to make the book “high-grade, dignified and attractive” but 
also inexpensive enough to reach a mass audience.225 It was sold in lots of 1,000 for thirteen and a 
half cents each. 
 
Initially, the independent movement was put on the defensive by attacks on subscriber 
fragmentation. By 1907, however, it had developed a plausible and interesting set of 
counterarguments. Fragmentation notwithstanding, the rivalry for new subscribers had resulted in a 
net increase in telephone access for most users. Business users may have had to pay more in 
absolute terms for two subscriptions, but they were getting access to five to ten times as many 
subscribers for a price that was only a little higher than the rates of the monopoly period.226 In 
Indianapolis, a business subscriber paid $72 per year for access to 2,286 other users in 1898. 
Following the entry of the New Company, a business user who subscribed to both systems paid $94 
for access to 21,000 subscribers. The independents also cited indisputable evidence that 
competition had improved the service offered by the Bell companies.227   Those benefits, they 
argued, were well worth the price of some fragmentation. Some independent spokesman responded 
that the very redundancy of which the business-people complained was of great value.228 The 
availability of more than one channel into the office promoted safety and reliability. 
 
A more thought-provoking argument pointed out that businessmen accepted fragmentation 
and duplication as a normal and unobjectionable product of competition in other 
communications-related areas. An analogy was drawn between telephones and newspapers as 
channels for gaining access to the public. At that time most cities had many competing daily 
newspapers. “What forces the business man to take two telephones?” asked Col. Powers of the 
Louisville Home Telephone Co. “The same thing that forces him to advertise his goods in two 
newspapers in a town instead of one-in order that he may reach the people.”229 In theory, a 
newspaper monopoly would relieve the advertiser of the need to place duplicate ads in two or three 
                                                 
225 12 TELEPHONY 155 (Aug. 1906). 
226 Independent Telephone Association, Some Comments on the 1907 Annual Report of the AT&T, cited in 
Wilcox, supra note 1, at 18. 
227 New York City Bureau of Franchises, Result of Investigation of the Operation of a Dual System of 
Telephones in Various Cities 8 (Nov. 21, 1906) Cited in Wilcox, supra note 1. 
228 “When a subscriber says that two telephones are a nuisance, he means that the two instruments sitting on 
his desk are an inconvenience, they are irritating to his vision. He objects to two bells ringing simultaneously, maybe 
once a month or so. But two telephones on a man’s desk, reaching two different companies in active competition with 
each other…are vastly beneficial to that man. His ability to reach everyone in two different manners through different 
sources is of immeasurable value, as is the ability to have everyone in the community reach him over two different 
ways.” Burt Hubbell, quoted in Chicago Hearings in Government-Bell Trust Suit, 65 TELEPHONY 21 (Nov. 29, 
1913). 
229 11 TELEPHONY (June, 1906). 
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different papers and would relieve the reading public of the inconvenience of buying and reading 
two or more newspapers. In actual practice, the competition between papers increased circulation, 
lowered advertising rates, and delivered to the business a larger audience at a savings. Thus, while 
the independents recognized the advantages of universal interconnection, they did not think that it 
made the telephone industry exceptional. 
 
The independents also supported competition as the best way to control rates. Eliminating 
fragmentation was usually associated with returning to monopoly. (The debate over physical 
connection will be taken up in the next chapter.) That was, in fact, the most popular argument of 
the independents. To many users, the inconvenience of fragmentation seemed less worrisome than 
being subjected to rates set by a monopoly. Unification of the systems seemed like a fine idea in the 
abstract, but if it would result in a rate increase, many preferred to stick with dual service. 
 
The material above makes it abundantly clear that as competition reached its zenith in 1907, 
fragmentation of the service had become the primary topic of telephone policy debate along with 
rates. That context is indispensable in any valid interpretation of Vail’s concept of universal 
service. 
Vail’s doctrine of universal service 
The biggest salvo in the debate was fired in AT&T’s 1907 Annual Report, written by 
Theodore Vail himself upon his return to the presidency. In it, Vail articulated for the first time the 
triad “One System, One Policy, Universal Service” and the philosophy underlying it. The themes 
struck up in 1907 were repeated with variations in every succeeding Annual Report until 1914. The 
Annual Reports were as much political pamphlet as business reports; they were sent to thousands of 
newspapers and opinion leaders as well as the company’s stockholders. In them, Vail hammered 
away at the theme that only an integrated monopoly offering connections among all subscribers in 
all locations could realize the telephone’s potential. 
 
Vail’s doctrine of universal service is well documented.230 Once placed in the context of the 
ongoing public debate about access competition, its meaning is clear. Universal service meant 
forsaking the fragmentation and heterogeneous management fostered by access competition and 
choosing instead to develop the telephone as a unified, integrated monopoly. The following 
statement from the 1910 Annual Report contains the essence of Vail’s conception of universal 
service: 
 
[The Bell System] believes that the telephone system should be universal, 
interdependent and intercommunicating, affording opportunity for any subscriber to 
any exchange to communicate with any other subscriber of any other exchange within 
the limits of speaking distance.231 
 
                                                 
230 Vail worked out the ideas promoted in the Annual Reports in a lengthy paper entitled Policy of the Bell 
System, Box 1080, AT&T-BLA. 
231 1910 AT&T ANNUAL REPORT 43. 
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In other words, all users of the telephone should be interconnected. As the preceding 
passage makes clear, Vail’s rhetorical style relied on alliterative triads, the elements of which were 
overlapping but not entirely redundant. “One system, one policy” meant a single physical network, 
centrally managed and coordinated to achieve compatibility. “Universal service” meant the 
interconnection of all telephone exchanges and users. It also had some connotations of geographic 
ubiquity, but Vail’s sublicensing policy made it clear that geographic coverage of remote areas was 
to be achieved by interconnecting with noncompeting independents, not by extending the Bell 
system everywhere. 
 
Implementing that vision required eliminating access competition. Indeed, it is impossible 
to understand the thrust of Vail’s arguments unless it is seen as a critique of, and alternative to, 
access competition. The power of Vail’s ideas came from their comprehensiveness and consistency. 
Universal service was not a ploy cooked up for Bell’s momentary advantage but a coherent set of 
principles regarding the telephone’s role in society and the proper way to develop the business. 
Vail’s rationale for universal service had four basic components, enumerated below. 
 
The “Network Externality” 
The first element was that the value of telephone service grew as the number of subscribers 
grew: 
 
“A telephone without a connection at the other end of the line is not even a toy or a 
scientific instrument. It is one of the most useless things in the world. Its value 
depends on the connection with other telephones-and increases with the number of 
connections.”232 
 
Vail’s acute recognition of the network externality provided the basis for his critique of 
access competition. Competing exchanges fragmented the telephone calling universe, thus 
diminishing the value of the service. Those who subscribed to one system, he said, received “a 
partial value [which] cannot be satisfactory,” while “important users” were forced to take out 
duplicate subscriptions.233 To that unwelcome predicament Vail contrasted his alternative: 
 
The fundamental idea of the Bell System is that the telephone service should be 
universal, intercommunicating, and interdependent; that there are certain people 
with whom one communicates frequently and regularly; there are a certain few with 
whom one communicates occasionally, while there are times when it is most 
necessary to get communication with some other one, who, until the particular 
necessity arose, might have been unknown and unthought of. It is this necessity, 
impossible to predetermine, which makes the universal service the only perfect 
service.234 (italics in original) 
 
                                                 
232 1908 AT&T ANNUAL REPORT 21. 
233 1907 AT&T ANNUAL REPORT 17. 
234 1910 AT&T ANNUAL REPORT 39. 
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Vail’s clear reference here to “the universal service” as a service that provides access to 
“unknown and unthought of” parties makes it undeniable that universality referred to the 
unification of service. Indeed, his emphasis on the value of unfragmented telephone access reveals 
a profound understanding of the growing interdependence and impersonality of industrial society. 
Dual service was less burdensome when parties could be reasonably sure of who and where their 
communication partners would be. But a modern urban society, with an increasingly specialized 
economy adapted to the capabilities of communication and transportation between remote points, 
required forms of coordination and cooperation that could not be predicted in advance. That was 
the strongest of his arguments for integration of the telephone system. 
 
Clearly, the network externality implies that a continuous broadening of telephone 
penetration would be beneficial to users. But just as clearly, Vail’s reference to “the universal 
service” in that context was not a commitment to extend service everywhere and to everyone 
regardless of cost. It simply meant that those who did have telephone service should be accessible 
to each other and not fragmented into competing exchanges. If the growth of penetration per se had 
been the primary issue, Vail’s argument against competition would have lacked any force, for no 
one disputed the rapid increases in telephone diffusion that had occurred because of competition. 
Moreover, everyone knew at the time that Bell’s prices were higher than its opponents’. 
 
Centralization of Control 
The second pillar of Vail’s argument was the claim that universal intercommunication 
required centralized control and coordination. Service should be provided by, or under the control 
of, a single firm: 
 
The Bell system was founded on the broad lines of “One System,” “One Policy,” 
“Universal Service,” on the idea that no aggregation of isolated independent systems 
not under common control, however well built or equipped, could give the public 
the service that the interdependent, intercommunicating, universal system could 
give.235 
 
Here again connectivity, not social ubiquity, is the basic issue being addressed. Unless the 
network developed under the guidance of a single firm, Vail contended, telephone users’ ability to 
make connections with exchanges in other locations would be thwarted by uncoordination and 
technical incompatibility. Although compatibility is a precondition of social ubiquity, the two 
cannot be equated. 
 
A corollary of that element of the universal service doctrine was the proposition that 
monopoly, not interchange of traffic among the competing systems, was the best way to achieve 
universal intercommunication. From 1907 to 1914, compulsory interconnection became an 
increasingly common demand among utility regulators. Vail condemned interconnection of 
competitors as unfair, because it allowed smaller competitors to share in the benefits of the Bell 
system’s larger access universe. Such competition would parasitize the larger system and amounted 
                                                 
235 1909 AT&T ANNUAL REPORT 18. 
 
101 
 
to legalized confiscation of its property.236 Interconnection also would create a messy, 
heterogeneous telephone system which would lack the technical integrity and coordination of a 
single system.237 
The imperfection of competition in telephony 
Third, Vail contended that competition between telephone networks is always imperfect 
competition. His argument was based on a clear grasp of the inherent nonhomogeneity of separate 
networks. Rival telephone services are never perfect substitutes for each other because both will 
offer access to different subscribers: 
 
Competition means that the same thing, or a satisfactory substitute, is offered. In this 
sense there can be no competing exchanges unless each exchange has the same list 
of subscribers, which is in itself inconceivable.238 
 
Consequently, competition requires either a duplicate subscription, which Vail considered 
wasteful, or restricted access.239 It is clear from this that in Vail’s mind, competition was 
synonymous with access competition, and that his doctrine of universal service was in essence a 
critique of and alternative to it. 
Regulation as the alternative to competition 
Having made the case for monopoly, Vail indicated that he was willing to accept the 
consequences of removing his industry from competitive pressures: government regulation of rates 
and service.240 In the annual reports and in an article in the Atlantic published in 1913, Vail argued 
for a private monopoly monitored by an expert commission, a view that dovetailed with 
developments in other utility services.241 That was an essential ingredient of the universal service 
doctrine because dual service retained a strong core of support among users who feared monopoly 
pricing if it were eliminated. But the role of government involvement, in that conception, did not go 
beyond substituting for the rate and service controls of a competitive marketplace. There is not a 
hint of the notion that Bell and the government were joining in a partnership to extend service to 
everyone. 
 
Contemporary readers can easily misinterpret Vail’s references to “universality” as a 
commitment to social ubiquity. By 1907, after fifteen years of independent competition, Vail did in 
fact make rhetorical jabs in that direction, although they were notable for their vagueness. In the 
1910 Annual Report he wrote: “[the Bell system] believes that some sort of a connection with the 
telephone system should be within the reach of all.”242 Just what “sort of a connection” and the 
meaning of “within the reach of” are left unspecified. In all his pronouncements about universal 
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service, that is the closest Vail ever comes to a enunciating a commitment to geographic ubiquity. 
There is a perfectly logical reason for the peripheral, passing way in which Vail handled that issue. 
Such statements represent a concession to the independent movement and to the pressures of access 
competition. Writing in 1910, Vail had, just two years earlier, drastically liberalized the company’s 
sublicensing policies to encourage interconnection with independent exchanges in remote, 
“unremunerative” areas so that the Bell system would not have to build and maintain its system 
there. The Bell system’s willingness to recognize independent systems as a permanent part of the 
country’s telephone network represented a major retreat from its earlier belief that Bell and Bell 
alone should control the entire industry. The breakneck expansion of the Bell system after 1900 to 
develop more exchanges and short-haul toll lines, another policy change forced upon it by access 
competition also represented a sharp departure from its earlier vision of an exclusively urban, 
business-oriented national network. If Vail was now forced to admit that “some sort of a connection 
to the telephone system should be within the reach of all,” the grudging character of that statement 
should not surprise us. 
 
The uniqueness of Vail’s vision lay not in AT&T’s alleged commitment to extend service 
everywhere and to everyone. At that juncture, no one disputed either the desirability or the 
inevitability of the telephone’s rapid diffusion. Indeed, the independents far outstripped the Bell 
system in their commitment to extend telephone service to previously unserved areas. The growth 
of penetration and the affordability of service were not really the points at issue at that time. What 
set the Bell policy apart was its commitment to interconnect all telephone users into one big, 
centrally managed, nationally integrated system. The real debate was between competition and 
monopoly, between unification and fragmentation. Vail’s doctrine of universal service represented 
the most powerful case for the latter that could be imagined. 
 
Vail’s vision infused the Bell system with a new coherence. “Universal service” became a 
competitive strategy, a political slogan, and a catchy advertising term rolled into one. In a series of 
full page ads which began to appear in 1912, Bell presented itself as a nationwide system linking 
every community in the United States, even though it was years away from achieving that goal (see 
figure 8-2). “To one who has a Bell telephone at his lips,” one ad declaimed, “the whole nation is 
within speaking distance.” Another ad contrasted “Telephone Service: Universal or Limited” (see 
figure 8-3) and compared independent telephone systems to medieval walled cities because of their 
alleged lack of connections to the outside world. 
 
Placed in historical context, Bell’s commitment to universal service emerges as a coherent 
response to the pressures of access competition. Bell’s ability to offer connections to more 
locations than its rival independent exchanges was its greatest competitive advantage. Instead of 
fighting to eliminate all independents, it would absorb them into the “universal” system by making 
them noncompetitive feeders through sublicensing. Above all else, universal service was the 
spearhead of Vail’s drive to achieve political support for the elimination of competition.243 It 
provided an appealing rationale for the consolidation of competing exchanges that could be used to  
                                                 
243 Bell’s positioning of itself as the universal system successfully concealed its own refusal to eliminate 
fragmentation by interconnecting with its independent competitors. Bell strategically withheld the benefits of a unified 
service from the public and the independents until it had succeeded in winning support for regulated monopoly as the 
industry structure. 
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counter growing antitrust challenges to Bell’s dominance. Far from being a benevolent gift of Bell 
management or government regulators, the universal service concept was a deadly competitive 
weapon and a very effective business strategy. 
 
The early debate over universal service did conceive of telephone penetration in broader 
terms. Trade journals and the popular press at the turn of the century marveled at its rapid 
penetration of farm areas and residences and interpreted that as a sign of the inexorable progress of 
the industrial age.244 Where the 1880s and early 1890s saw the telephone as a specialized 
commercial device, few observers in the 1900s or 1910s would have disagreed with the assertion 
that eventually there would be or should be a telephone in every home. But that progress was seen 
as something that would occur naturally as industrialism increased wealth, lowered prices, and 
improved technology. Universalism in that sense posed no special policy issue and required no 
government action. The real policy issue was whether the telephone would develop under the guise 
of separate, competing systems or as a unified monopoly. 
 
In 1907, public opinion was almost evenly divided, with dual service probably commanding 
more support because of its intrinsic constraints on rates. But the events of the next ten years would 
bring about a profound shift in public attitudes. 
 
  
                                                 
244 Commenting on the growth of residential subscribership in New York city, the ELECTRICAL REVIEW 
wrote, “it will not be long before no moderately well appointed residence will be considered completely equipped if it 
is not connected to the telephone system,” 31 ELEC. REV. 180 (Oct. 13, 1897). For similar expressions of confidence 
in the inevitability of the spread of the telephone, see The fanner and the telephone, 31 ELEC. REV. 126 (Sept. 15, 
1897), and Making [Social] Calls by Telephone, 30 ELEC. REV. 146 (Mar. 31, 1897). 
 
106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE POWER OF INTERCONNECTION, 1908-1913 
 
 
FROM 1908 TO 1913, access competition entered a critical phase-the beginning of a 
breakdown of system exclusivity. Access competition still placed enormous pressures on both sides 
to increase the scope of their network. The era of raw expansion was mostly over, however. The 
greatest potential for growth in the scope of the networks came from more intensive development 
of toll connectivity among established exchanges and from the growth of telephone penetration 
within exchanges. In that context dual service came to be perceived as a barrier to communication 
more often; users began to demand a complementary relationship between the networks rather than 
an exclusive one. In order to remain competitive, the telephone companies had to respond to that 
demand. If the scope of the telephone system was to continue to widen, the barriers between the 
two systems had to be breached. Unfortunately for the independents, their movement was far more 
prone to disintegration than Bell’s. Bell’s unified organization and policy made it impervious to 
fragmentation. The real basis of the Bell system triumph in that period came from maintaining its 
integrity as a system while relaxing its restrictions on allowing independents to interconnect with it. 
As a result, large numbers of independent exchanges connected with the Bell system and deserted 
the exclusive access universe of the organized independent movement. 
  
The relationship between interconnection and network competition was the central 
preoccupation of that period. There were two distinct aspects to the issue. One was the strategic use 
of interconnection in the Bell-independent rivalry. The other was the attempt of courts, legislatures 
and regulatory commissions to find an appropriate public policy regarding interconnection. Should 
competing networks be compelled to connect or not? Did interconnection preserve or destroy 
competition? Was the strategic use of interconnection rights an anticompetitive practice or a 
legitimate exercise of the right of contract? Was it necessary to eliminate competition to bring 
about universal interconnection? Those questions moved to center stage but only succeeded in 
producing a welter of contradictory decisions. 
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The Development of regional independent operating companies 
From 1898 to 1906 the story of independent development was largely one of building 
exchanges and short-haul toll lines. After 1906, the independents began to exploit their control of 
exchange access to develop competitive intercity long-distance lines. While independent exchange 
development peaked around 1904, their long- distance activity flourished from 1906 to 1911. Large 
regional independent operating companies, formed through mergers of several smaller companies, 
started long-distance subsidiaries and went about constructing access universes comparable in 
scope to that of a Bell licensee company. The independents, too, began to speak of “universality.” 
In 1908 A. C. Lindemuth, the proprietor of the Richmond, Virginia, independent exchange, 
proclaimed “for ten years we have been building exchanges. Let us now build systems.” Dual 
service could only survive, he knew, if the independents matched the growing scope of the Bell 
system: 
 
I have adopted…the motto…‘the Integrity of the Independent System and its 
Universal Extension.’ That motto implies the continuing of the present independent 
telephone system as a separate and distinct system, extended into all undeveloped 
territory whether in city or country, reorganized and strengthened into a complete 
and effective whole.245 
 
That was more than rhetoric. Numerous regional independents grew up in that period, 
belying the stereotype of small, exclusively local operations. A typical independent operating 
company owned exchanges in ten to thirty key cities and signed long-term, exclusive connecting 
contracts with independent exchanges they did not own. On the borders of their territories, they 
entered into agreements with the neighboring independent regionals for the interchange of traffic. A 
sampling of some of those systems follows. 
 
In Missouri and Kansas, the Kansas City Home Telephone Co. was the centerpiece of a 
regional independent network. It served 20,000 of Kansas City, Missouri’s 40,000 subscribers. Its 
long-distance subsidiary owned 10,000 miles of toll wire in 1909 and offered connections to 
Topeka, Lawrence, Omaha, and many smaller exchanges in the vicinity. The Kansas City Co. was 
connected to the competing exchanges in St. Louis and St. Joseph over the lines of two neighboring 
independent regionals, the Kinloch Telephone Co. and the St. Joseph Home Telephone Co. The 
Kinloch Co. was another well-established, high quality, and long-lasting independent regional. In 
1907 the Kinloch Co. had 21,000 subscribers in St. Louis, about 36 percent of the total, and owned 
fourteen exchanges in eastern Missouri and central Illinois. Its toll lines covered an area bounded 
by Sedalia, Missouri, Springfield, Illinois, Terre Haute, Indiana, and Farmington, Illinois.246 The 
St. Joseph Home Co. had connecting contracts with forty-eight companies in the area, giving it 
access to 40,000 telephones.247 
 
                                                 
245 15 TELEPHONY 267-8 (April 1908). 
246 1910 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE KINLOCH LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE 
COMPANY OF MISSOURI. Box 16, AT&T-BLA. 
247 St. Joseph Home Telephone Co. and the St. Joseph Home Long Distance Co., Boxes 17 and 18, AT&T-
BLA. 
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In Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia, several large independent regionals 
competed with the Bell system. The American Union Telephone Co., centered in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, was formed in 1906 through the merger of twelve independent companies, including 
the competing exchanges in Harrisburg, Altoona, Lancaster, Williamsport, and Chester. The 
Keystone Telephone Co. owned exchanges in and around Philadelphia, including Trenton and 
Camden. The Consolidated Telephone Company covered the territory to the north and west of 
Philadelphia, operating exchanges and toll lines connecting Allentown, Scranton, Wilkes-Barre, 
and Reading. The Pittsburgh and Allegheny system connected independent exchanges in the 
western parts of the state. The National Telephone Co. owned exchanges in Wheeling, 
Steubenville, and other towns in West Virginia. Each of those systems were connected to each 
other through an organization known as the “Eastern Traffic Association,” a clearing house which 
accounted for and divided joint toll revenues and coordinated maintenance and operations.248 
 
Headquartered in Aurora, Illinois, The Inter-state Independent Telephone and Telegraph 
Co. owned twenty-nine exchanges in Illinois, including the cities of Peoria, Springfield, Joliet, and 
Elgin. In 1911 it reached an agreement with the Illinois Tunnel Co. that gave it access to 
independent subscribers in the city of Chicago. Its lines connected with the Kinloch system to the 
west and with the Indiana’s New Long Distance Co. to the east. 
 
Centered in Ohio, the United States Telephone Company was one of the largest and 
strongest independent regional systems. It owned twenty-two independent operating companies, 
including exchanges in Cleveland, Columbus, Akron, and Youngstown, Ohio. Its long-distance 
lines covered the state of Ohio. After 1906, the financial syndicate controlling U.S. Telephone 
acquired control of the Home Telephone Co. of Detroit, the Indianapolis independent exchange, 
and the New Long Distance Telephone Co. The latter connected all of the sizable independent 
exchanges in the state of Indiana. In 1908 it furnished long-distance service to 800 independent 
exchanges in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan, reaching 325,000 telephones.249 The U.S. Telephone 
Co. required its connecting exchanges to sign a contract that guaranteed the long-distance company 
exclusive access to the local company’s toll business. The contract was an attempt to secure the 
same kind of control over interconnection rights embodied in the Bell system’s license contract. It 
stipulated that the local exchange was not allowed to make connecting arrangements with any other 
long-distance company for a term of ninety-nine years. 
 
Comparably sized independent regionals existed in New York state,250 Kentucky,251 
Southern California,252 Washington and Oregon,253 and Minnesota.254 By 1910, independent 
systems extended in an unbroken line from New York to Kansas along the east-west axis. On the 
north-south axis, they ran from Tennessee to Minnesota. With the exception of isolated systems in 
                                                 
248 Independent Telephone Cos-Financial History, Box 65, AT&T-BLA. 
249 1908 Annual Report of the United States Telephone Co., Dec. 31, 1908. Box 36, AT&T-BLA. 
250 Federal Telephone Co. Box 25, AT&T-BLA. 
251 Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph, acquisition of Central Home T & T, Kentucky, Box 39, AT&T-
BLA. 
252 Pacific Tel. & Tel., Los Angeles Consolidation, Box 18, AT&T-BLA. 
253 Acquisition of Pacific Independents, Box 30, AT&T-BLA. 
254 Northwestern Exchange Co. Connection with Toll Lines of Tri-State, Box 39, AT&T-BLA. 
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Dallas, Atlanta, Mobile, and Shreveport, they were all physically connected. The independents did 
not have the technology or the organization to offer talking circuits over 300 miles in length. 
Nevertheless, it was clear by the time of Vail’s return that the independent regionals were viable 
competitors for toll traffic as well as exchange subscribers. 
 
Independent toll service was usually lower priced than Bell’s and their lines often connected 
into exchanges where Bell had only a public toll station.255 Independent toll systems had seized a 
substantial amount of traffic because of their lower rates and sometimes superior exchange access. 
The incursions into toll business “not only assist the revenue of the opposition but greatly increase 
its prestige with the more important telephone customers,” noted AT&T’s Pickernell.256 In upstate 
New York, the effect of independent toll line competition was so severe that the Bell toll earnings 
had fallen to 1 to 2 percent. There was a “pronounced loss of business” in AT&T service from 
Buffalo to Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Jamestown.257 
Bell’s war on independent connectivity 
With the return of Vail, Bell had a clearly defined goal: the elimination of dual service and 
the creation of a nationally interconnected monopoly administered by Bell but supervised by 
regulators. Monopoly would bring about universal service and relief from the low rates locked into 
place by the fierce competitive struggle. Universal interconnection was not the sole object; Bell 
also wanted to make sure that it controlled the system. In order to do so, it had to prevent physical 
connection with overlapping systems and maintain absolute control of interexchange connections. 
There was a place for independent companies in that scheme, but only as local feeders to the Bell 
system. In the major cities, dual service was to be eliminated by buying out the independent and 
physically consolidating the exchanges. If the independent was dominant, Bell would sell out and 
enter into a connecting contract with the surviving exchange. Consolidation would demonstrate the 
benefits of a unified service while permitting the companies to raise rates to their “proper level.” In 
the smaller cities and the country, competition would be eliminated by an aggressive new 
sublicensing effort. Any overlapping, competing telephone systems that remained were to be 
isolated and squeezed out as all others were absorbed into the system. 
Liberalization of sublicensing 
Vail’s competitive tactics were directly aimed at the growth of connectedness among the 
independents. One of his most important countermoves was to revitalize Bell’s sublicensing efforts. 
The independent companies who directly overlapped and competed with Bell accounted for only 40 
to 45 percent of all independent telephones. The rest of the independent subscribers were in areas 
unoccupied by Bell. Those noncompeting independents, Vail understood, held the balance of power 
in the competition for universal coverage. If they could be tied into the Bell system, Bell could 
broaden its coverage without investing in facilities or engaging in local competition. In many areas, 
whoever won connecting rights with the majority of the noncompeting independents would have 
access to the largest number of subscribers. 
 
                                                 
255 Pickernell, AT&T to E.J. Hall, AT&T, May 12, 1909. Box 1376, AT&T- BLA. 
256 Pickernell, AT&T, to E.J. Hall, AT&T, May 12, 1909. Box 1376, AT&T- BLA. 
257 Pickernell, AT&T, to E.J. Hall, AT&T, May 21, 1909. Box 1376, AT&T-BLA. 
 
110 
 
Bell’s first sublicense contract had limited the exchange to Bell connections and required 
the use of Bell telephones. That tactic prevented the independents from running away with the 
business in the central states, but by the beginning of 1907 it had induced just 14 percent of the 
independent telephones to be connected to the Bell system. In order to gain access to more 
independent systems, Vail dramatically liberalized the Bell interconnection conditions. Starting in 
October 1907, independent exchanges connecting with Bell no longer had to use Western Electric 
instruments but could keep using independently manufactured telephones as long as they were of 
“first class” construction and would not impair the quality of service offered over joint lines.258 
Letters urged the licensee companies to “pursue vigorously the policy of sublicensing” in the part 
of their territory which was “more or less unremunerative” or “not yet occupied.”259 Managers were 
warned to make sure that Bell controlled all the toll lines connecting the sublicensed exchanges.260 
Vail also allowed Western Electric to begin selling telephones to independent companies for the 
first time.261 
Exclusive connecting contracts 
Bell went on to liberalize its interconnection policy in a more radical fashion. In an attempt 
to pry more independent subscribers away from the exclusive control of competing independents, 
Bell began to interconnect with independent exchanges even when they already maintained 
connections with competing long-distance lines. In a few cases, it was even willing to connect its 
toll lines to an independent exchange that was directly competing with one of its own if the 
independent had a commanding lead in the number of subscribers. Such was the case in Richmond, 
Indiana, where the independent exchange in 1908 had 2,400 subscribers to the Bell exchange’s 100. 
In lieu of consolidation, L. G. Richardson, President of the Central Union Co., proposed an 
interconnection agreement that would connect AT&T and Central Union Co. toll lines to the 
independent exchange in the city. Vail disapproved of the idea but Richardson went ahead with it 
anyway.262 That tactic was used in Ohio and Indiana, where hundreds of independent exchanges 
had signed exclusive connecting contracts with the United States Telephone Company (UST). The 
new policy amounted to soliciting the exchanges to break their contract with UST. Nevertheless, it 
was an attractive option for the local exchanges, as it gave their customers access to the subscribers 
and cities controlled by both systems.263 In 1908 sixteen local independent companies in Ohio and 
Indiana entered into connecting agreements with Bell in violation of their exclusive contract with 
UST.264 UST’s attempts to block those actions in the courts were unsuccessful (see section below 
entitled Exclusive Connecting Contracts and the Courts). 
 
                                                 
258 Vail Circular Letter, Oct. 9, 1907. Box 1376, AT&T-BLA. 
259 Vail Circular Letter, Feb. 10, 1908. Box 1376, AT&T-BLA. 
260 Vail Circular Letter, Sept. 10, 1908. Box 1376, AT&T-BLA. 
261 FCC TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION 138(GPO, 1939). 
262 Richardson to Vail, July 3, 1908. Vail to Richardson, July 7, 1908. Box 1357, AT&T-BLA. 
263 “Our plan of having all toll lines entering our city on one switchboard has been so pleasant and satisfactory 
to our patrons that I think that when the court order requiring us to remove them becomes known to our patrons, I 
would not be surprised if some demonstrations on their part would take place expressing their disapproval of being 
compelled to go back to the old and unsatisfactory way of having more than one toll station in the city.” William 
Shumaker, President, Butler (Indiana) Telephone Co. to L.N. Whitney, Central Union Co., Dec. 1, 1908. Box 1357, 
AT&T- BLA. 
264 J.B. Smith to J.D. Ellsworth, Dec. 5, 1908. Box 1357, AT&T-BLA. 
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Armed with its new interconnection policies, Bell licensees made great efforts to attract 
farmer and mutual company lines. “The opposition Bell has shown more activity than ever before 
in establishing and encouraging rural mutual companies to connect up with its system,” wrote 
Telephony in 1909. Bell promised rural telephone users service at one-fifth the rate of the 
independent companies.265 The importance of sublicensing as a form of enlarging the Bell system’s 
scope was particularly evident in the areas where strong independent toll systems were developing. 
In the Missouri and Kansas Co.’s territory in mid-1909, sublicensed toll lines outnumbered the Bell 
licensee’s in mileage, and sublicensed telephones outnumbered Bell-owned telephones by two to 
one.266 The Bell licensee in the territory around St. Louis was so dependent on sublicensing for toll 
connections that an AT&T agent speculated that if the sublicensees should happen to break with 
Bell “the Bell toll business and the Bell development would disappear, and the opposition would 
absolutely control most of the territory outside of St. Louis.”267 
 
Tables 9-1 and 9-2 show in statistical terms the devastating impact Vail’s policy of 
absorbing competition through interconnection had upon the independents’ attempt to build a rival 
system. The number of Bell-connecting independent telephones jumped from 297,218 at the 
beginning of 1907 to 1.2 million in only two years. By 1914, two-thirds of all independent 
telephones were connected to the Bell system. The competitive impact of the new policy becomes 
clear when those numbers are expressed as a proportion of the independent telephones not in direct 
competition with Bell (see table 9-2); that is, all of the independents not in dual service territories. 
At the beginning of 1907, only 25 percent of the noncompeting independents were connected to 
Bell. A year later, 46 percent of them were so connected. By October 1909, 79 percent were 
connected to Bell.268 By the time of the Kingsbury commitment, 89 percent of all noncompeting 
independents were embraced by the Bell system’s access universe. 
Price war in toll service 
Bell’s cooptation of noncompeting independents was supplemented by a price war against 
selected independent toll lines. The independent long-distance companies were able to charge 
lower rates because they had lower fixed costs. Unlike Bell, they did not attempt to provide 
complete toll coverage of an area but concentrated their resources on high volume routes. Bell toll 
lines served both “fat” and “lean” districts and installed enough capacity to handle most of the 
traffic. By constructing a simple economic model of those conditions, Pickernell discovered that 
cutting Bell rates in half to secure a larger share of the traffic would hurt the independent more than 
it would hurt Bell. The independent’s profit would be “enormously impaired,” while Bell’s would 
fall only slightly.269 Rate cuts proposed by Pickernell went into effect in May in selected cities of 
Ohio, the target being the U.S. Telephone Co. The Ohio rate cuts succeeded in increasing Central 
Union's toll traffic by 53 percent, while reducing its revenue by only 12 percent.270 In New York 
state, where strong independent systems in Buffalo, Syracuse, Rochester, and Erie, Pennsylvania 
existed, cuts went into effect in July. 
                                                 
265 17 TELEPHONY (Mar. 27 1909). 
266 Pickernell to Hall, supra note 11. 
267 Id. 
268 Chappelka (1956), 1912 Telephone Census. 
269 Pickernell to Vail, Box 1376. 
270 Thayer to Vail, Nov. 18, 1909. Box 1376, AT&T-BLA. 
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TABLE 9-1 
INDEPENDENT TELEPHONES CONNECTING WITH BELL, 1907-1914 
 
As of 
January 1, 
1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 
#Independent 
phones 
2.16 3.11 3.31 3.47 3.70 4.00 3.93 4.29 
#Bell 
connecting 
(millions) 
0.30 0.83 1.19 1.62 1.95 2.28 2.50 2.88 
Percent 
connecting 
(%) 
14 27 36 47 53 57 64 67 
Growth Rate 
(%) 
- 178 44 36 20 17 9 15 
Source: Chappelka, 1956; FCC, 1939; Telephone Censuses, 1907, 1912. 
 
TABLE 9-2 
NON-COMPETING INDEPENDENT TELEPHONES  
CONNECTING WITH BELL, 1907-1914 
As of 
January 1, 
1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 
#Non-
competing 
Independent 
phones 
1.19 1.80 1.86 2.00 2.35 2.68 2.87 3.23 
#Bell 
connecting 
(millions) 
0.30 0.83 1.19 1.62 1.95 2.28 2.50 2.88 
Percent 
connecting 
(%) 
25 46 64 81 83 85 87 89 
Source: Chappelka, 1956; FCC, 1939; Telephone Censuses, 1907, 1912. 
 
The price war made major inroads into the toll business of the United States Telephone 
Company. In an attempt to stop the loss of its long-distance business, UST tried to get both 
companies to restore their rates to their original levels. It approached the Central Union Company 
through the state independent association, which had come into much closer contact with the Bell 
licensee due to the growing number of sublicensed independent companies. At the instigation of 
James Brailey, president of UST, a committee of the Ohio Independent Telephone Association met 
with the Central Union and argued that the lower rates injured the local sublicensees by reducing 
their commissions from toll traffic. That argument was merely a cover for the real concern, which 
was that Bell's price war was hurting UST severely. They asked that the state independent 
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association be given the right to approve or disapprove of any change in toll rates made in the state 
of Ohio. That price-fixing offer was refused.271 As a result, Brailey took steps to sell off the United 
States Co. property. The United States Co. ended up in the hands of J.P. Morgan & Co. 
Acquisitions of competing exchanges 
The most direct blows against dual service came from Bell buyouts of competing 
exchanges. The policy of eliminating dual service in the larger cities through acquisition or sale 
progressed rapidly during that period. At the beginning of 1907, 59 percent of the Bell exchanges in 
cities with a population of 5,000 or more had dual telephone exchanges. By October 1913, the 
number of those cities with competition had been reduced to 37 percent. In smaller cities, mergers 
of competing exchanges were often followed by the franchising and construction of a new 
competing exchange. In Marshalltown, Iowa, for example, a new franchise was issued within a 
month of the takeover.272 In the larger cities, however, the losses were irreversible. 
 
Independent companies were particularly susceptible to divide-and-conquer acquisitions. 
Their decentralization made it difficult to weather extended bouts of competition or to adhere to a 
common policy. Selling out to Bell offered an appealing way to escape from a variety of financial 
pressures: the diseconomies of growth, price wars with a competitor who was willing and able to 
sustain losses for an extended period of time, rate restrictions in municipal franchises, and a 
constant need to raise more capital. Those problems had always existed, however. What 
precipitated the surge of independent sell-outs between 1910 and 1913 was the failure of 
independent attempts to build regionally interconnected systems capable of matching the scope of 
the Bell system. That failure was primarily the result of Bell’s liberalized interconnection policy. 
The financial panic of 1907, which made investors less willing to put scarce capital into dual 
systems, also contributed. The stampede of noncompeting independents into connecting 
arrangements with Bell between 1907 and 1910 prompted many of the more profit-oriented 
independent system owners to get out while the getting was good. In 1912 the consolidation trend 
began to chip away at the urban strongholds of the independents. Competition was eliminated in ten 
of the sixty-eight cities over 50,000 in population that had had dual service. In that year alone, Bell 
purchased 136,000 telephone stations and sold 42,650.273 
 
Early on, Bell takeovers led to the severance of independent toll line connections.274 After 
1910, the mediation of utility commissions made the mergers more orderly and protected the 
interests of the other independent exchanges in the state whose users were dependent upon access 
to the city. In order to ensure that public reactions against severed connections did not threaten the 
policy of achieving a universal service monopoly through buyouts, Bell announced the “Vail 
Commitment” in January 1912. The Vail Commitment was a promise that Bell would leave all 
                                                 
271 Richardson to Vail. June 21, 1909. Box 65, AT&T-BLA. 
272 17 TELEPHONY (Feb. 20, 1909). 
273 FCC TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION 140 Table 35 (GPO: 1939). 
274 In 1910 and 1911, independents in Adrian, Michigan, Memphis Tennessee, and Clarksville, Tennessee all 
suffered from severed connections after Bell acquired independently-owned toll lines in the vicinity. The practice was 
not as common as it has been made out to be, however, as the independents nearly always countered with lawsuits and 
were fairly influential politically at the state and local levels. 
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long-distance connections intact when an exchange changed hands. Acquisition would neither 
enlarge nor restrict the toll access of the exchanges involved.275 
 
Vail made his consolidation overtures explicit beginning in the Fall, 1910. During a national 
independent association meeting in Chicago, Vail and H. P. Davison of J. P. Morgan & Co. invited 
independent leaders to meet with them at the Blackstone Hotel. About twenty-five prominent 
independent representatives responded to the invitation. At the meeting, Vail offered to cooperate 
with the independents in thoroughly eliminating competition in the telephone business. He told the 
independents that the destructive warfare between them was costing the Bell Companies millions. 
He wanted to effect a merger that would end those losses and leave AT&T in control of most of the 
large cities and long-distance lines, while ceding the smaller places to the independents, where, he 
admitted, they operated more efficiently than Bell. The specific places to be controlled by AT&T or 
the independents would be settled through negotiations later. With a representative of the Morgan 
Co. at his side, Vail said that the merged companies could be capitalized liberally to cover the 
losses that had been sustained.276 
 
At Vail’s suggestion, a committee of seven independent leaders was appointed to conduct 
the negotiations. What became known as the Committee of Seven met with Vail and Davison 
several times over the next four months.277 That group became the nucleus of the major mergers 
that helped create a telephone monopoly. Negotiations concerning the purchase of almost every 
important independent property were initiated between 1910 and 1913. Though some of those deals 
were not consummated until a decade later, they represented the beginnings of Bell-independent 
cooperation in the control of the industry. 
Interconnection in law and public policy  
The law and public policy regarding interconnection, competition, and monopoly took two 
divergent and ultimately incompatible paths after 1907. The disturbingly rapid acquisition of 
competing exchanges by Bell set off antitrust alarms all over the country. Antimonopoly sentiment 
was at fever pitch; public fears that big businesses were strangling the market economy had led to 
successful prosecutions of the Northern Securities Company and to the dissolution of Standard Oil 
and the American Tobacco Company in 1911. Congress passed a new, broader antitrust law, the 
Clayton Act, in 1913. Other institutional responses at the state and local level, however, pointed in 
an altogether different direction. Municipalities weary with dual service began to favor 
consolidation or connection of competing exchanges. State governments began to create utility 
commissions with the authority to regulate telephone companies, or empowered existing railroad 
commissions to do so. The majority of them also passed laws authorizing the commissions to 
                                                 
275 For a glimpse of how the Vail Commitment affected consolidations see J.M.B. Hoxsey, Southern Bell, to 
N.C. Kingsbury, AT&T, Dec. 17, 1912. Box 39, AT&T-BLA. The independent in Louisville claimed that connections 
to hundreds of cities in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois had been possible prior to consolidation. Bell suspected that the 
connections, while physically possible, had never actually been made before and that the independent was exploiting 
the terms of the Vail commitment to acquire long-distance service over Bell lines. Box 39, AT&T-BLA. 
276 65 TELEPHONY 19-23 (Nov. 29, 1913). 
277 The “Committee of Seven” consisted of Frank Woods of Lincoln, Nebraska, E.H. Moulton of Minneapolis, 
Theodore Gary of Missouri, H.D. Critchfield of Chicago, Arnold Kalman of St. Louis, and B.G. Hubbell of Buffalo. 
All were owners of large independent systems. 
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compel the telephone companies to connect their lines. The commissions upheld regulation as a 
substitute for competition and often encouraged monopoly. The desire to preserve market 
competition mingled uncomfortably with an impulse to unify the system. As the courts, 
commissions, cities, and telephone companies groped for a solution to the “telephone situation,” it 
did not become evident that those two approaches worked at cross purposes to each other until the 
Kingsbury commitment, made at the end of 1913, transfigured the contradiction into a national 
policy. 
Antitrust Law 
The organized independents knew that competition could not be sustained without dual 
exchanges in as many cities as possible. The weapons they used to fight Bell acquisitions were state 
and national antitrust laws.278 When the national independent association gained wind of Bell’s 
intentions to merge independent and Bell properties in 1908, it formed a litigation committee and 
raised thousands of dollars from independent companies and associations.279 The litigation 
committee prodded the Attorneys General of Michigan, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri to block 
Bell purchases of independent companies.280 A merger in Marion, Ohio, in 1908 was also 
countered by a lawsuit under the Valentine Act, a state antitrust law. In Kentucky, merger 
negotiations between Bell and the Louisville-based independent were called off because the state 
constitution prohibited the consolidation of competing common carriers. Prodded by complaints 
from the Postal Telegraph Company, the state of Mississippi sued AT&T for integrating its 
operations with Western Union, charging that it was trying to monopolize the telegraph business.281 
 
Federal antitrust proceedings were initiated in July 1912, when the U.S. Attorney General in 
the Portland, Oregon district filed a suit under the Sherman Act, charging Bell with an attempt to 
monopolize the telephone business in the Pacific northwest. For the next six months special agents 
of the Justice Department took depositions from people involved in the telephone industry around 
the country. As the new administration of Woodrow Wilson took over the Justice Department in 
January 1913, the outgoing Attorney General turned over the completed investigation amidst 
widespread rumors that AT&T would be prosecuted.282 
 
At the local level, consolidations were opposed by those who feared they would lead to a 
rate increase or a deterioration of service. Advocates of that position had no trouble finding 
evidence that Bell rates in noncompetitive cities were higher than those in cities with competition. 
As Bell and independent plans to consolidate in Kansas City began to be floated, the Kansas City 
Post waged an effective newspaper war against the merger, noting that while Bell had promised 
residential rates of $36 a year, the residential rate in monopolized cities of comparable size was $42 
or $48 a year. “If the Bell Company charges from $42 to $48 a year for residence phones in other 
cities, won’t it find excuses to do the same thing here if competition is removed?” the paper 
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asked.283 In many quarters there was still a willingness to rely on the traditional method of 
competition to control rates and service. 
Exclusive connecting contracts and the courts 
The dispute over exclusive connecting contracts brings out the complexity of the 
relationship between interconnection, competition and monopoly. From the viewpoint of the local 
exchange, an exclusive connecting contract prevented competition by tying all of its long-distance 
traffic to one carrier. From the viewpoint of the subscriber, exclusivity destroyed their ability to 
choose long-distance carriers, and made them accept a system with less than universal coverage. To 
the embattled independent regional systems, however, exclusive access to independent exchanges 
was its chief competitive advantage against Bell. Opening up its connecting exchanges to Bell 
subscribers destroyed their ability to complete with a much larger system. Protecting consumers' 
and local exchanges’ right to choose toll carriers would accomplish little if enforcing that right left 
only one carrier in the field. 
 
The United States Telephone Company lawsuit against Bell for connecting with its 
contracting exchanges was the testing ground for those issues. It went first to the Common Pleas 
Court, which treated the case as a simple breach of contract. The court upheld the independent long 
distance company and ordered the exchanges to sever their connections with Bell toll lines. Bell 
continued the practice, however, and UST was forced to litigate the case on broader grounds. It 
sued Bell under the state antitrust laws, charging that its new policy was an attempt to drive UST 
out of business and monopolize the trade.284 The 1909 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, 
however, found not Bell but the United States Company guilty of monopolistic practices. The court 
invalidated its ninety-nine-year exclusive contracts because they gave the independent long 
distance company a “monopoly” of the local exchange’s long distance business. 
 
In a lively and incisive review of the application of common carrier principles to the 
telephone, Judge Taylor of the Court dismissed the precedent of the railroad express cases, which 
for the preceding fifteen years had shielded telephone companies from interconnecting with other 
companies. The practical demands of railroad operation were completely different from those 
attending the making of telephone connections, the Judge wrote. While it was physically 
impossible and unsafe to allow railroad companies to run trains over another company’s tracks 
without the second company’s cooperation and consent, the interconnection of telephone 
companies did not pose the same problems. A long distance company need not be treated 
differently than any other individual subscriber: 
 
Conceivably, 20 long-distance companies might be connected with the local 
exchange with the same simplicity and with the same absence of confusion which 
we find in relation to the local subscriber’s lines, and there is no more physical 
difficulty,…in connecting a subscriber with one of the 20 long-distance lines than in 
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connecting a subscriber with another local subscriber served by the same 
exchange.285 
 
As common carriers, telephone companies were required to provide service to all who 
applied without discrimination. Since the operations required to link subscribers to the lines of a 
long-distance company were no different from those required to set up a connection with any other 
subscriber, the company’s common carrier obligation could and should be extended to long-
distance companies. The U.S. Supreme Court’s earlier doctrine that “common carriers” had no 
obligation to be “common carriers of common carriers” was no longer valid. 
 
The pro-competitive intent of the decision is clear from its basis in antitrust law and its 
reference to the possibility of “20 long-distance companies” serving a single exchange. Indeed, its 
reasoning was exactly the same as that underlying the “equal access” provisions of the 1982 
Modified Final Judgment, which paved the way for long-distance competition in the 1980s. In 
theory and in the received version of telephone history, larger networks are supposed to benefit 
from the refusal to connect and smaller competitors are supposed to favor joining their system to 
the larger one. In 1909, however, the dominant network was seeking to interconnect with 
companies bound to its competitors. The Ohio Supreme Court decision allowing it to do so was 
correctly seen as a setback to the cause of independent long distance competition. 
 
Competition suffered because the court decision interfered with the competing 
independents’ ability to coalesce a critical mass of subscribers and exchanges outside of the Bell 
system. Joseph Ware, secretary of the national association, expressed the prevailing view among 
independents: 
 
Judge Tayler fails to grasp the first great principle in the telephone struggle and 
business, that, excepting the Independent companies are connected together into one 
system there can be no competition in the telephone business.286 
 
Competition in the telephone business revolved around the scope of access. A few large 
independent companies were attempting to construct regional access universes that would be 
competitive with Bell’s. In any given region of the country, Bell controlled a far greater number of 
exchanges than any individual rival. Thus, the many small, scattered independent exchanges held 
the balance of power. Bell had guaranteed access to a larger number of exchanges to begin with; 
allowing it to break exclusive contracts binding the small independents to competitive long distance 
networks would place “50 percent of the Independent force in the doubtful column,” a Nebraska 
independent wrote.287 If all independents did not hold together as a system, Bell would easily 
dominate the industry by virtue of its nationwide presence and extensive network facilities: 
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If our faction [the Independents] were made up of one organization some uniformity 
of methods could be followed, but to compel an interchange of service under present 
conditions means elimination of competition in favor of the larger organization and 
nothing else.288 
 
Ostensibly, nondiscriminatory interconnection would also open Bell exchanges to UST, but 
the independents expressed doubts about whether that would lead to a truly competitive situation: 
 
The second point which the judge fails to grasp is, that there is no competition where 
long distance lines are connected into one exchange-where one operator can put 
messages over all lines. The benefits to the public which come from 
competition…can only be obtained successfully by having competitive systems, 
rather than variously owned lines into each exchange, with one long-distance 
company-the Bell. He overlooks the fact that the Bell company has, or had, a 
competing local exchange in each of the towns where connection was made with a 
local company having contract relations with the U.S. Telephone Co., and that, co-
incident with the connection of the Bell toll lines to the local independent exchange, 
local competition was eliminated.289 
 
The independents were asserting that nondiscriminatory interconnection was fundamentally 
incompatible with competition. If Bell could gain access to local subscribers through an 
independent exchange it would not operate a competitive exchange. If there were competing long-
distance lines terminating in a monopoly local exchange, the operators of the exchange would route 
long-distance calls over their own company’s lines rather than those of a competitor. 
 
The tendency to apply concepts of nondiscrimination to the telephone business in such a 
way as to require competing companies to exchange traffic appeared in other important legal 
decisions of the period, and represented one strand of thinking.290 The Supreme Court of New 
York, on the other hand, upheld the validity of exclusive contracts on the grounds that it preserved 
competition.291 
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Physical Connection Laws 
A different approach to the problem was taking shape at the state level. Twenty eight states 
passed laws creating regulatory commissions or giving existing railroad commissions jurisdiction 
over the telephone companies between 1909 and 1913.292 Twenty-six states passed laws 
authorizing some form of compulsory physical connection between telephone companies from 
1907 to 1913, inclusive.293 In 1910 the Interstate Commerce Commission was given the authority 
to regulate telephone companies as common carriers. Armed with their new powers to regulate 
entry, mergers and connections, the utility commissions began to push the telephone system toward 
a monopolistic structure. 
 
Compulsory physical connection legislation was the most important arena for working out 
the public policy regarding dual systems. Contrary to common assumptions, the passage of those 
laws did not end access competition, but merely empowered a utility commission to order 
connections when petitioned to do so by the telephone users of a specific locality. Rulings required 
hearings and a finding of public interest, convenience and necessity by the commission, and thus 
could only be applied on a case-by-case basis. The laws were almost never used to connect urban 
exchanges engaged in direct competition with each other; more often, they were applied to broaden 
interexchange access. The restricted scope of their application was attributable to the widespread 
belief that merging the subscriber sets of the telephone companies would eliminate competition 
and/or do economic harm one of the two telephone systems. Because there was as yet was no 
public consensus on the issue of monopoly, the commissions concentrated on cases where dual 
service restricted communication between different cities. 
 
The flood of physical connection legislation from 1910 to 1913 reflected a change of heart 
among some of the independents. There had always been public demands for connecting the 
separate networks, but the combination of Bell and independent opposition had prevented action. 
By 1910 some independents were beginning to back away from access competition. Those who 
embraced that view did not see interconnection as a means of preserving competition, but were 
generally the same independents who worked out consolidations or divisions of territory with Bell. 
Others saw interconnection as a way to minimize Bell competition at the local level by giving their 
exchanges access to Bell toll lines. 
 
The physical connection provision of Wisconsin’s state utility law was defeated in 1907, 
when the independents opposed it, but passed in 1911, after they had given up hope of establishing 
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an exchange in Milwaukee and the state association had become dormant.294 Frank Woods, the 
president of the National Independent Telephone Association, openly embraced the “universal 
service” concept and advocated laws compelling the interchange of service between all companies 
under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission.295 Two years later, Woods worked 
out a consolidation with Bell that eliminated dual service in most of southeastern Nebraska. In 
1911, the NITA national convention followed Woods’s lead and passed a resolution for compulsory 
connection and state and national regulation.296 
 
The issue of interconnection and cooperation with Bell split the independents, however. A 
splinter independent association led by the owners of the competing systems in New York, 
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia was formed in January 1913. One of its leaders, Burt Hubbell, 
explained that the new association “shall be composed of members who represent telephone 
companies not owned or controlled by the AT&T, directly or indirectly.”297 
 
Municipal governments also were agitating for the elimination of fragmentation locally. A 
Cleveland city council resolution of January 1908 declared dual service a “nuisance” and instructed 
its committee on telephones and telegraphs to investigate the feasibility of compelling the Bell and 
Cuyahoga exchanges to interconnect. A civic committee in another former independent stronghold, 
Indianapolis, also recommended a return to one system after an investigation of the telephone 
situation. Kansas City and Los Angeles both experienced political agitation to connect or 
consolidated their systems.298 In all cities, however, support for the elimination of dual service was 
tempered by fears that it would lead to a rate increase.299 
 
Compulsory interconnection laws were vociferously opposed by Bell and by the hard-core 
independents led by Hubbell. Although their motives were different, their arguments about the 
competitive effects often paralleled each other. Physical interconnection posed a problem for Bell 
in that it publicly advocated universal service but was unwilling to bring that goal about by 
connecting with competing systems. It had to argue that universal service could be achieved best 
under the administration of one system. A detailed memo outlining its argument was prepared in 
1907.300 Its arguments were reflected in Vail's attack on interconnection of competing systems in 
the Annual Reports. 
 
The Bell memo contrasted the standardization, coordination, and high quality that could be 
achieved under a monopoly with the chaotic and uncontrolled conditions that would result from 
nondiscriminatory connection with a multiplicity of independently owned, overlapping systems. It 
                                                 
294 D. Gabel 349 (1987). 
295 MacMeal 183 (1934). 
296 MacMeal 186 (1934). 
297 MacMeal 196 (1934). 
298 Bells may talk to Homes, KANSAS CITY STAR, Mar. 6, 1911. For more information about the Los 
Angeles situation, see chapter 10. 
299 CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 2, 1911. After passing several resolutions urging the telephone 
companies to consolidate, the city council passed a resolution on that date stating its opposition to any rate increase 
following a merger. 
300 Physical Connection, a syllabus and brief on the question of statutorily compelled connection of telephone 
lines owned by different companies. Memo dated Apr. 25, 1907. AT&T-BLA. 
 
121 
 
also attempted to argue that independently manufactured telephones would not work with the Bell 
system as well as Bell telephones, although that point was easily discredited as Bell went about 
sublicensing thousands of non-Bell systems. 
 
A more significant argument was that competition between connected networks was 
inherently imperfect and even parasitic. If a Bell exchange in a dual service city had fewer 
subscribers than its opponent and Bell was forced to connect its toll lines with it, the independent 
subscribers could benefit from Bell toll access without subscribing to Bell. Bell would lose all of its 
exchange subscribers to the larger local company: 
 
“If toll lines were forced to connect with competitors, any fellow who feels 
aggrieved because his call did not reach him promptly when his mother-in-law had 
cramp colic…can and probably will build a competing line between your most 
profitable points, hitch onto you at each end, and make you take his calls to all other 
points on your lines. [If exchanges were forced to connect with competitors,] if a 
handful of businessmen are hostile to you for any reason,…they will build a co-
operative exchange in the business section of the town-hire an operator or two-
install telephones for themselves at a cost of only a collar or a little over a month, 
take out your telephones, connect to your exchange,…and you will hold the bag, and 
eventually lose out entirely.”301 
 
In economic terms, that can be summarized as an argument that interconnection made 
networks complements rather than competitors. Bell’s defenders also made an appropriability 
argument: Bell laid out telephone facilities to cover an entire district, including what it called the 
“fat” and the “lean” areas. Even though some parts of the system were not profitable in isolation, 
connecting everyone could make the system as a whole profitable. Interconnection laws would 
allow another company to serve only the profitable areas while benefitting from Bell's access to the 
“lean” areas. 
 
The independents’ motive in opposing compulsory interconnection was to preserve dual 
systems rather than to eliminate them. A unified, fully interconnected telephone system, they 
believed, could not possibly be a truly competitive one. They advanced two reasons for that view: 
first, there was a tension, if not an outright contradiction, between competitive rivalry and the kind 
of interfirm cooperation needed to set up telephone connections jointly; second, the whole 
competitive process in telephony was driven by access differentials which would disappear once 
the systems were interconnected. 
 
Establishing a telephone connection over the facilities of two or more companies involved 
linking their lines at the same time to form an unbroken channel for voice communication. The 
workers of the two companies had to cooperate rapidly and efficiently, and their methods had to be 
compatible. The independents did not deny that this was possible. They did point out that the level 
of cooperation required was so intricate that two companies involved in it could hardly maintain 
their status as competitors. 
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Business firms sufficiently cooperative to exchange traffic could just as easily divide the 
market, fix prices, and cease to compete. By the same token, integrating their operations involved a 
degree of mutual trust and openness that hardly seemed compatible with business rivalry. Whoever 
controlled the local exchange, for example, would be in a position to discriminate between the toll 
lines of the long-distance companies when it routed the traffic or could engage in preferential 
treatment of one’s own subscribers at the expense of the other’s. A columnist in the independent 
trade journal Telephony said of making connections over Bell toll lines: “It would be easy to detect 
discrimination if Bell operators refused to record your calls. But the switchboard having lots of 
business, some calls will have to wait. Do you think the Bell calls would wait? No! But do you 
doubt that your calls would wait? They would wait.”302 The independent defenders of dual systems 
also believed, like Bell, that dissolving the access differences between the net- works eliminated 
real competition. 
 
There was at least one advocate of connecting with competing companies within the Bell 
system. B. E. Sunny, the head of the Chicago Telephone Co., believed that Bell would benefit from 
voluntarily entering into connecting arrangements. In February 1910, he wrote a memo proposing 
to operate lines connecting the independent exchanges in Indianapolis, Grand Rapids, Racine, and 
Aurora to the Bell system. The arrangement would give independent subscribers in those cities 
access to Chicago, Cincinnati, and Milwaukee. Sunny pointed out that the proposal would have 
numerous advantages-it would preempt the growing demand for physical connection legislation, 
allowing Bell to connect on its own terms; it would eliminate the need to grant a franchise to 
competing companies in cities currently monopolized by Bell; it would greatly increase Bell’s toll 
business, or at least allow them to find out what effects interconnection would have on its traffic; it 
would reveal the identity of independent long-distance users to Bell, allowing Bell to solicit them to 
take its own service and save time and money by doing away with the costs of transferring calls 
between two systems. The only disadvantage Sunny recognized was that it might lead to the loss of 
exchange subscribers in cities where Bell rates were higher.303 The proposal was not implemented, 
however, because the national Bell management feared that interconnection would perpetuate dual 
systems and ease the pressure for consolidation. 
 
Sunny’s arguments tend to support the independents’ contention that interconnection would 
lead to a single system rather than continued competition. A particularly shrewd aspect of Sunny’s 
proposal was that all long-distance calls from independent to Bell points would have to go over 
Bell lines the whole way. If an independent user in Peoria wanted to call Chicago, for example, he 
would not be allowed to use independent toll lines between Peoria and Aurora and then transfer to 
Bell lines; Bell would have to carry the traffic between both cities. The independents knew that 
those kinds of problems were not only possible but likely when interconnecting competing 
networks, which is why they viewed the prospect with suspicion. Sunny’s proposal is also 
significant because it may have been used as a model for the interconnection arrangements of the 
Kingsbury commitment (see chapter 10). 
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Case Studies in the Application of Interconnection Laws 
Three landmark cases in California, Wisconsin, and Oregon highlight the different facets of 
the interconnection issue-the attitudes of users toward nonconnected networks, the effects that the 
telephone companies believed connection would have on their economic viability, and the attitudes 
of regulators toward competition. 
Glen and Tehama Counties, California 
In April 1912 complaints calling for physical connection were filed with the state railroad 
commission by two rural independent telephone systems in northern California.304 The Glen and 
Tehama County Telephone companies started operation five years earlier in the predominantly 
rural counties. Prior to their formation, the Bell system had established exchanges only in the cities, 
had minimal toll lines, and used obsolete equipment. The new companies built exchanges and toll 
lines throughout their counties using modern independent apparatus. Following the standard pattern 
of access competition, Bell was forced to install modern switchboards, construct extensive toll 
lines, and sublicense farmer lines in order to remain competitive. Competition had produced a high 
level of duplicate subscriptions. At the time of the proceeding the subscriber breakdown was as 
follows: 
 
TABLE 9.3 
TELEPHONE COMPETITION IN GLEN AND TEHAMA COUNTIES, CA, 1912 
 
 Tehama County Glen County 
Bell-connected users: 629 674 
Independent users: 457 570 
Duplicate users (%): 241 (28%) 329 (36%) 
 
Bell held the majority of users, but only 30 percent of the Bell-connected telephones were 
leased from Bell; the rest were sublicensed phones owned by farmers. The commission considered 
connecting the two systems an appropriate solution because the independents offered superior local 
service while the Bell system had more extensive toll access. 
 
From the text of the decision it is clear that the local telephone companies viewed 
interconnection as a way to overcome the competitive advantages given to Bell by its toll lines. 
They believed that once the two systems were connected they would win the majority of the local 
exchange subscribers. The utility commissioners also saw interconnection as a means of 
eliminating duplicate subscriptions and overlapping exchanges. Its ruling pointedly did not disagree 
with Bell’s contention that it would lose most of its exchange subscribers if telephone users could 
gain access to its toll lines without subscribing to its local exchanges. Like Bell, the commissioners 
thought of the telephone as a natural monopoly. That Bell had been forced to extend and improve 
its service by the new entrants was interpreted by the commission not as evidence for the benefits 
of competition but as an indication that a monopoly could and should have been doing better.305 
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Wisconsin 
In the city of LaCrosse, Wisconsin (pop. 30,000), Frank Winter, a subscriber to the 
independent company, petitioned the Wisconsin Railroad Commission to connect the toll lines of 
the two competing systems in 1912. LaCrosse was the largest city to undertake a physical 
connection proceeding at that time. The Wisconsin Telephone Co. (Bell) had 1,400 subscribers in 
the city; the LaCrosse Telephone Co. had 4,200. Both companies had toll facilities offering 
connections throughout the state, but Wisconsin Telephone lines extended to many places not 
reached by the local independent. Only 8 percent of the telephone users bad duplicate subscriptions, 
and twelve to fifteen large businesses had PBXs connected to the toll lines of both companies. The 
petitioner’s business required almost daily use of Bell toll facilities. When calls for local people not 
on the Bell exchange came into the city, messengers had to be dispatched to bring the desired party 
to a Bell station. Winter requested connecting only the toll lines of the two systems, leaving the 
division of local exchange service intact. The petitioners argued that the arrangement would be 
more convenient and would benefit the Bell company by increasing its toll business.306 
 
Wisconsin Telephone opposed the request with its usual arguments. Interconnection would 
result in the loss of most of its exchange subscribers. If users could obtain access to Bell toll lines 
without a subscription to Bell’s exchange, they would migrate to the larger independent exchange 
in order to obtain universal local service in addition to Bell’s widespread toll line service. To 
support its contention it introduced evidence from Canada, where interconnection had been ordered 
in eight cities and Bell’s growth in subscribers had been reversed while its local competitors 
grew.307 
 
The Wisconsin regulators ordered the connection made. Unlike the California Commission, 
however, they took seriously the question of confiscation of property. “It is evident that the only 
inducement to subscribe to the Bell system is the fact that thereby the subscriber is connected with 
a telephone system covering like net work the entire country.” In order to compensate for economic 
damage to Bell’s exchange, the commission imposed a surcharge on users of Bell toll lines who did 
not subscribe to the Bell exchange. “A subscriber who has not installed the telephones of both 
exchanges is not entitled to the toll service of both exchanges without paying an additional charge,” 
it said.308 A surcharge had also been imposed in Canada, however, where it had failed to stop the 
desertion of the Bell system. In June 1914 the Wisconsin Commission issued another physical 
connection order pertaining to the city of Janesville, Wisconsin. In that case the connection order 
included both local exchange and toll service.309 In LaCrosse, Bell’s fears proved to be true-local 
subscribers gradually deserted the Bell exchange over the next four years until the exchange was 
closed. In Janesville, however, market shares stabilized, but he exchanges were eventually 
consolidated anyway. 
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Portland, Oregon 
Portland, Oregon, in 1913 was a dual service city with about 40,000 Bell telephones, 13,600 
Home Co. telephones and 7,000 duplicate subscribers. The Hotel Oregon had Home Co. telephones 
in its 400 rooms and forty-five Bell system phones in the public places throughout the hotel. The 
hotel’s customers objected to the inconvenience of having to walk to the lobby or hallways to call 
Bell subscribers in the city. When incoming calls came into the hotel over the Bell system, the hotel 
staff had to contact the patrons and bring them to a Bell station. The switchboards of the two 
systems were in the same room in the hotel. The Home Co. was willing to set up a connection 
between the two, but Bell refused to do so. The only remedy Bell offered was to install duplicate 
Bell telephones in all the hotel rooms, an expensive proposition for the hotel management. On the 
motion of the hotel owners, the case was brought to the Oregon Railroad Commission. The 
commission ordered the telephone companies to connect their hotel switchboards and exchange 
traffic and charge three and a half cents for each transferred call. 
 
There were other important physical connection cases in Hamilton, Ohio, and Grand Ledge, 
Michigan. The commission ordered connections, but in each case the decision was appealed. As in 
the exclusive connecting contract cases, the state supreme courts decisions conflicted with each 
other. Indiana’s Supreme Court ruled against compulsory physical connection in August 1909.310 
California’s Supreme Court overturned the railroad commission’s interconnection order in 1913, 
calling it “confiscatory.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld its commission in 1916.311 
Regulation as a substitute for competition 
Regulatory commissions often promoted consolidations as well as interconnection. In 
September 1911, only three months after the bill creating the Ohio utility commission became law, 
state officials were meeting with representatives of the Bell company to discuss plans for the 
elimination of dual service throughout the state. In 1912 the Bell and independent telephone 
companies in southeastern Nebraska worked out a consolidation in which Bell achieved a 
monopoly in some territories and the independent a monopoly in the others. The deal was made 
with the aid and approval of the state commission. The Michigan commission presided over the 
consolidation of the competing exchanges in Detroit in 1912 and helped to assure the remaining 
independent companies that the change would not impair their access to the city.312 When the 
regulators and their supporters attempted to push for legislation against dual service, however, they 
were rarely successful. Bills which explicitly prevented competition or permitted mergers between 
competing companies were defeated in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Ohio in 1909 and 1910. Another 
merger bill with the support of both Bell and the Morgan interests (which controlled the big 
independent system in the state) was introduced in Ohio in 1911 but failed to pass again. A similar 
bill was vetoed by the governor of Nebraska in 1911. While the creation of one system had the 
support of regulators, it was still controversial with the general public. 
 
The vitality and novelty of the issue of interconnection can be measured by the 
contradictory nature of the responses it evoked. Exclusive connecting contracts had been declared 
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311 Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 162 W.R. 383 (1916). 
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to be both anti-competitive and the salvation of competition. Their legality had been upheld by one 
state supreme court and overturned by others. Consolidation of competing telephone companies 
was being prosecuted under state and federal antitrust laws but actively encouraged by state utility 
commissions. The commissions could bring about consolidations, but bills explicitly authorizing 
them were usually defeated. Physical interconnection was the desirable goal, but so was 
competition and the two did not seem to be compatible. Compelling physical connection was 
authorized by law in many states but had been declared confiscatory and illegal by some state 
courts. 
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SAVING DUAL SERVICE? THE KINGSBURY COMMITMENT 
 
 
BY THE END OF 1913, Vail’s attempt to unify the telephone system had reaped a 
whirlwind of controversy. AT&T was mired in lawsuits regarding rates or antitrust issues in almost 
every state. The federal government, too, had initiated antitrust litigation against Bell in the Pacific 
Northwest. A stockholder of the Central Union company was suing AT&T for conspiring to 
bankrupt the licensee company in order to subject it to an inexpensive takeover by AT&T. More 
threatening still, AT&T’s pursuit of a single system had fueled agitation for government ownership 
of the telephone system. Postmaster General Burleson’s annual report for 1912 had advocated 
government ownership of all forms of interstate communication. Burleson was cooperating with 
two powerful congressmen, Representative Moon of Tennessee, Chairman of the House Committee 
on Post Offices and Post Roads, and Representative David J. Lewis of Maryland, in the drafting of 
a bill to nationalize long-distance telephone lines. 
  
Bell’s attempt to acquire and consolidate the Morgan-owned independent properties in Ohio 
brought matters to a head. After extensive negotiations with state and federal authorities, it learned 
that the consolidations would be considered a violation of the Sherman Act. In order to extract 
itself from litigation and abate the threat of government ownership, Bell was forced to back away 
from its pursuit of a unified system. Its vehicle for doing so was the “Kingsbury commitment” of 
December 19, 1913, so named because it was expressed in a letter from AT&T Vice President 
Nathan C. Kingsbury to Attorney General McReynolds and Assistant Attorney General G. Carroll 
Todd of the Department of Justice. The letter eliminated, for the time being, the threat of federal 
antitrust prosecution and stilled some of the demands for government ownership. 
 
The Kingsbury letter committed AT&T to three things: 
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1) AT&T agreed to divest itself of its controlling stock holdings in its Western Union 
telegraph company, despite the important economies of scope gained from joint operation of 
telephone and telegraph lines; 
 
2) AT&T agreed to stop acquiring competing independent exchanges, thus preserving dual 
service in the 1,234 cities and towns where Bell and an independent divided the market; 
 
3) AT&T offered to open up its long-distance lines to independent exchanges under certain 
conditions. The interconnection provisions of the commitment only applied to exchanges that were 
more than fifty miles apart. Thus, the agreement appeared to preserve a divided, competitive 
service at the local level while depriving AT&T of the competitive advantage it obtained by tying 
long-distance access to local exchange service.313 
 
Contemporaries viewed the Kingsbury commitment as a near-complete victory for the view 
that competition rather than monopoly should be the norm in the telephone industry. The 
independents referred to the commitment as a “gift from Santa Claus Bell”314 and congratulated 
themselves on what seemed to be “the acceptance of the principle of competition in the conduct of 
[the telephone] business.”315 Indeed, to this day the Kingsbury commitment is reknowned within 
the telecommunications industry as a historical milestone. But it is hard to understand why. The 
agreement proved to be completely ineffectual at preserving a competitive market structure. 
Although the spinoff of Western Union was accomplished, the commitment had no impact 
whatsoever on toll interconnection. Within three years of its ban on acquisitions, Bell, the 
independents, and state and federal governments were engaged in a mutually agreeable process of 
consolidating their properties. Only seven years later, its restrictions on buyouts were officially 
eliminated by a new federal law. The Kingsbury commitment was neither a milestone nor a turning 
point but a brief pause on the road to regulated monopoly. 
The Kingsbury Commitment and Toll Interconnection 
The Kingsbury commitment is often misinterpreted as a sweeping interconnection 
agreement that effectively ended the fragmentation brought about by Bell and independent 
competition. It was nothing of the kind. Its primary intention was to leave dual service competition 
intact at the exchange level. Thus, it did not permit connection of Bell and independent exchanges 
that were sited within a fifty mile radius of each other. As noted before, 95 percent of all telephone 
calls at that time were to points within fifty miles. More importantly, there is no evidence that any 
sizable independent company availed itself of the opportunity to establish long-distance 
connections with AT&T under its terms. Bell’s own statistics on the number of telephone 
subscribers connected to itself through independent companies show no quantum leaps in 1914 or 
1915. On the contrary, the rate of increase in the number of connecting stations, which advanced 
rapidly during Vail’s sublicensing craze of 1908 to 1912, declined steadily from 1913 to 1916.  The 
                                                 
313 The complete text of the Kingsbury commitment is published in the 1913 AT&T ANNUAL REPORT 24-
26. 
314 65 TELEPHONY 1 (Dec. 27, 1913). 
315 Comments of E. B. Fisher, President. Independent Telephone Association of America, 65 TELEPHONY 
20 (Dec. 27, 1913). 
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number of independent stations connected to the Bell system increased by 8 percent from 1912 to 
1913, by 4 percent from 1914 to 1915, and by only 3 percent from 1915 to 1916.316 Additional 
sublicensing of small exchanges in outlying areas, rather than the Kingsbury commitment, accounts 
for that growth. 
 
The reason for the commitment’s lack of impact on interconnection becomes apparent as 
soon as its actual provisions are examined. The commitment was carefully crafted to preserve 
Bell’s competitive advantage, and its terms were far from generous. To make long-distance 
connections over the Bell system, an independent had to build its own lines to the nearest Bell 
exchange and pay the regular toll charges, plus a ten cent fee for every call handled. The idea of 
imposing a surcharge on the exchange of traffic between competing systems had been employed by 
many utility commissions as a way around the appropriability argument and court restrictions on 
confiscation. But the physical connection agreements ordered by utility commissions usually 
established a surcharge one-half to one-third that size! The agreement also stipulated that the entire 
toll circuit should be over Bell facilities and under the control of Bell operators. Independent long-
distance lines, in other words, could not be used to make up any part of the circuit, except to get the 
call to the nearest Bell switchboard in cases where there were no Bell lines. That excluded 
independent long-distance companies from the entire market for long-distance traffic flowing from 
independent to Bell telephones. More restrictive still, the agreement only permitted independent 
subscribers to terminate calls in Bell exchanges; it did not allow Bell subscribers to place calls to 
users on independent systems. 
 
Those terms of trade benefitted only Bell. The terms of the commitment were so 
disadvantageous to the independents that they were immediately dismissed by them as “absurd” 
and “insane.”317 Most independents still viewed the commitment as a victory, however, because 
they thought the Kingsbury commitment would be the first step in a bargaining process that would 
eventually lead to acceptable terms. But there were a few dissenting voices. 
 
J.C. Kelsey, a columnist in Telephony, correctly characterized the commitment as the last in 
a series of three steps taken by Bell to deprive the independents of their exclusive control of 
portions of the telephone business. The sublicensing contracts had opened up a significant number 
of independent exchanges to Bell connections without allowing competing independents access to 
Bell exchanges. The decision to sell Bell-manufactured telephones to independent companies had 
eroded the independent manufacturers’ exclusive control of independent operating company 
purchases without permitting any Bell companies to buy independently-manufactured equipment. 
Now the Kingsbury commitment opened up to Bell parts of the long-distance business heretofore 
exclusively controlled by independents, without any reciprocal concessions: 
 
The Bell company throws open its long-distance lines... Does it involve any loss to 
Bell? Does it involve any gain to you? ... [Bell] retains its long-distance business. 
You can’t get any of that. But it puts the large independent centers on the clock. It 
                                                 
316 FCC TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION (GPO, 1939) Table 32, 129. 
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has offered to share your exclusive customers’ business with you. Surely, another 
typically generous act.318 
 
In a letter to Assistant Attorney General G. Carroll Todd, Kingsbury made clear the non-
reciprocal nature of the commitment: “the Bell system cannot, under the terms of that contract, 
open up an independent system to its subscribers.”319 
 
The independent’s optimism about improving the toll interconnection arrangements was 
dashed when major independents entered into post-Kingsbury negotiations. In October 1914 
President Hubbell of Buffalo’s independent Federal Telephone Co. made an inquiry about 
interconnecting with Bell toll lines. In his correspondence with AT&T Vice President Kingsbury, 
he quickly discovered that AT&T would make no concessions to reciprocity.320 Hubbell 
complained to the Department of Justice to no avail. Late in 1916 the Independent’s national 
association charged that Bell had failed to live up to the spirit of the interconnection agreement.321 
The protests had no effect. 
The Ban on Acquisitions 
The Kingsbury commitment’s moratorium on acquisitions was far more important than its 
lopsided, ineffectual interconnection proposal. Hundreds of ongoing negotiations for Bell purchases 
of major independent properties were suddenly suspended. The suspension left intact many large 
independent operating companies, rooted in major cities and possessed of significant levels of toll 
interconnection. At the time of the agreement, there were 1,234 communities in which Bell 
competed with an independent exchange and 630 communities in which a Bell-connecting 
independent competed with other independent exchanges. Dual service thus remained in 1,864 
places, 13 percent of the total number of communities with exchanges in the United States.322 
 
The moratorium on consolidations, however, was at odds with other forces propelling the 
telephone system towards monopoly. The growing desire of users for universal access, state utility 
commissions’ determination to supplant competition with regulation, and World War I-induced 
centralization all pointed towards the unification of the network. The Kingsbury commitment thus 
created a temporary hiatus in the march toward monopoly rather than a victory for the competitive 
principle. For the next five years, the commitment impeded consolidations while the political, 
economic, and social forces favoring them continued to build. 
 
The forces undermining the commitment are evident in a host of Bell archives files 
pertaining to acquisitions of independents after 1912.323 In many cases, the commitment was the 
                                                 
318 J. C. Kelsey, Some New Year Thoughts, 66 TELEPHONY (Jan. 10, 1914). 
319 N. C. Kingsbury to G. Carroll Todd, Oct. I, 1914, Section 7, Papers of the Attorney General, National 
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323 N. C. Kingsbury, AT&T, to Geo. W. Wickersham, U.S. Attorney General, Mar. 3, 1913, Box 32, AT&T-BLA. 
Attached memo contains a list of 29 acquisitions in Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota which “have been postponed or 
abandoned on account of Mr. Vail’s letter of August 6th [1912].” For other postponed acquisitions, see Continental, 
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only obstacle in the path of a proposed merger in which the independents were willing to sell, Bell 
wanted to buy, the city and state authorities approved of the deal, and voters had expressed their 
desire to unify the service by large majorities. Faced with that situation, the independent telephone 
interests and/or local government officials approached the federal government and asked the 
antitrust authorities to sanction the deal. In a delicate process of negotiations, the Attorney 
General’s office let it be known that they would raise no objections to widely supported 
consolidations as long as dual service was eliminated by swapping territories rather than via simple 
takeovers. Although that option left Bell in exclusive control of one territory and the independent in 
exclusive control of the other (and thus eliminated competition) Bell and the independents stayed in 
control of roughly the same number of telephones as before. Invariably, the key argument used to 
justify the consolidation-not only by Bell, but by independents, government officials, and users-was 
that unification of the telephone service was more desirable than a divided service. Thus, within a 
few years of the Kingsbury Commitment a number of major consolidations of telephone service 
took place. Kansas City, Los Angeles, Memphis, and many smaller places traded dual service for 
universal service. Three of those consolidations are examined in detail in the next chapter. 
 
The government’s explicit acquiescence in the piecemeal elimination of dual service is a 
critical element in understanding why the United States ended up with a telephone monopoly. 
Historical interpretations which stress economic predation by the Bell system (and/or Bell-inspired 
manipulations of the political process) ignore the fact that at that critical juncture in telephone 
history, major independent operating companies had survived, and both federal and state 
governments possessed all the tools they needed to prevent monopolization of the industry. 
Antitrust laws, at both state and federal levels, could have prevented consolidation had they been 
applied. Opposition from any well-organized and reasonably influential interest group could have 
stopped the process of waiving the Kingsbury Commitment.324 But that opposition rarely 
materialized. More often than not, voters, city councils, and statewide referenda weighed in on the 
side of universal service and consolidation. 
 
The antitrust-inspired Kingsbury commitment was a shrewd tactical move by AT&T, in that 
it deflected antitrust pressures but did not undermine its superior position in the access competition. 
The erosion of the ban on acquisitions was the product of a legal and regulatory system that had not 
yet come to grips with the fact that its desire for an integrated telephone system was completely at 
odds with its commitment to the preservation of normal market competition. The only positive 
accomplishment of the Kingsbury commitment was to bring Bell’s accelerating acquisition of 
independent systems to a halt for four years, giving the telephone companies, utility commissions, 
city and state governments, and federal antitrust officials the breathing room needed to work out a 
coherent policy regarding telephone monopoly, competition, and interconnection. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1910, Box 65, AT&T-BLA; Indianapolis, 1907-1915, Box 36, AT&T-BLA; St. Louis, Missouri, Box 16; Missouri and 
Kansas, 1909-1919, Boxes 17, 18. 
324 In Kansas City,  for  example,  the newspapers waged a  successful editorial campaign against 
consolidation in 1911, (Box 17, AT&T-BLA) while in Shreveport, Louisiana, labor interests coalesced to defeat a 
resolution favoring consolidation. 
 
132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE SUBTLE POLITICS & ECONOMICS OF UNIFICATION, 1914-
1921 
 
 
THE PERIOD BETWEEN the Kingsbury commitment of December, 1913, and the 1934 
Communications Act is something of an empty space in telephone historiography. Accounts of the 
Bell-independent competition tend to trail off after the Kingsbury commitment. Noting the rise of 
state regulatory commissions and the Kingsbury commitment’s alleged interconnection of the 
competitors, those accounts tend to imply that the regulated monopoly system was basically in 
place from 1914 on. The Kingsbury commitment, however, was actually intended to preserve dual 
service competition, as noted in the previous chapter. In the aftermath of its agreement to stop Bell 
acquisitions, more than 1,800 cities still had unconnected, competing exchanges. Major, urban-
based independent regionals still thrived in places like Buffalo, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Los Angeles, 
St. Louis, Indianapolis, Columbus, Cleveland, and Kansas City. Those systems had weathered the 
storm of acquisitions and interconnection from 1908 to 1913 and showed no signs of going out of 
business. Dual service was still an important factor in the American telephone industry. 
 
Nevertheless, within three years of the Kingsbury commitment a series of great unifications 
of independent and Bell telephone systems in major cities began. Many were concluded by 1918, 
well before a 1921 federal law nullified the Kingsbury commitment. Clearly, an important change 
in attitudes toward telephone competition took place during those years. From a historical 
standpoint, it is important to examine the ideas which motivated that process. It is also important to 
examine the unification of service from an economic standpoint in order to evaluate the sources of 
efficiency in telephone monopoly. This chapter examines three of those unifications: in Los 
Angeles, California, Buffalo, New York, and the state of Kentucky. 
 
The unification of telephone service could be accomplished in essentially two ways. One 
would be to interconnect the competing systems so that they could exchange traffic. Physical 
interconnection could take place with or without a merger of ownership. The other alternative was 
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for one system to buy out the other and gradually migrate all of its customers to the remaining 
system. At the time, that option was called “consolidation.” (A third, rarely selected option was a 
municipal takeover of the telephone system.) As we shall see, the process of unification ultimately 
took the form of consolidation rather than interconnection. 
Consolidation in Buffalo, New York 
The Buffalo-based Federal Telephone Co. was run by Burt G. Hubbell, a prominent national 
independent leader and one of the ablest and most sincere supporters of telephone competition. 
Hubbell’s company had an ownership interest in thirty-five independent exchanges in western New 
York, including the systems of Buffalo, Rochester, and Jamestown. The James-town independent 
exchange had more subscribers than its rival Bell exchange; the Rochester exchange was roughly 
equal to its competitor, while Bell’s subscriber list in Buffalo outnumbered the independent by 
nearly three to one. 
 
In 1916 Hubbell observed a tendency among subscribers served by two exchanges to 
gravitate toward the larger of the two systems. His Buffalo exchange was having a harder and 
harder time attracting new subscribers, and the size of its list was decreasing. Thus, continued 
access competition in Buffalo was culminating in convergence as users gradually realized the 
benefits of joint consumption. But convergence at the local level was leading to greater 
fragmentation at the interexchange level. According to Hubbell, “the natural tendency of the public 
to patronize the company with the largest number of subscribers…has led to a segregation into 
telephone districts in each of which one of the two competitors has usually acquired a great 
predominance of subscribers.” As a result, large numbers of users in western New York were 
unable to communicate with each other by telephone.325 
 
That this process of convergence was driven by demand-side economies of scope, rather 
than by the superiority of Bell’s service, is clear. In a memo to the U.S. Attorney General seeking 
his approval for a consolidation, Hubbell pointed out that the Federal Company had used every 
means at its disposal to reverse the downward trend in Buffalo. It had waged an advertising 
campaign touting competition, local control, and lower rates. It had financed, purchased, and 
installed an automatic switching system in Buffalo. Automation resulted in rapid and efficient 
service but failed to reverse the migration of subscribers to the Bell system. On the other hand, in 
Jamestown, where the Federal system had the most subscribers, the independent exchange was 
increasing its share. Hubbell concluded: 
 
A careful and painstaking analysis of this situation has brought the company 
to the conclusion that through a change in sentiment (entirely beyond the control of 
this company to direct or influence) the public, in the territory occupied by the 
company, now feels that its best interests can be served through a unified telephone 
system under state Public Service Commission control, rather than through the 
support of two companies giving a divided service.326 
                                                 
325 B. G. Hubbell to U.S. Attorney General, Aug. 30, 1916. Box 25, AT&T-BLA. 
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Bell’s New York Telephone Company pursued the consolidation in the manner 
characteristic of the Bell companies at that time. During the consolidation, it worked closely with 
the Buffalo Chamber of Commerce to secure its approval of the rate changes it wanted to make. It 
insisted that the majority of telephone users express their approval of the consolidation by petition 
or a local referendum before the companies applied to the Attorney General for a waiver of the 
Kingsbury commitment.327 As in many other localities in that period, Bell skirted the prohibition of 
the Kingsbury commitment against the acquisition of competing independents by proposing to 
trade territories with its former competitor. In that case, Bell acquired control of the Buffalo area 
while the independents gained a monopoly over Rochester and Jamestown and vicinity. 
 
The Buffalo Chamber of Commerce approved the consolidation after a special committee 
conducted a detailed investigation of telephone rates in the city. The first of the committee’s 
conclusions: 
 
No permanent and satisfactory telephone situation can be established which 
contemplates the division of our people into two separate groups. General inter-
communication is the essential requirement for adequate and complete telephone 
service, especially for business men.328 
 
Fragmentation of the subscriber universe was always a critical factor in driving 
consolidations forward. What is equally interesting, however, is how the unification process 
affected and reflected the interests of people located in different levels of the communications 
hierarchy. The issue was not merely whether the public wanted universal service or not, but also 
who would gain and who would lose because of the transition. That issue comes out most clearly 
by examining the way rates were adjusted following the consolidation. 
 
The Chamber of Commerce report proposed to completely overhaul the telephone rate 
structure upon consolidation. The report claimed that neither telephone company was making an 
adequate return under present conditions and could, if they so requested, obtain approval for a rate 
increase from the Public Service Commission. That, it claimed, “would prove an added burden to 
the telephone users of this city, and particularly to those who use both services.” As an alternative 
to rate increases under continued dual service, the report proposed a system of measured rates and a 
move away from party line service. Consolidation would result in reduced operating expenses, 
while the proposed rate changes, the committee asserted, would reduce rates for most subscriber 
groups while justly assigning a larger share of the costs to those who used the telephone the most. 
In its assessment of the impact of the rate change, the committee relied almost entirely on 
information provided by New York Telephone. 
 
The structure of the proposed rates yields important clues about who wanted universal 
service and who was expected to pay for it. One effect of the new rates was to dramatically increase 
                                                 
327 Federal Tel. & Tel. Co., Rochester Tel. Co., Home Telephone Co. of James- town, New York Telephone 
Co., “An Analysis of the Present Unsatisfactory Telephone Conditions now Existing in Western New York and a Plan 
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the charges of the 1,000 or so large business users at the top of the hierarchy. One such user, the 
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., entered an emphatic protest with the city council, pointing out that its 
payments for telephone service would triple under the proposed rates.329 The Postal Company 
circulated its own petition for continued competition to counter the Bell-Chamber of Commerce 
petition favoring merger. The leaflet carried a list contrasting the rates of cities with and without 
competition.330 
 
The Chamber of Commerce report tried hard to make it look as if residential and small user 
rates would be unaffected by the change. But it is fairly certain that the rates of users on the bottom 
of the hierarchy were also being subtly increased. All business party lines were to be eliminated, 
and half the business subscribers of both companies were served on a party line basis. The lowest 
of the new measured service rates allowed a business sub scriber to make only about two calls a 
day without incurring extra charges. Four-party residential lines, formerly priced at $24 per year, 
were to be put on a measured basis, while individual and two- party residential lines were to be 
offered on a flat-rate basis at much higher rates. Although the four-party residential line preserved 
the old monthly rate, it now came with a limit of 600 messages, beyond which there would be an 
additional charge of four cents per call. If each person on a four-party line made only one call a 
day, they would exceed that limit by 840 calls, leading to extra charges of $33 per year. 
 
The discouragement of party lines was a predictable characteristic of a telephone system 
that no longer had to compete on the dimension of access. Party lines had flourished during the 
competitive period because each network wanted to get as many subscribers as possible onto its 
system at the lowest possible cost. As competition waned, the telephone companies took access for 
granted and concentrated on maximizing their revenues from usage. 
 
If the consolidation increased rates for users at the top and bottom of the hierarchy, it 
probably saved money for business users located somewhere in the middle, assuming that they 
were single-line users before. Savings would be especially pronounced for businesses with a 
moderate level of calling who had paid for two subscriptions before. Consolidation gave them 
universal access at a price about the same (and possibly lower) than the price of a subscription to a 
single system before the change. 
Consolidation in Southern California 
The political response to dual service in Southern California was particularly revealing. By 
1916 the Bell and independent systems had split the telephone business of the region almost exactly 
in half. Bell’s Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. had eleven exchanges serving 67,000 stations 
in the area. Its toll lines offered connections to most of the Bell exchanges west of the Rockies and 
AT&T connections to the rest of the United States The independent Home Telephone and 
Telegraph Co. operated fourteen local exchanges and one toll exchange using automatic switching 
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equipment. In 1916 the Home Co. had 60,300 subscribers and toll connections to many other 
independent exchanges in Southern California, although it offered no interstate connections. 
Despite the fact that the Los Angeles city council had imposed artificially low rates on both 
companies, forcing them to operate at a loss, both systems were financially sound and in good 
physical condition.331 The unremunerative rates harmed the credit of the independent company and 
made it difficult for it to raise money for expansion, but its effect on the Bell company was equally 
severe; only its financial ties to AT&T and the rest of the Bell system kept it solvent. Assuming 
reasonable rates, then, dual service could have been maintained indefinitely in Southern California. 
 
Yet as the telephone saturated the area, political agitation against dual service and for some 
form of unification took hold. Organized demands for change began around 1910, when the city 
created its own municipal Public Utilities Board. Three remedies were discussed: 1) compulsory 
interconnection of the competing exchanges, 2) municipal ownership of the telephone system, and 
3) consolidation into a privately owned but publicly regulated monopoly. The first option, which 
appeared to leave both competition and the existing companies intact, was the most popular. 1n 
April 1910 the Municipal League of Los Angeles asked the Board of Public Utilities to investigate 
the feasibility of establishing a method of interconnecting the two rival telephone systems. 
 
As the Board prepared its report, agitation against dual service by the business community 
grew. In 1912 the Southern California Hotel Men’s Association created a committee to prepare a 
plan to eliminate the use of both telephones in hotels.332 The Hotel Association’s approach to the 
problem boiled down to an attempt to coordinate users to select one telephone system over the 
other as a bloc. The same year a group calling itself the Telephone Reform Association initiated a 
campaign against dual service and for consolidation.333 By 1914 the Association had changed its 
name to the “One Phone League” and claimed 1200 members. There was no doubt that the policy 
of interconnecting the two companies enjoyed wide-spread public support. A municipal referendum 
of June 1, 1915, saw 63,194 voters express their preference for compulsory interchange of service, 
while only 14,921 voted against it. Also in 1915, the Socialist Party put a referendum on the ballot 
authorizing the city to take over and operate the telephone system. The proposition was defeated 
with 20,000 votes in favor and 30,000 votes against. 
 
If the opposition to dual service is broken down by subscriber group, a familiar pattern 
emerges. Earlier in chapter 6 the correlation between telephone users’ duplication rate and their 
position in the calling hierarchy was demonstrated. Organizations at the top of the hierarchy-i.e., 
those whose usage was large both in volume and in geographic scope-had high duplication rates. 
Telephone users at the bottom of the hierarchy tended not to duplicate. In the political reaction to 
dual service the same hierarchy appears. A survey taken by an economics student at the University 
of Southern California in 1916 asked telephone users, “Are you ever troubled about not being able 
                                                 
331 A letter from Henry Robinson to N.C. Kingsbury, July 27, 1915, notes the improved financial condition of 
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332 LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 22, 1912. 
333 For a complete chronology of the political opposition to dual service in Los Angeles, see Summary of 
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to get people by telephone because they have the other service?” The survey interviewed fifty 
“business men,” fifty “professional men,” and fifty “housewives.” The answers are shown 
below:334 
 
 Yes % No % N = 
Business Men 100 0 50 
Professional Men 96 4 50 
Housewives 66 34 50 
 
The data as reported here contain a measure of ambiguity. The surveyed population is 
small,-we do not know how the samples were selected, nor do we know what the economic status 
of the housewives was. Still, the unanimity with which business users opposed dual service is 
striking. It is reasonable to assume that most of the businessmen were “troubled” not because they 
were unable to get people by telephone – many of them would have been duplicate subscribers, 
after all – but because they objected to the additional expense of subscribing to both systems. As 
noted before, telephone rates had been a volatile political issue in the city since 1907, with the 
voting public demanding (and politicians supplying) rates that could not recover the companies’ 
costs. Business and professional users of the telephone provided the political constituency for those 
actions. 
 
The corresponding lack of unanimity among housewives is equally striking. Although a 
large majority of them answered “Yes” to the question, one in every three of them was willing to 
say that she was not troubled at all by an inability to reach half the telephone subscribers in the 
region. That is even more remarkable when we keep in mind that very few residential users were 
duplicate subscribers, so that they, unlike the business and professional users, really were unable to 
reach subscribers on the other system. The demand for homogenization was widespread, but the 
most vigorous calls for it came from the upper and middle levels of the communications hierarchy. 
 
The Los Angeles Board of Public Utilities issued its report on the subject of interconnection 
on April 28, 1914.335 The report had been conducted by the Utility Department’s Chief Engineer, 
James Barker, and was viewed by all concerned as an objective and impartial study. The Barker 
report effectively destroyed compulsory interconnection as an option by showing how expensive it 
would be to build and operate the facilities required to transmit, switch, and record calls between 
the two systems. 
 
Although Barker concluded that interconnection was “physically possible,” the expense of 
joint service was increased by the technical incompatibility of the two systems. Bell relied on 
manual and the Home Co. on machine switching, and both operated at different voltages. The main 
problem, however, was the sheer size of the two systems. Compulsory interconnection had never 
been carried out on a scale involving more than 100,000 telephone subscribers before. The places 
                                                 
334 Lloyd Heck Marvin, The Telephone Situation in Los Angeles, Master’s Thesis, Department of Economics, 
University of Southern California, Jan. 7, 1916, Plate II. 
335 The text of the Barker Report, Apr. 1914. is printed in the 1914 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
CALIFORNIA RAILROAD COMMISSION 62. AT&T-L&R. 
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in which it had been tried, such as Janesville and La Crosse in Wisconsin, or Pasadena in 
California, had only a few thousand subscribers and one central office for each company. 
 
To connect the two large regional systems in Southern California, Barker observed, required 
one of two methods. One could, first, build direct trunk lines between all of the Home Co.’s central 
offices and all of the Pacific Co.’s central offices. While that was the most technically desirable 
method, Barker concluded that: 
 
The expense in connection with this plan is so great as to preclude its adoption. The 
initial investment and fixed charges on the necessary equipment are prohibitive. 
Under this plan it would be necessary to practically duplicate the present trunking 
equipment of the companies and make extensive changes in the switchboards. In 
order to carry out this plan it would be necessary in some instances to enlarge the 
quarters in which the switchboards themselves are contained. In view of these 
difficulties, and the enormous expense involved, this plan presents so many 
obstacles that it appears commercially impracticable.336 
 
The other method of interconnecting the two exchanges was to establish what would now be 
called a tandem switching center, an exchange office where calls between the two systems would 
converge to be switched. Barker estimated that such a switching center would have to be able to 
handle a peak load of 20,000 calls an hour and calculated that building and operating it would 
require about $400,000 in capital investment and another $500,000 to $600,000 per year in 
expenses. The latter figure represented about one-third of the total annual operating revenues of 
both companies combined. Barker concluded by saying: 
 
By far the best plan for obtaining the desired results is, in my opinion, through a 
consolidation of the two systems. By this means all duplication and unnecessary 
investments are avoided and operating and overhead costs are reduced to a 
minimum, and in the end the patrons will be given a better service and at the lowest 
rates commensurate with the necessary investment.337 
 
After the Barker report, consolidation became the most popular strategy for unification, as 
municipal acquisition had been repudiated by the voters. The Bell Company’s franchise expired in 
November 1916, and the city seized on that opportunity to require a consolidation by refusing to 
grant its request for a renewal. The product of the merger, the Southern California Telephone 
Company, was Bell-owned. It began operation on the first of May, 1917. The three-sided struggle 
over rates between the city’s telephone users, the regulators, and telephone companies continued, 
but the question of dual vs. universal service had been settled. 
 
The Los Angeles case indicates that, as in Buffalo, the economies to be realized from 
unification came from the demand side rather than the supply side. Here again, dual service seemed 
more efficient from the standpoint of a smaller user than for business users. However, the Barker 
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report showed that supply-side considerations played a significant role in the choice of 
consolidation, rather than interconnection, as the method of providing a unified service. The cost of 
establishing complete interconnection between competing, large-scope telephone systems was 
prohibitive. 
Consolidation in the State of Kentucky 
Bell’s principal competitor in Kentucky was the Central Home Telephone Company. 
Central Home owned nineteen exchanges in the state in 1910, as well as its own long-distance 
company. After a financial failure in 1907, the system was successfully rehabilitated by the 
committee of bankers who assumed control of it. As they were not interested in remaining in the 
telephone business, the bankers approached Bell about selling out near the end of 1910. When 
Central Home initiated its negotiations, its facilities were generally in better shape than Bell’s and 
its exchanges had more subscribers.338 In Louisville and its suburbs, for example, the independent 
had gained over 3,000 subscribers while Bell had lost 1,200 since 1907. The company claimed that 
this growth had been achieved without any extraordinary promotional measures but suggested that 
they would become more aggressive if Bell did not buy them out. 
 
Bell, however, was only mildly interested in acquiring Central Home in 1911. There were 
two serious obstacles to a merger from its point of view. Already embroiled in controversy and 
litigation in Kentucky, Bell was not interested in acquiring a major telephone property unless it 
could be done openly and legally, and the Kentucky constitution contained a flat prohibition of 
mergers of competing common carriers.339 The other problem was a city ordinance in Louisville 
fixing the rates for telephone service. Bell was already involved in litigation against rate controls in 
two Kentucky cities. The president of Bell’s Cumberland Company advised Kingsbury that the 
rates imposed by the city would preclude any possibility of making a profit on a consolidated 
investment. He went on to say: 
 
I am of the opinion that the two companies will be compelled to operate for several 
years, until the people there get tired of two systems and join with us in formulating 
a plan by which the two companies can be consolidated and fair rates charged.340 
 
That comment illuminates both the nature of Bell’s commitment to universal service and its 
antipathy toward physical interconnection in that period. Bell was confident of the ultimate victory 
of the universal service idea and expected it to come about through a process of public negotiation 
in which reasonable regulators balanced the interests of the telephone users and the telephone 
companies. Until that happened, the benefits of a unified service were to be withheld, and used as 
leverage for bringing the interested parties around to a merger that would allow the surviving 
telephone company to increase its rates. There would be no universal service without a rate 
                                                 
338 Thomas Tracy to UN Bethell, AT&T, Feb. 3, 1913. Box 39, AT&T-BLA. 
339 Section 201 of the Constitution of Kentucky read: “No…telegraph, telephone…company  shall consolidate 
its capital stock, franchises, or property, or pool its earnings, in whole or in part, with any other…telegraph, 
telephone…company, owning a parallel or competing line…or acquire by purchase, lease or otherwise,  any parallel or 
competing line or structure, or operate the same.” 
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increase. Given that policy, pressures to interconnect with competing exchanges in major cities had 
to be rebuffed because they would deprive Bell of its bargaining power over the unification 
process. 
 
In an internal letter, Kingsbury admitted that the only reason he was interested in buying 
Central Home was the possibility that independent subscribers in Louisville and other parts of 
Kentucky would begin to demand a connection to Cincinnati.341 A major metropolis only 100 miles 
from Louisville, Cincinnati attracted a substantial part of Kentucky’s commerce and 
communication, yet had always been a Bell monopoly town. If a substantial number of telephone 
users in Kentucky remained on independent systems, especially one as politically well-connected 
as the Central Home, there was a danger that Bell could be ordered to supply long-distance 
connections to its exchange there or that a competing exchange would be established there. Late in 
1911, in fact, the Postal Telegraph Company, which had an outlet in Cincinnati, offered to provide 
four heavy copper long-distance circuits between the Louisville independent exchange and 
Cincinnati.342 
 
If the Central Home Co. knew definitely that it was not going to be purchased by Bell, it 
would either adopt more competitive tactics or, worse, cause legal and political trouble for Bell 
throughout the state. Kingsbury advised his local operatives to keep them mollified so as to avoid 
potentially “embarrassing” and “annoying” actions on their part. While he was not able or willing 
to buy out the independent, he had to convince them that a Bell purchase was imminent or 
possible.343 Kingsbury bided his time for two years, conducting an appraisal of the property and 
encouraging its owners to be patient, but negotiations were broken off in November 1912. The 
Kingsbury commitment, made about a year later, laid the matter of a sale to rest. 
 
During the lull created by the antitrust agreement, Bell and its allies addressed themselves 
to the political situation in Kentucky. The company’s unpopular litigation against municipal rate 
regulation in Louisville was settled in 1914, with the company accepting the city’s dictates. Its rate 
litigation with the city of Paducah, which had led to the massive boycott of 1911, was settled by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1915. In the meantime, support for one telephone system had been growing. 
A new utility bill was passed in 1912, giving the railroad commission the power to compel toll 
connections. It also contained a provision allowing the railroad commission to authorize 
consolidations of telephone companies when they were supported by the municipalities involved. 
The part of the law legalizing mergers was an attempt to skirt the constitutional prohibition on 
consolidations. 
 
A few months after its passage, the railroad commission approved a merger of the 
competing systems in Christian and Todd counties344 but expressed doubts about the 
                                                 
341 N. C. Kingsbury to George W. Leverett, AT&T General Counsel, Dec. 1, 1911. Box 39, AT&T-BLA. 
342 Thomas Tracy to N. C. Kingsbury, Nov. 21, 1911. Box 39, AT&T-BLA. 
343 Kingsbury toW. T. Gentry, Oct. 10, 1912.  Box 39, AT&T-BLA. 
344 The Kentucky Railroad Commission, Opinion and Resolution, “Application of the Christian-Todd 
Telephone Co., the Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Co., the Hopkinsville Home Telephone Co., and the Todd 
County Home Telephone Co. to Consolidate.” July 22, 1912. Box 39, AT&T-BLA. 
 
141 
 
constitutionality of the ruling. Pending test litigation, neither the commission nor Bell felt ready to 
proceed with any further consolidations. 
 
Dual service reached its numerical peak in Kentucky in 1914, when there were competing 
exchanges in sixty-three of the 159 cities with exchanges. Public support for it, however, was 
rapidly waning. Having extracted itself from its unpopular rate litigation and repaired its relations 
with the state officials, Bell was in a position to promote the final step needed to eliminate it. In 
1916 the legislature passed a constitutional amendment specifically exempting telephone 
consolidations from the merger prohibition. To become law, the amendment had to be ratified by 
the state’s voters. The vote was scheduled for the November, 1917 elections. Hunt Chipley of 
Southern Bell, who had been instrumental in building up political support for the move, wrote to 
Kingsbury that the passage of the bill reflected a major change in public attitudes toward Bell since 
the Kingsbury commitment: 
 
The legislature passed this bill because it was made plain to them, from all quarters 
of the state, that the public were tired of supporting dual systems of telephones and 
that the companies should be put in a position, under proper regulations, to remedy 
this situation. 
 
The proposed amendment passed with 63 percent of the vote. It was supported by every 
major newspaper and board of trade in the state and passed through the legislature almost 
unanimously. In singling out the telephone for a special exemption from laws intended to preserve 
competition, Kentucky anticipated the federal Willis-Graham Act of 1921. Even the political 
composition of the coalition that brought the change about-an alliance of Bell and independents 
who claimed that they needed to be able to consolidate to maintain their economic viability-was 
reproduced at the national level four years later. Although the legal prerequisites of a monopoly 
telephone system had been supplied, Bell did not actually acquire the Central Home system until 
1924. 
Analysis of Consolidations 
In retrospect, it is clear that telephone consolidations were not motivated by Bell’s ability to 
achieve supply-side economies of scale or scope, nor did they result in rate decreases. Pressures for 
mergers came from both the demand and the supply side, but the cases of Los Angeles, Buffalo, 
and Kentucky make it clear that no change could have been affected without users. 
 
From the demand side, consolidations were supported because they unified the service. 
Users in the middle of the communications hierarchy-businesses and professionals-wanted the 
benefits of unified telephone access without the expense of a duplicate subscription. In the rate 
changes that accompanied a consolidation, they typically succeeded in raising the telephone costs 
of both smaller and larger users. The case of Buffalo shows that even without consolidation, users 
were showing a tendency to converge on a single network. 
 
From the supply side, the mergers were motivated by a desire to eliminate competition and 
clear the way for a rate increase. Both Bell and the independents had engaged in ferocious access 
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competition for the preceding fifteen to twenty years. Access competition demanded constant 
expansion of facilities, which tended to increase costs, while placing severe restraint on rates. Rate 
pressure came from both the market and municipal franchises and regulations. In competing cities, 
Bell openly held its rates below its costs in order to hold on to subscribers, even though its cost of 
providing exchange service was often higher than the independents, subsidizing its losing 
exchanges with profits from monopolized operations. Bell looked upon the elimination of dual 
service as an opportunity to recover those losses. 
 
Pressures for a rate increase also came from the fact that consolidation increased the 
telephone company’s short-term expenses.345 The Bell exchange was often unable to use much of 
the physical plant it had purchased, yet the costs of buying it had to be recovered. The placement of 
the wires and switchboards of the formerly competing systems usually did not facilitate their 
combination into one system. If some parts of the telephone exchanges could be combined, money 
had to be spent on connecting facilities, and in general operations became more complicated as the 
system grew. The revenue of a combined system was less than the sum of the revenue of both 
systems because of the loss of duplicate subscribers. Whatever operating economies were achieved 
by merging were offset by the increased expenses and proportionally less revenue.346 
 
While the user public and the municipal government generally looked favorably upon 
unification of the service, support for it could evaporate if it was accompanied by a rate increase. A 
rate increase, of course, was the primary motive of the suppliers. Thus the politics of the transition 
had to be handled carefully. Bell had a distinct method and agenda to its approach to the 
consolidations. The promise of universal service was used to develop public support for the change, 
but the company had to make sure that this carne about through consolidation rather than 
interconnection of competing exchanges. Bell promoted consolidations cautiously, making sure that 
it had the support or at least tacit consent of telephone users and all relevant government 
authorities. Technically, new acquisitions violated the Kingsbury commitment, but Bell had learned 
that it could obtain the Justice Department’s approval if the merger had the support of the public 
and the approval of state and local officials. The only form of restraint imposed on Bell was that it 
could not come out of the transaction with control of a larger share of the nation’s telephones. That 
made it possible for Bell and the independents to merge by trading territories. The independent 
would assume control wherever it was dominant or firmly entrenched, while Bell would take over 
the territories where it had a commanding lead. The Attorney General would then be presented with 
a list of the exchange territories being swapped, which showed that Bell was losing control over as 
many telephones as it was gaining. The antitrust officials generally granted their approval to those 
trades. 
 
During World War I, when the Post Office took over the operation of the telephone system, 
pressures for consolidation and unification increased. There were still 1,450 competing points 
                                                 
345 The economics of consolidation in Madison, Wisconsin are discussed in 17 TELEPHONY 375 (Mar. 27, 
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346 Id. See also “Memorandum Regarding Ohio Mergers,” Feb. 1912. Box 36, AT&T-BLA. This document 
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remaining.347 Postmaster General Burleson received numerous letters from the city governments of 
dual service cities urging his approval of telephone consolidation.348 Several unions, including the 
Commercial Telegraphers’ Union of America and the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, sent open letters to the Secretary of War advocating consolidation of telephone and 
telegraph industries as a means of economizing on technical people who might be used in the Army 
Signal Corps.349 That type of public support made it even easier for the Justice Department to 
waive the Kingsbury commitment’s restrictions on mergers. 
Completing the Transition 
In large cities such as Buffalo, Louisville, and Los Angeles, public policy was consumed 
with the problem of what to do with established competitors. Given the heavy capital requirements 
and the entrenched position of the existing firms, there was little threat that a new company would 
enter. That was not true of the small towns and rural areas, however. There telephone competition 
continued with the vigor of the early 1900s until the state utility commissions actively suppressed 
it.350 
 
The state of Ohio affords a revealing case study. The state law authorized the PUC to 
prevent telephone companies from “invading the territory” of another company without a certificate 
of public interest, convenience, and necessity from the commission. When numerous farmer and 
small town telephone companies carne to the commission to obtain permission to compete with an 
existing company, showing that they could supply better service or offer lower rates, the 
commission refused whenever it had the authority to do so. In a case involving the Village of New 
Washington, the PUC denied permission to set up a new phone system even though the proposed 
service was at lower rates and the application was supported by a pleading filed by the Village 
government.351 Entry was suppressed because prevention of a “multiplicity of telephone systems” 
and the confinement of telephone service to “one well regulated company” was “the whole 
intention of the [utilities] Act,” a judge ruled.352 
 
When another small town company attempted to enter the territory of a neighboring 
company because of the latter’s failure to maintain its facilities in proper working condition, the 
PUC’s opinion denied that this was a legitimate reason for competition. The filing of a complaint 
before the PUC, it said, could compel any company to improve its facilities. In other words, the 
commission was determined to substitute regulatory remedies for problems of service and rates 
formerly addressed by means of competition. 
 
                                                 
347 Memorandum, Acting Statistician, AT&T, Jan. 9, 1918, Box 13, AT&T-BLA. 
348 See, for example, resolutions from the city  council of Toledo, Canton, and Findlay, Ohio, dated, 
respectively, Nov. 22, Oct. 9th, and Oct. 21st, 1918; Box 27, AT&T-BLA. 
349 Consolidation of Telephone and Telegaraph Cos to Aid WWI War Effort-1918, Box 13, AT&T-BLA. 
350 The April 24, 1909 TELEPHONY reported that the independent telephone companies of New York 
opposed commission regulation “because of the prejudice of that body against competition in public utilities.” 
351 In the matter of the application of the Cranberry Horne Telephone Co. for authority to construct a 
Telephone System in the Village of New Washington. Ohio, Ohio Public Utilities Commission Case #204, (July 11, 
1912). AT&T-L&R. 
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That evidence suggests that while dual service was still economically viable in many parts 
of the country, its elimination was mandated politically by the victory of the regulated monopoly 
paradigm. That adamant reliance on regulatory solutions reflected a movement that embraced all 
utilities. Once the telephone industry had been classified as a natural monopoly, regulatory 
commissions insisted on applying to it the techniques of regulatory control as a substitute for the 
market. 
 
After the end of World War I there were still competing exchanges in 1,000 locations, 
including twelve major cities.  Further consolidations were blocked by the Kingsbury commitment 
and more importantly by the Clayton antitrust act.353 The telephone companies’ inability to 
consolidate, they claimed, made it impossible for them to raise money to rebuild their systems. In a 
movement that had the active support of both Bell and independent interests, Congress amended 
the Transportation Act to permit the consolidation of dual telephone systems with the approval of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission. In introducing the Willis-Graham Act of 1921, Senator 
Graham stated: 
 
I think I am stating the opinion of most men who have considered the matter, that it is 
believed to be better policy to have one telephone system in a community that serves all the people, 
even though it may be at an advanced rate, properly regulated by State boards or commissions, than 
it is to have two competing telephone systems. There is nothing more exasperating, nothing that 
annoys the ordinary business man or the ordinary person more than to have two competing local 
telephone systems, so that he must have in his house and in his office two telephones, on neither 
one of which he can get all the people he wants to be in communication with.354 
 
The passage of the Willis-Graham Act gave the imprimatur of the U.S. Congress to the 
elimination of the last vestiges of competition. It cleared the way for major consolidations in Ohio, 
Kentucky, and elsewhere, although such consolidations had been taking place gradually since 1916. 
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THE LEGACY OF ACCESS COMPETITION 
 
 
BY THE MID-1920s, the remnants of access competition had been completely eliminated. 
The political and ideological victory of the regulated monopoly paradigm, advanced under the 
banner of universal service, has been so complete that the accomplishments of that period have 
been eclipsed. Nevertheless, the twenty-five year bout of dual service competition left an indelible 
impression on the American telephone network. The geographic scope of the network and popular 
adoption of telephones had been pushed to surprisingly modem levels. 
 
Our picture of the popularization of the telephone by 1920 has been distorted somewhat by 
the modem emphasis on telephone penetration ratios as the indicator of telephone development. At 
the end of the dual service era, household penetration was about 30 percent and the simple 
penetration ratio (i.e., the number of telephones in service per 100 population) was only 13 percent. 
In most developed countries with universal service today, the penetration ratio is about 45 to 55 
percent. Those bare numbers overlook two important facts about the dual service era, however. One 
is that by 1920 the U.S. telephone network was geographically universal; that is, it reached virtually 
all settled areas with public exchanges and lines. The other is that there were major regional 
variations in penetration. Many parts of the United States-particularly those where independent 
competition was strongest-had already achieved household penetration levels above 50 percent. 
The Geographic Scope of the Telephone Network by 1920 
Access competition did not put a telephone in every home, but as far we can determine from 
the available statistical sources, it did put a telephone exchange or line in practically every 
community. By 1920, the physical infrastructure for supporting universal telephone service was 
essentially in place. By “physical infrastructure,” I mean public telephone exchanges linked by 
trunk lines to the national network. The presence of an exchange is the best indicator of 
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geographical coverage, because it is the most important factor determining whether access was 
available in a given location. Table 12-1 shows the number of public exchanges, the number of Bell 
and independent exchanges, the growth rate of exchanges, and the number of places with dual 
service competition. 
 
The 1920 census documents 15,692 incorporated places of all sizes in the United States.355 
According to AT&T records, there were 19,550 places with a telephone exchange in November 
1917.356 The 1917 telephone census counted 12,294 telephone exchanges with annual incomes over 
$5,000. The remaining 3,858 exchanges were probably serving small rural communities. For the 40 
percent of the U.S. population who in 1920 still lived in unincorporated areas, there also were 
30,317 rural lines as of 1912.357 
 
Undoubtedly, some remote parts of the country were unreached by telephone lines or 
exchanges, but an impressive level of coverage had been attained. No other country or region 
achieved a comparable degree of continent-wide coverage so rapidly. Indeed, the number of public 
telephone exchanges in the United States has changed only marginally since 1917. (In fact, growth 
in exchanges slowed noticeably after 1907, when the phase of system overlap ended.) Fifteen years 
later, in 1932, the number of exchanges had increased by only 3 percent. In 1990 15,227 telephone 
central offices in the continental United States reported to the Federal Communications 
Commission. That is significantly less than  the 19,550 total counted by AT&T in 1917, but about 
3,000 more than the 12,294 exchanges with an income greater than $5,000 reported in the 1917 
Telephone Census. The comparison between 1917 and 1990 statistics is of necessity rough and 
imprecise. Telephone companies under a certain size do not report to the FCC, but the reporting 
criteria have changed since the 1920s. Some of the additional exchanges counted in 1990 may have 
existed in 1917 but were owned by companies too small to count. The lack of precision does not 
detract much from the essential observation: despite the huge growth in population, users, 
penetration levels, and traffic between 1920 and 1990, the number of telephone central offices has 
changed relatively little. The geographic extension of the American telephone network came during 
the years of access competition. 
Telephone Penetration by 1920 
Access competition also produced major changes in the quantity and type of users. The 
telephone became a rural as well as an urban device, a household item as well as a business tool. 
Penetration expanded at a rapid pace to the highest levels in the world, although here the picture 
becomes more complex. Some parts of the country actually began to approach the ideal of universal 
household penetration; for other regions, notably the South, that goal remained a long ways off. 
 
During the Bell monopoly, telephony had developed almost exclusively as an urban service. 
Access competition turned that situation on its head. In 1920 38.7 percent of American farms 
reported telephones, whereas the average of all American households was 30 percent. In other 
                                                 
355 Bureau of the Census, POPULATION 1920, 50, Table 31, Distribution of population in groups of cities 
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356 Memorandum, Acting Statistician, Jan. 9, 1918, Box 13, AT&T-BLA. 
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words, rural areas on average had higher levels of penetration than urban areas. The 
disproportionate rural adoption of the telephone occurred because geographic isolation made 
expanded communication more valuable to rural inhabitants. The social density of urban 
environments made it easier to rely on public telephone stations or other forms of communication. 
Telephone service was also more expensive in the cities because of the larger scope of local 
exchange service. And large cities had a greater proportion of poorer, immigrant populations. The 
main point, however, is that no one contemplating the development of the telephone business in the 
1880s or 1890s would have predicted that. The telephone was supposed to be an urban-oriented 
tool. Only the spontaneous, “disorderly” phenomenon of access competition allowed the full scope 
of rural demand to emerge. 
 
Table 12-2 is a state-by-state breakdown of farm telephone penetration in 1920. The 
statistics show surprising levels of telephone diffusion in the North Central states. They also reveal 
extremely wide regional variations in penetration. In the North Central states, farm households 
stood on the brink of achieving universal penetration. Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, and Nebraska 
reported subscription rates between 60 and 80 percent. The most surprising statistic relates to Iowa, 
where 86 percent of the 213,439 farms reported telephones in 1920. One can hardly fail to notice 
that of the ten states with the lowest farm penetration, eight are Southern. The four lowest states-
South Carolina, Louisiana, Florida, and Georgia-have levels of telephone penetration scarcely one-
tenth that of the North Central states. 
 
That result can be explained only partly by variations in wealth. A linear regression between 
average farm value by state and the state’s telephone penetration among farmers yields a moderate 
but statistically significant correlation coefficient (R2) of .29.358 Independent competition is a 
weaker but also statistically significant factor. States with higher levels of rural telephone 
penetration tend also to be those in which a high proportion of the users were served by 
independents in 1907 (R2=13).359 The huge size of the regional disparity, however, suggests that 
other important cultural and socioeconomic differences were at work. Statistical analysis of 
telephone penetration in the 1980s and 1990s yields a much stronger correlation between wealth 
and variation in penetration levels. Further consideration of that puzzle is outside the scope of this 
work. 
 
Another sense in which access competition pushed the United States toward universal 
service is the extension of telephone service to homes. The telephone had been primarily a business 
tool prior to independent entry. The ratio of business to residential subscriptions was about 9 to 1. 
The years between 1900 and 1910 saw the number of residential telephone subscriptions surpass 
the number of business telephones in most cities with an exchange. The growth of residential 
subscribership reflected access competition’s relentless drive to increase the value of networks by 
increasing their scope, as well as falling prices for equipment. 
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TABLE 12.1 
TELEPHONE EXCHANGE GROWTH AND ACCESS COMPETITION,  
1888-1918 (In cities over 5,000 in population) 
Jan.1  Bell 
Exchanges 
Independ. 
Exchanges 
Total 
Exchanges 
Growth rate 
% 
# Dual 
Service cities 
1888 1160 0 1160  0 
1889 1194 0 1194 3 0 
1890 1228 0 1228 3 0 
1891 1241 0 1241 1 0 
1892 1297 0 1298 5 0 
1893 1351 18 1369 5 3 
1894 1409 98 1507 10 28 
1895 1439 300 1739 15 98 
1896 1613 520 2133 23 187 
1897 1799 800 2599 22 220 
1898 1962 1250 3212 24 244 
1899 2134 1700 3834 19 286 
1900 2426 2220 4646 21 342 
1901 2773 2780 5553 20 408 
1902 3005 3400 4605 15 449 
1903 3365 3900 7265 13 466 
1904 3740 4400 7140 12 483 
1905 4080 4800 8880 9 478 
1906 4532 5200 9732 10 471 
1907 4889 5400 10,289 6 466 
1908 5108 5505 10,613 3 458 
1909 5043 5680 10,723 1 451 
1910 4968 5850 10,818 1 443 
1911 4933 6010 10,943 1 408 
1912 5014 6170 11,184 2 342 
1913 5182 6333 11,515 3 310 
1914 5245 6433 11,678 1 293 
1915 5289 6500 11,789 1 277 
1916 5300 6560 11,860 1 261 
1917 5397 6590 11,987 1 179 
1918 5676 6618 12,294 3 147 
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TABLE 12.2 
TELEPHONE PENETRATION IN FARM HOUSEHOLDS, 1920 
(Rank) State Rate % (Rank)  State Rate 
(1) Iowa 86 (25) Colorado 37 
(2) Kansas 78 (26) Nevada 36 
(3) Nebraska 77 (27) Idaho 33 
(4) Illinois 73 (28) Texas 32 
(5) Indiana 66 (29) NJ 32 
(6) Missouri 62 (30) California 32 
(7) Ohio 62 (31) Wyoming 28 
(8) Minnesota 62 (32) Delaware 27 
(9) S. Dakota 59 (33) Kentucky 27 
(10) Wisconsin 59 (34) Maryland 25 
(11) Vermont 58 (35) Utah 25 
(12) Conn. 52 (36) Arkansas 23 
(13) Mass. 52 (37) Tennessee 23 
(14) Oregon 51 (38) Virginia 18 
(15) Michigan 50 (39) Montana 17 
(16) N. Hamp. 50 (40) Arizona 16 
(17) Maine 49 (41) Alabama 15 
(18) NY 48 (42) NCarolina 12 
(19) N. Dakota 47 (43) NM 11 
(20) Penn. 44 (44) Miss. 10 
(21) W. VA 43 (45) Georgia 9 
(22) Wash. 42 (46) Florida 8 
(23) R. Island 31 (47) Louisiana 6 
(24) Oklahoma 37 (48) SCarolina 6 
Sources: 1920 Farm Census, Table 62, p.50. 
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TABLE 12-3 
TELEPHONE PENETRATION AND WEALTH IN FARM HOUSEHOLDS, 1920 
State Rank in $$ Rank in Farm tels Ind Tel %, 1907 
Iowa 1 1 84 
Kansas 10 2 81 
Nebraska 4 3 69 
Illinois 6 4 51 
Indiana 20 5 75 
Missouri 24 6 71 
Ohio 22 7 63 
Minnesota 11 8 67 
S. Dakota 5 9 93 
Wisconsin 15 10 56 
Vermont 33 11 45 
Conn. 19 12 02 
Mass. 25 13 03 
Oregon 12 14 33 
Michigan 29 15 51 
N. Hamp. 37 16 22 
Maine 38 17 30 
NY 23 18 26 
N. Dakota 8 19 78 
Penn. 18 20 39 
W. VA 39 21 75 
Wash. 16 22 36 
R. Island 27 23 02 
Oklahoma 35 24 56 
Colorado 13 1 84 
Nevada 2 2 81 
Idaho 4 3 69 
Texas 6 4 51 
NJ 20 5 75 
California 24 6 71 
Wyoming 22 7 63 
Delaware 11 8 67 
Kentucky 5 9 93 
Maryland 15 10 56 
Utah 33 11 45 
Arkansas 19 12 02 
Tenn. 25 13 03 
Virginia 12 14 33 
Montana 29 15 51 
Arizona 37 16 22 
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Alabama 38 17 0.30 
NCarolina 23 18 0.26 
NM 8 19 0.78 
Miss. 18 20 0.39 
Georgia 39 21 0.75 
Florida 16 22 0.36 
Louisiana 27 23 0.02 
Scarolina 35 24 0.56 
$$ rankings taken from Average Value per Farm, 1925, Agric. Census, Table 14, p.60. 
Independent share of telephones taken from 1907 Telephone Census. 
 
The large exchange in Louisville, Kentucky, serves as a typical example. In 1902, the first 
year of dual service competition in Louisville, the subscriber breakdown was as follows: 
 
TABLE 12.4 
SUBSCRIBER BREAKDOWN, LOUISVILLE, KY, 1902 
 Bell Co Home Co Duplics Totals 
Bus. lines 3,293 3081 (1,376) 4,998 (54%) 
Res. lines 3169 1851 (741) 4,629 (46%) 
Totals 6462 4932 (2,117) 9,277 
 
From 1902 to 1910, residential users increased from 46 percent to 59 percent of all users in 
Louisville. Of the 6,746 net new users added during the period, 5,151 of them (76 percent) were 
residences. For the Bell exchange, residential subscribers were the only source of growth during 
that period. 
 
TABLE 12.4, CONT’D 
SUBSCRIBER BREAKDOWN, LOUISVILLE, KY, 1910 
 Bell Co Home Co Duplics Totals 
Bus. lines 3,230 5,396 (2,023) 6,603 (41%) 
Res. lines 4,421 5,899 (900) 9, 420 (59%) 
Totals 7,651 11,295 (2,923) 16,023 
 
Household diffusion of the telephone was more extensive in smaller cities. Statistics for five 
medium-sized Illinois towns (pop.10,000 to 50,000) between 1909 and 1912, for example, show 
that residential subscribers often accounted for more than 70 percent of the users. 
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TABLE 12.5 
RES/BUS SUBSCRIBER BREAKDOWN, 
ILLINOIS EXCHANGES, 1909-12 
Decatur IL, 1912 (pop. 31,000) 
 Bell Co Indep Co Duplics Totals 
Bus. lines 1,161 850 (551) 1,460 (24%) 
Res. lines 3,307 1,308 (460) 4,155 (69%) 
Farm lines 198 192 N/A 390 (06%) 
Totals 4,666 2,350 (1,011) 6,005 
Freeport, IL, 1909 (pop. 18,000) 
 Bell Co Indep Co Duplics Totals 
Bus. lines 281 788 (142) 927 (19%) 
Res. lines 1,094 2,903 (101) 3896 (81%) 
Totals 1,375 3,691 (243) 4, 823 
Galesburg, IL, 1909 (pop. 22,000) 
 Bell Co Indep Co Duplics Totals 
Bus. lines 333 601 (194) 740 (18%) 
Res. lines 598 2,943 (57) 3,484 (82%) 
Totals 931 3,544 (251) 4,224 
Champaign/Urbana, IL, 1912 (pop. 30,000) 
 Bell Co  Indep Co Duplics Totals 
Bus. lines 575 542 (300)* 817(25%) 
Res. lines 1,364 1,315 (710) 2,509(75%) 
Totals 1,939 1,857 (470) 3,326 
Aurora, IL, 1909 (pop. 30,000) 
 Bell Co  Indep Co Duplics Totals 
Bus. lines 568 694 (394) 868(20%) 
Res. lines 2,100 1,549 (93) 3,556(80%) 
Totals 2,668 2,243 (487) 4,424 
Source: 1909 statistics: 17 TELEPHONY 688 (May 1909); 1912 statistics: AT&T Legal and 
Regulatory Library, State of Illinois. 
 
The distribution of residential and business subscribers looks very similar to what one 
would see today. The levels of household penetration achieved in those cities also is not as far from 
the current pattern as one might think. According to the 1910 Census, the average number of 
persons per household in the United States was about 4.5. Using the conservative figure of 4.0, we 
can estimate how many households there were in those communities by dividing the total 
population by 4.0. The total number of residential telephones (corrected for duplication) can then 
be used to derive a household penetration figure. The results, at least for that limited sample of the 
country, are impressive: 
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TABLE 12.6 
ESTIMATED HOUSEHOLD PENETRATION RATES, ILUNOIS, 1909-12 
City 1910 Pop. Households(pop/4) Residential 
Telephones 
Household 
Penetration % 
Decatur 31,000 7,750 4,155 54 
Freeport 18,000 4,500 2,400 53 
Galesburg 22,000 5,500 3,283 60 
Cham/Urb 30,000 7,500 2,509 33 
Aurora 30,000 7,500 3,556 47 
 
Thus, while the average for the country as a whole in 1920 was about one telephone for 
every three households, there were many communities in the United States that had telephones in 
more than half of their households as early as 1910. 
 
If telephone development in the United States by 1920 is contrasted with Europe, the 
uniqueness of the U.S. experience is even more evident. With the exception of Sweden, there was 
no significant episode of independent competition in Europe (not coincidentally, Sweden has 
achieved the highest telephone development levels in Europe). The U.S. development trajectory 
diverges sharply from the European one during that period. Table 12-6 shows how widely the U.S. 
and European growth rates diverged. The historical precociousness of U.S. telephone development 
becomes even clearer if the U.S. penetration rate for 1920 is compared to the European rate forty 
years later. If the seven major western European countries (West Germany, France, Spain, Italy,  
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Sweden) are combined, the ratio of telephones to population 
for Europe in 1961 (table 12-6)  was still lower than the U.S. rate for 1920 (12.69).360 
 
TABLE 12-7 
US AND EUROPEAN PENETRATION GROWTH, 1895-1912 
 USA Europe 
1895 0.36 0.25 
1902 2.30 0.30 
1912 8.80 0.70 
 
Source: AT&T Co., Telephone Statistics of the World, 12 May, 1912. 
 
The United States was still some distance from today's level of 94 percent household 
penetration, and large regional disparities existed. Nevertheless, the competitive period had by 
1920 created the kind of geographic and social penetration capable of supporting the modem notion 
of universal-service-as-social-ubiquity. The social role of the telephone had been utterly 
transformed. Later, the policy expectations applied to the telephone by government legislators and 
regulators began to reflect that new social role. But it is important to understand the sequence: 
market processes made the telephone a popular and geographically ubiquitous item first; 
government policy to extend and support that notion came second. 
                                                 
360 THE WORLD’S TELEPHONES, 1961, New York, AT&T Co., at 2. 
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UNIVERSAL SERVICE REINCARNATED 
 
 
THE UNIFICATION OF TELEPHONE SERVICE by the middle of the 1920s put an end to 
the first-generation debate over universal service. But the term made a highly visible comeback in 
the mid-1970s, sparking a debate which is still underway in the 1990s. The return of “universal 
service” as a policy touchstone gave the term a new meaning. As noted in chapter 2, an entire 
historical mythology has grown up around the new definition. 
 
Accurate or not, that change in the popular meaning of the term is an important part of the 
history of telecommunications in the United States. This chapter analyzes that change and shows 
how it emerged from the debates over the introduction of competition in long-distance markets in 
the 1970s. The chapter retraces relevant developments in regulation from 1920 to the mid-1970s, 
including the development of separations by federal and state regulators and the passage of the 
1934 Communications Act. In the process, it refutes the historical misconceptions created by the 
shift in the meaning of the term. 
The Second-generation Universal Service Concept 
Contemporary readers will have no difficulty recognizing the “new” definition of universal 
service; it the one that prevails to this day. The new concept defines the goal of universal service as 
comprehensive household telephone penetration-a “telephone in every home.” A related change has 
occurred in the policy associated with the term. Universal service policy has become synonymous 
with the manipulation of rate regulation to make telephone service more affordable to consumers. 
A variety of cross-subsidies are employed to do that; one is to overcharge long-distance users in 
order to subsidize local service while another is to charge urban consumers higher rates in order to 
lower charges on rural users. 
 
Whatever their merits as public policy, those concepts represent a departure from the 
original meaning of the term. As chapter 8 documented with citations from the early dialogue, the 
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first-generation universal service debate was a response to the conditions created by dual service. 
The goal of universal service then was technically unified, fully interconnected, geographically 
ubiquitous service. The policy required to bring it about was consolidation of local exchange 
service into a monopoly and the interconnection of Bell and independent exchanges. The older 
policy viewed regulation as a substitute for the price and service incentives of competition. It did 
not conceive of regulation as a mechanism for effecting cross- subsidies. Nor did government 
policy focus on household penetration as such. 
 
If that shift in the meaning of the term represented nothing more than a change in 
government policy (made with full knowledge of the difference between the two alternatives) it 
would not be so problematical. The change has not been so innocent, however. The newly forged 
linkage between the term “universal service,” household penetration, and regulated monopoly was 
part of a politically-motivated attempt to salvage the fortunes of the regulated monopoly system in 
the 1970s. The new definition brought with it a sweeping revision of the history of the telephone 
system-a revisionism which fabricated the legislative origins of universal service policy and 
exaggerated the role of regulated monopoly in making telephone service affordable and available to 
most Americans. 
 
In the historical mythology associated with the new conception, the competitive era’s 
contribution to the development of the infrastructure was ignored, and the earlier universal service 
debate was forgotten. The origins of universal service policy were instead traced to the 1934 
Communications Act, specifically to the wording of the Act's Preamble: 
 
“…to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, a 
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service 
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”361 
 
In that view, regulators and telephone monopolies acting together exploited the 
characteristics of the regulated monopoly system to bring about widespread household access to 
telephone service. Generally, the separations and settlements process, which allocates part of the 
revenues generated by the long-distance network to the support of the local network, is identified as 
the mechanism by which that policy goal was accomplished. In its more romantic formulations, the 
modern construction of universal service implies that without such measures telephone service 
would never have been affordable to the bulk of the population.362 
 
Of course, Vail was using the term “universal service” almost three decades before the 
passage of the Communications Act. That did not deter the revision of the term, however. Instead, 
those who bothered to read Vail’s pronouncements simply projected the new meaning into them. 
Thus, many historians, especially those directly associated with the Bell system, contend that 
                                                 
361 47 U.S.C. s. 151. 
362 See, for example, John Browning, Universal Service, an idea whose time has past, 3 WIRED 102 (Sept. 
1994): “This is the story of the noblest idea in the history of technology: universal telecommunications service. 
Universal service brought America into the information age. It put telephones into every home (well, about 94 percent 
of them) and wove telephone lines through the fabric of American life....Universal service was made a guiding 
principle of American telecom regulation in 1934.” 
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universal service in the modern sense was an objective of AT&T from the very beginning.363 They 
view the gradual but steady increase in household penetration after 1920 as evidence of Bell's 
commitment to widespread household penetration. Those historians would refuse to recognize any 
qualitative distinction between the term’s usage now and Vail’s usage in the early 1900s. 
 
With the new mythology of universal service sketched out, we can now review the post-
regulation era developments to assess its historical accuracy. The narrative that follows will make 
three arguments: 1) that the separations process was not actively used to subsidize local service 
until the late 1960s and the 1970s, and that its impact on the growth of penetration was minor; 2) 
that the 1934 Communications Act did not articulate a national universal service policy; and 3) that 
the redefinition of universal service actually took place in the mid-1970s as part of the regulated 
monopoly system’s attempt to defend itself against long-distance competition. 
Universal service and the problem of separating the rate base 
The initial application of rate regulation to the telephone industry in the 1920s posed 
complex problems in economics. Rate base regulation demands that the rates charged by a 
telephone company for a particular service be based on the book costs of the physical plant used, 
plus expenses and a reasonable rate of return. It assumes, in other words, that a scientific link 
between the cost of the facilities used and the price charged can be established. Applying that logic 
to telephone service is no simple matter. A telephone system supplies millions of possible 
connections to its users, some local, some to nearby areas, and others to long-distance points. In 
chapter 3 we argued that each connection is a separate service. But subscribers use the same 
telephone, local access line, and central office switch for all of those outputs. In the context of rate 
regulation, how should the costs of those facilities be apportioned among the different services so 
that regulators can determine what the “proper” rates should be? 
 
The first-generation concept of universal service supported a holistic approach to that 
problem. It focused on sustaining the telephone network as a system and not as a collection of 
discrete components. A regional telephone system, it was often observed, covered both “fat” and 
“lean” territories. Access competition had forced the telephone companies to extend their networks 
into the “lean” territories in order to preserve the competitive value of their systems. With the 
pressures of competition gone, regulators wanted to ensure that service would not be withdrawn 
from less profitable or remote areas. Thus, the application of utility regulation to the telephone 
companies brought with it “obligation to serve” requirements, or restrictions on the firms’ freedom 
to exit from markets.364 Naturally, the telephone companies wanted to ensure that the method of 
rate regulation allowed them to profitably sustain the scope of service regulators required of them. 
As a result, both regulators and the local telephone companies supported methods that based rates 
upon sustaining the telephone companies’ system as a whole. 
 
                                                 
363 A. VON AUW, HERITAGE AND DESTINY: REFLECTIONS ON THE BELL SYSTEM IN 
TRANSITION (Praeger 1983); PETER TEMIN AND LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM 16 
(Cambridge University Press 1987). 
364 See, for example, some of the cases cited in ALAN STONE, PUBLIC SERVICE UBERALISM 226 
(Princeton University Press 1991). 
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A memorandum written by H. O. Seymour for the Chicago Telephone Company in 1912 
(and widely distributed among the Bell operating companies) laid out those problems in a thorough 
fashion.365 The memo argued that “with the telephone stations and lines, all do not and 
cannot…pay their way, yet they must be continued as a necessary part of the whole system and the 
elimination of one, lessens the service and economic value of the part that remains.” The author 
argued that it was impossible to separate the investment and expenses associated with specific 
services.366 Seymour concluded that “in considering rates for any and all classes of service, the 
operation of the company as a whole must be taken into account, its total investment, total expense, 
and total revenue; and the reasonableness of a particular rate must depend upon the net earnings of 
the utility as a whole.” 
 
Although the holistic approach to the rate base involved some averaging of costs, those 
were not perceived as subsidies but as a method of determining reasonable rates in a way that took 
into account the demand interdependence of telephone service. The principle that users paid rates 
not simply to recover the cost of the physical facilities they used, but rates which sustained the 
system as a whole, became known in the industry as “value of service” pricing. Value of service 
pricing is a logical expression of the first- generation universal service concept, because it attempts 
to recover the value of the network externality. Indeed, as evidence produced in chapter 6 showed, 
the pressures of access competition had induced the telephone companies to adopt similar policies 
on their own, prior to regulation. Seymour’s 1912 memo explicitly acknowledged that under 
competitive conditions, “intelligent selfishness” on the part of the telephone companies would 
“lead it to so distribute the [cost] load as to bring about the greatest development of the enterprise.” 
 
The holistic approach, however, could only be applied uniformly within a single regulatory 
jurisdiction. Whenever telephone calls crossed state boundaries, the rate base had to be divided into 
separate parts in order to distinguish between federal and state regulatory authority. That became 
known as the problem of jurisdictional separations. 
 
In the 1920s, debate over jurisdictional separations took the specific form of how to 
separate the costs and revenue requirements of the local exchange service and the long-distance 
service. There were two basic theories about how that should be done. One, the so-called “board-to-
board” method, held that the rates for local service should recover all of the costs of the local 
exchange plant. Long-distance rates should recover only those additional costs required to supply 
facilities connecting the switchboards of local exchanges. The other principle was known as the 
“station-to-station” method. The station-to-station method held that because local exchange 
facilities were used in establishing a long-distance call, some of the costs of the local exchange 
plant and service should be recovered from long-distance rates. It traced costs from one telephone 
(station) to the other. That method was more complex in that the costs of the local network had to 
be divided or allocated among state and interstate services. 
 
                                                 
365 B. W. Trafford, Vice President, Chicago Telephone Company, to E.C. Bradley, Vice President, Pacific 
T&T Co., Jan. 26, 1912. Attached memo by H. 0. Seymour, “A telephone property must be considered as a whole in 
determining the reasonableness of any rate.” In San Francisco Telephone Pioneers Archive. 
366 “If we were asked to provide a subscriber with equipment designed  for local service only, we could not 
serve him, as all equipment used is designed,  built up and associated so as to make all classes of service possible.” Id. 
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The Bell system supported board-to-board accounting-and for a very good reason. At that 
time, state regulation of rates was fairly stringent, whereas rate regulation in the federal jurisdiction 
was practically nonexistent. The long-distance business was increasingly profitable, whereas the 
Bell system viewed the consolidation of local service as an opportunity to raise what it viewed as 
the unremunerative rates foisted upon it by fifteen years of competition.367 Brock has observed that 
“when there is differential regulation, the monopolist has an incentive to maximize the allocation of 
costs to the tightly regulated jurisdiction in order to justify higher regulated prices, while 
minimizing costs to the unregulated jurisdiction in order to capture [unregulated levels of] 
profit.”368 If AT&T could shift more of the allocated costs to the state jurisdiction, it could justify 
local rate increases and clear the way for higher long-distance profits. (That fact by itself calls into 
question the claim that AT&T was interested in promoting universal service in the modern sense at 
that time.) State regulators, of course, had quite different incentives. Ratifying unpopular local rate 
increases made them look bad before their constituents. They supported the station-to-station 
method. 
 
For modern-day observers it is tempting to read a second-generation universal service 
promotion policy into that debate. Under the board-to-board method, local exchange access rates 
would be relatively higher and long-distance rates relatively lower. Under the station-to-station 
method, long-distance users pay more to support the local exchange plant. Station-to-station can 
thus be seen as a means of using long-distance revenues to make local service more affordable. In 
fact, the debate over separations principles did take that form starting in the early 1950s. But from 
the 1920s until the end of World War II, the debate had no such implications. 
 
That is apparent from the Supreme Court decisions which sanctioned the station-to-station 
principle, Smith v. Illinois (1930) and Smith v. Lindheimer (1933).369 The issue before the Court 
was whether the rates imposed on the Chicago Telephone Company by the Illinois state 
commission were “confiscatory” under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Bell interests based their 
argument on board-to-board accounting methods. The Supreme Court rejected their method. It 
ruled that separation of interstate and intrastate plant “is essential to the appropriate recognition of 
the competent governmental authority in each field of regulation.” Some part of the local exchange 
plant should be “apportioned” to interstate service, the Court ruled, otherwise “the exchange 
property…will beat an undue burden.” There is no indication that regulators were attempting to 
keep exchange rates low to stimulate telephone penetration, or that the regulators or the Supreme 
Court recognized subsidization of exchange access to promote universal service as a valid criterion 
in ratemaking. In fact, such considerations would definitely have been considered illegal. The “just 
and reasonable” rates mandated by regulation required establishing a link, as scientific as possible, 
between actual costs and the rates charged to customers. Rates which did not adequately 
compensate the telephone companies, or which were designed to transfer wealth from one person to 
the other, could be challenged as confiscatory. 
 
The courts and regulators were grappling with the issue of how to define the costs of a 
multiproduct firm, not pursuing a social welfare policy. Even if that had been their intention, the 
                                                 
367 See chapter 11 for evidence of this. 
368 GERALD BROCK,       67 (1994); see also TEMIN AND GALAMBOS, supra note 3, at 20-22. 
369 Smith et al v. Illinois Bell 282 U.S. 133 (1930) and Lindheimer v. lllinois Bell 292 u.s. 151 (1933) 
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impact of separations practices on local rates would have been minimal. According to Gabel, the 
separations concepts prevailing in the 1920s and early 1930s would have relieved exchange 
property of only 2 or 3 percent of the investment burden.370 Even more important, the station-to-
station principle, though sanctioned by the Supreme Court in 1930, was not actually implemented 
on a nationwide basis until 1949. Thus, the growth of telephone penetration from 1920 to 1950 
cannot be attributed to the effects of that policy, whatever its motives. (That is discussed in greater 
detail in the section of this chapter entitled Cross Subsidies and Local Telephone Service). 
The Communications Act of 1934 
The Communications Act of 1934 was passed after the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce spent more than a year investigating the communications industry. The 
Congressional committee probed not only AT&T but also independent telephone holding 
companies, the telegraph industry, RCA, and the new broadcasting networks. There was a 
suspicion among the committee members that the large holding companies controlling 
communications were rife with financial abuses. AT&T attracted particular notice because, despite 
its status as a monopoly, it operated free of effective regulation, particularly at the interstate level. 
Its ability to move assets and accounts between the federal and state jurisdictions in a way that 
could manipulate the regulatory process was particularly troublesome to the Congress. “The 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company,” the committee’s special counsel wrote, “is more 
powerful and skilled than any State government with which it has to deal.”371 The Interstate 
Commerce Commission should be relieved of regulatory authority over telephones, the Committee 
believed, because it was preoccupied with railroad regulation and lacked the resources to oversee 
the large and growing communications field at the same time. “Thus far regulation, particularly by 
the federal government, has been nominal largely because Congress had not made appropriations 
sufficient to enable the ICC to give effect to existing statutes.”372 
 
The Committee report accompanying the draft bill described its objectives as follows: 
 
The bill would accomplish three purposes: (a) codification of existing federal 
legislation regulating communications; (b) a transfer of jurisdictions from several 
departments, boards, and commissions to a new communications commission; and, 
(c), a postponement for further action after further study and observation of some of 
the more difficult and controversial subjects.373 
 
From that it is clear that the Communications Act was essentially a consolidation of federal 
regulatory authority over the burgeoning new telecommunications field. It was not the starting 
point of a new policy or a new approach to regulation, but the beginning of real regulation at the 
                                                 
370 RICHARD GABEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARATIONS CONCEPTS IN THE TELEPHONE 
INDUSTRY 17 (Michigan State University Public Utilities Studies 1967). 
371 73rd Cong., H.R. No. 1273, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COMMUNICATION COMPANIES, 
Submitted by Mr. Rayburn pursuant to H.R. 59, 72nd Cong., and House Joint Resolution 572, 72nd Cong., Apr. 18, 
1934, xxx. 
372 Id. at xxxi. 
373 Id. at xxxi. 
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federal level. As the report stated, the new law codified existing laws and regulations, and the 
report emphasized Congress's desire to make existing statutes effective. A new, specialized 
regulatory agency was perceived as the best means to carry out that task. 
 
The subject of universal service, in either its modern or classical sense, did not appear in 
the deliberations. The records surrounding the passage of the law contain no mention of telephone 
penetration levels. There is no data in the reports purporting to show that an unacceptable number 
of people were unreached by the telephone network or unable to afford service. There is not even a 
discussion of the problem of jurisdictional separations. Instead, Congress amassed thousands of 
pages of materials analyzing the telephone and telegraph companies’ capital structures, 
shareholders, ownership and voting control, and interlocking directorates. 
 
What, then, are we to make of the Act’s preamble, oft-cited as the mandate for the second-
generation approach to universal service promotion? A complete citation of the preamble provides 
the basis for a more realistic understanding of its meaning: 
 
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all 
the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire 
and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for 
the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and 
property through the use of wire and radio communication, and for centralizing 
authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional 
authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio 
communication, there is hereby created a commission to be known as the “Federal 
Communications Commission,” which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, 
and which shall execute and enforce the provisions of the Act. 
 
The preamble contains a grab-bag of extremely broad purposes, such as protecting national 
security and the safety of life and property, as well as the standard regulatory commission charge to 
ensure adequate facilities at reasonable charges. The absence of any concern with telephone 
penetration or separations principles in the record, or of any specific provisions addressing those 
issues in the statute itself, suggests that that aspect of the law is largely rhetorical-a list of all the 
good things that come about from telecommunications. 
 
But the most direct refutation of those who see a cryptic universal service policy in those 
two little lines of the preamble comes from the behavior of the FCC itself. In the first two decades 
after the creation of the new federal commission, many state regulators opposed involving it in 
station-to-station separations, because they feared it would lead to encroachment on their regulatory 
authority.374 For its part, the FCC did not begin to shift revenues from the federal jurisdiction to the 
state jurisdiction in order to subsidize local service. On the contrary. Between 1935 and 1945, the 
FCC succeeded in extracting a series of long-distance rate reductions out of AT&T. The FCC had 
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no interest in reducing local service rates via separations because that would have jeopardized its 
ability to deliver rate decreases in its own jurisdiction. 
 
As the FCC was reducing interstate long-distance rates, the Bell system and other telephone 
companies were asking for, and often receiving, increases in state exchange rates and intra-state 
long-distance rates. The resulting disparity between state and interstate telephone rate trends was 
embarrassing to state regulators. Federal regulators were perceived as being more effective, more 
able to “deliver the goods,” than state regulators. 
 
In reaction to the FCC’s decreases in AT&T’s interstate long-distance rates, state regulators 
eventually unified in support of the station-to-station principle. The station-to-station method would 
shift some of the intra-state costs to the federal jurisdiction, thereby preventing another interstate 
rate decrease and eliminating the pressure for more state rate increases.375 At that time, AT&T also 
accepted the station-to-station principle because it could be used to counteract pressure for lower 
interstate long-distance rates.376 By 1944, AT&T, state regulators, and the FCC were working 
together to develop a common approach to separations. 
 
A comprehensive agreement about how to divide up ex- change and toll plant did not come 
until 1947 with the adoption of the first uniform Separations Manual by the National Association of 
Regulatory Utility Commissioners and the FCC. The Bell companies did not actually file intrastate 
tariffs that reflected the new cost separations methods until 1950.377 Thus, the station-to-station 
method of separating costs was not fully operational at the national level until thirty years after the 
end of dual service. Despite the absence of any specific policy to promote or subsidize local 
service, household penetration grew steadily from 1920 to 1950, faltering only for a few years 
during the depths of the Great Depression. 
Cross-subsidies and local telephone service 
After 1950, the formula used by regulators to allocate part of the costs of the local network 
to the long-distance rate base was based on “subscriber line use” (SLU), or the average proportion 
of minutes a subscriber’s telephone line was used for state and interstate calls. In 1950 interstate 
SLU was less than 3 percent, so the impact of the station-to-station method on local rates was still 
minimal. Politicians and state regulators, however, were quick to realize the potential of separations 
to shift the cost burden among more or less favored constituencies. In 1951, as the FCC began a 
new inquiry into interstate rates, AT&T, with the support of the National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners (NARUC), proposed an alteration of the Separations Manual that would 
shift more of the local telephone plant into the interstate rate base.378 The FCC opposed that plan on 
the grounds that it would lead to a situation in which “services subject to Federal jurisdiction 
would, in effect, be subsidizing services beyond that jurisdiction.”379 The FCC’s resistance was 
                                                 
375 Id., at 27-45. 
376 TEMIN AND GALAMBOS, supra note 3, at 22-25. 
377 See CAROL WEINHAUS & ANTHONY OETINGER, BEHIND THE TELEPHONE DEBATES (Ablex 
1988) for a detailed history and description of separations and settlements procedures. 
378 TEMIN AND GALAMBOS, supra note 3, at 24. 
379 Paul A. Walker, FCC to Matt L. McWhorter, Oct. 18, 1950. 
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overcome, however, by the strenuous intervention of Senator Ernest W. McFarland of Arizona, the 
Chairman of the Senate subcommittee on communications. NARUC, citing the growing disparity 
between state rate increases and interstate rate reductions, had appealed to the Senator for support. 
Senator McFarland’s correspondence with the FCC on separations raised explicitly the issue of 
cross-subsidization, scolding the FCC for its willingness to: 
 
shift the load from the big user to the little user, from the large national corporations 
which are heavy users of long distance to the average housewife and business and 
professional man who do not indulge in a great deal of long distance.380 
 
Thus in 1952 and 1953 the interstate (long-distance) contribution to local exchange plant 
increased from 3 percent to 5 percent. The first step towards the use of long-distance revenues to 
subsidize local service had been taken. 
 
At that juncture, a number of interpretive issues regarding that incident must be 
underscored. First, the Federal Communications Commission, which had been created by the 1934 
Communications Act and charged with its implementation, actively opposed the expansion of 
cross-subsidization. Second, neither NARUC nor Senator McFarland cited the preamble, or any 
other section of the Communications Act, in making their case for shifting the burden. Instead, 
NARUC was concerned about the growing state-interstate rate disparity. For the Senator, it was the 
obvious political advantage of lowering rates for the many by taxing the few that attracted 
attention. Indeed, the Senator’s political calculus did not even assert that the “average housewife 
and business or professional man” would be unable to afford telephone service unless the burden 
was shifted. It was, rather, an argument that it would be more fair for large users to carry more of 
the load. In fact, household penetration was growing rapidly in the postwar period, with or without 
the departure from SLU. 
 
Indeed, while the precedent was important, the impact of the 1952 separations change on 
local rates was still small. From 1952 to 1965, the percentage of local plant cost allocated to the 
interstate jurisdiction grew from 5 percent to 7 percent, while interstate SLU grew from 2.5 percent 
to 4 percent (see figure 13-1). As that occurred, the average monthly charge for residential 
telephone service, in constant 1980 dollars, actually increased from $14.25 in 1952 to $15.86 in 
1955. In fact, average residential telephone service rates remained higher than their 1952 levels 
until 1965 (see table 13-1). While one could argue that rates would have gone up faster without the 
changes, it appears that no drastic subsidy was involved, particularly when compared to post-1970 
changes. Despite that, household penetration grew rapidly. 
 
Full-fledged exploitation of the separations process to subsidize local service did not really 
begin until 1965. From 1952 to 1965 only 3 percent of the costs over and above SLU were shifted 
from  the state to the interstate jurisdiction. During the seventeen years from 1965 to 1982, an  
  
                                                 
380 Ernest W. McFarland to Paul A. Walker, Jan. 30, 1951, cited in TEMIN AND GALAMBOS, supra note 3, 
at 25. 
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FIGURE 13-1 
PERCENTAGE OF SUBSCRIBER PLANT COSTS  
ALLOCATED TO INTERSTATE SERVICE 
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additional 20 percent was so shifted.381 From 1965 to 1969, the real average monthly charge for 
residential service dropped by $2. By 1982, it was almost half of what it had been in 1965 (see 
table 13-1). The culmination of that process came with the adoption of the so-called Ozark Plan in 
1970.382 The Ozark plan’s separations were still based in part on measures of relative use, but its 
formulas effectively multiplied interstate minutes by a factor of three in order to establish the 
amount of local plant to be recovered from the interstate revenues. That led to a continuous and 
automatic increase in the cross-subsidy from 1971 on. 
 
TABLE 13-1 
AVERAGE MONTHLY CHARGE FOR 
RESIDENTIAL PHONE SERVICE, 1950-1980 
Year Current Dollars Constant 1980 dollars 
1950 4.29 14.58 
1951 4.48 14.11 
1952 4.62 14.25 
1953 4.93 15.08 
1954 5.10 15.53 
1955 5.19 15.86 
1956 5.24 15.78 
1957 5.28 15.35 
1958 5.36 15.17 
1959 5.51 15.46 
1960 5.55 15.33 
1961 5.61 15.35 
1962 5.62 15.21 
1963 5.65 15.11 
1964 5.66 14.93 
1965 5.67 14.70 
 
  
                                                 
381 In 1965, as part of the so-called “Denver” plan, state and federal regulators increased the interstate 
allocation by nearly 3 percent. Only four years later, a new separations plan put forth by the FCC increased the 
interstate allocation by another 5 percent. 
382 See Weinhaus and Oettinger 83-103 (1988) for a description and analysis of the Ozark plan. 
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TABLE 13-1, CONT’D 
AVERAGE MONTHLY CHARGE FOR 
RESIDENTIAL PHONE SERVICE, 1950-1980 
Year Current Dollars Constant 1980 dollars 
1966 5.64 14.22 
1967 5.60 13.73 
1968 5.61 13.20 
1969 5.68 12.68 
1970 5.76 12.14 
1971 6.04 12.20 
1972 6.38 12.48 
1973 6.69 12.33 
1974 7.08 11.77 
1975 7.32 11.14 
1976 7.81 11.24 
1977 8.07 10.90 
1978 8.31 10.43 
1979 8.40 9.47 
1980 8.61 8.60 
Source: Federal Communications Commission, Common Carrier Dkt. No. 80-286, 
Comments of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to the Federal-
State Joint Board, Appendix B, Aug. 17, 1981, p. 11. 
 
The pressures to do that were simultaneously ideological, political, and regulatory. 
Consumer groups in the activist 1960s were pressuring utility commissions for lower rates.383 
Regulatory analysts were becoming aware of the social policy possibilities of the separations 
system. In 1967, for example, economist Richard Gabel published an influential monograph 
charging that the separations principles used by regulators penalized exchange ratepayers: 
 
Alternative separations treatment could reduce the costs of local exchange service and, 
eventually, exchange rates, making possible a universal development of exchange services.384 
 
Most important, perhaps, was the desire to avoid upheavals. Regulators and telephone 
companies were faced with a precipitous drop in long-distance costs and a steep increase in the 
costs of labor-intensive local services. By shifting costs from the state to the interstate jurisdiction, 
regulators would avoid the kind of rapid price dislocations that would undoubtedly create political 
headaches. 
 
Ironically, that move to exploit the social policy possibilities of the separations and 
settlements process carne at a time when the justification for such a subsidy was weak, as at least 
                                                 
383 Horwitz 235 (1989), notes that state regulators’ support for the Ozark plan was partly a response to 
pressure from public interest groups to keep residential rates low. 
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85 percent of all American households already had telephone service.385 Telephones were 
becoming universal for much the same reason that television sets became universal-Americans 
wanted them and their increasing affluence made it possible for most of them to get them. 
 
Simple chronology thus defeats any attempt to attribute the growth of household penetration 
to a universal service policy formulated by the Communications Act and implemented by 
regulators and telephone companies. The “universal service policy” that is commonly attributed to 
the 1934 Act was not fully in force until 1965. The use of rate regulation to lower the cost of local 
access was never part of the law but was a set of practices that evolved out of the debate over the 
proper way to separate the rate base into different regulatory jurisdictions. And the policy kicked in 
at a time when the vast majority of American households already had telephone service. 
The retroactive redefinition of universal service 
It is a deeply entrenched part of telephone industry folklore that the Communications Act of 
1934 gave birth to a nationwide universal service policy. That belief is an important part of the 
history of universal service in the United States not because it is true, but because it is so obviously 
untrue. Despite the absence of any historical evidence for that notion, it persists. How did that myth 
take hold? 
 
The answer is that a major redefinition of universal service occurred in the 1970s, when 
long-distance competition began to threaten the new separations practices adopted by federal and 
state regulators. By targeting long-distance routes for selective entry, competition struck at the 
heart of rate regulated monopoly. Long-distance services had been assigned higher costs due to the 
new separations methodology embodied in the Ozark plan. The alternative long-distance networks 
of companies such as MCI and Sprint had no requirement to allocate a portion of their costs to local 
service; they simply ordered local business lines from AT&T at the normal (subsidized) rates to 
gain access to local users. They therefore had a built-in cost advantage against AT&T. The political 
challenge that represented forced AT&T and state regulators to develop an explicit rationale for 
regulated monopoly and its system of separations and settlements. In that struggle, the concept of 
universal service was redefined in a way that linked it to the practices of regulated monopoly. 
Regulated monopoly and its separations practices were retroactively credited with making 
telephone service universally available and affordable. 
 
Three milestones in that reconstruction can be clearly identified. One was a speech before 
NARUC in late 1973 by AT&T CEO John DeButts. The second was a report submitted to 
Congress by Eugene V. Rostow on behalf of AT&T in 1975. The third was the Bell system’s 
proposal in 1976 to reform the 1934 Communications Act to preserve regulated monopoly. 
 
                                                 
385 The FCC’s Statistics of Communications Common Carriers for the year ended Dec. 31, 1965 reported that 
85 percent of all American households had telephone service; the Statistics for 1970 reported that 92 percent of all 
households had telephones. Because the method used to measure household penetration at that time is thought to have 
overstated the actual amount, I have deducted 5 percent from each estimate, which yields a household penetration 
percentage of 87 percent for 1970 and 80 percent for 1965. Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of 
Communications Common Carriers (1970), (1965). 
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By the early 1970s, the FCC’s incremental opening of AT&T’s markets to competition had 
provoked a crisis in telecommunications policy. The Bell system felt itself besieged on many 
fronts, confronted with an ambiguous and shifting set of rules. One alternative was to gradually 
accommodate itself to the new order. Another was to stand its ground and fight for the old order. In 
1973 AT&T chief executive John B. DeButts chose the latter option. In a speech before the 
assembled state regulators of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
(NARUC), DeButts took a public stance against competition and in favor of traditional public 
service regulation. His speech, entitled “An Unusual Obligation,” harked back to the earliest years 
of regulation in the 1920s and invoked the special social contract between the regulator and the 
regulated firm. 
 
Debutts’ attempt to provoke a public dialogue was next extended into the legislative arena. 
Bell began to promote congressional action to protect itself from new competition. Eugene V. 
Rostow was an influential figure in Washington. Having once served as the chair of President 
Johnson’s 1968 Task Force on Communications Policy, he was retained by AT&T to support its 
legislative efforts. In 1975 he submitted testimony to Congress entitled, “The Case for 
Congressional Action to Safeguard the Telephone Network as a Universal and Optimized 
System.”386 It was AT&T, via Rostow, that first aired the specious claim that a monopoly system 
devoted to universal service was part of the mandate of the 1934 Communications Act. 
 
Bell’s actions, however, indicated that it considered the existing Communications Act far 
too weak a reed on which to base its case. It prepared a new version of the Communications Act, 
The Consumer Communications Reform Act of 1976. According to Temin and Galambos, 
 
The bill was cast as an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934. It reaffirmed the 
nation’s commitment to universal service and went beyond existing law to state that a unified 
telephone net- work had been and continued to be essential for the achievement of that goal. The 
bill bluntly stated that the existing rate structure, by which it meant primarily separations, had 
promoted universal service.387 
 
We have only to look at the context of those events to understand the function of the new 
universal service ideology. The fateful antitrust suit which eventually led to the breakup of AT&T 
was filed by the Department of Justice in 1974. MCI had invaded switched long distance with its 
Execunet service in 1975, a development which threatened to subvert the whole station-to-station 
approach to separations. The Bell company was in the thick of an all-out attempt to persuade 
Congress to pass a law to preserve the classical monopoly arrangements. 
 
During the battle over the Bell bill and the ensuing years of antitrust proceedings, “universal 
service” became one of the key rallying cries of AT&T and the other defenders of regulated 
monopoly, especially state regulators. Just as Vail had used the term to fend off access competition 
from 1907 to 1920, so AT&T under DeButts attempted to use the same term-albeit with a different 
                                                 
386 Eugene V. Rostow, “The Case for Congressional Action to Safeguard the Telephone Network as a 
Universal and Optimized System.” Paper based on the memorandum prepared for AT&T for use in the Nov. 1975 
hearings before the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 
387 TEMIN AND GALAMBOS, supra note 3, at 119. 
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meaning and in a very different context-to renew the nation’s commitment to the regulated 
monopoly structure Vail had helped to establish. The modern reconstruction of universal service, 
however, was not an accurate description of a historical policy, nor was it really intended to be. It 
was a political weapon in the battle for the preservation of an institution.388 Its political appeal-
support for lower residential telephone rates and cross-subsidies to rural areas-proved to be 
remarkably powerful. Even Congressional leaders who opposed most of AT&T’s legislative 
proposals could not resist taking advantage of the political capital to be made by invoking 
“universal service” in defense of low residential and rural rates. The so-called “Universal 
Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983,” an opportunistic attempt to maintain local rate 
subsidies after the divestiture, was drafted by two Senators-Dingell and Wirth-who had refused to 
support Bell’s 1976 legislation. 
 
AT&T’s political objectives failed miserably. Its historical revisionism, however, was an 
overwhelming success. As a revised ideology of “universal service” was pressed into the service of 
telephone monopolies and other opponents of rate reform in the 1970s and 1980s, its meaning 
changed in ways that obscured what it had meant when it was coined in 1907. A confusion between 
its contemporary and historical usage has made it difficult for modem scholars and policymakers to 
appreciate the significance of the earlier universal service debate. And the universal service claims 
of regulated monopoly have unfairly eclipsed the earlier contribution of access competition to the 
development of a ubiquitous telephone infrastructure. 
  
                                                 
388 In the case of European PTTs. the retroactive nature of universal service claims is even clearer. European 
monopolies adopted the same averaging and cross subsidy practices as the American telephone companies without 
attaining anything near the penetration levels of the United States. but nevertheless made “universality” one of their 
defenses against the onslaught of new competition in the 1980s.  As Gamham (1988) has shown, officially proclaimed 
universal service goals in Europe often coexist with low penetration and large regional disparities in access to the 
telephone. 
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UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN THE 1990S 
 
 
UNIVERSAL SERVICE HAS REMAINED a focal point of telecommunications policy in 
the 1990s. That has happened not only in the United States but in every other country that has 
begun to liberalize or deregulate its telecommunications industry. The new policy dialogue is 
preoccupied with interconnection of competing networks and with the problem of financing 
universal service “subsidies” in a competitive environment. In the United States, it is also part of an 
attempt to extend second-generation universal service concepts to the new technologies of the 
National Information Infrastructure (NII).389 As that book goes to press, new legislation adding a 
new section to the Communications Act explicitly devoted to universal service is before the 104th 
Congress.390 
 
That chapter establishes connections between the historical and current policy debates over 
universal service. The first section shows how current legislation has been powerfully influenced 
by historical myths. The second section provides a critique of current thinking about the 
relationship between universal service and competition. The third section argues that the historic 
choice between dual service and universal service offers a source of fresh insight into the policy 
problems posed by the growth of a new information infrastructure. The last section shows that the 
historical evidence also is pertinent to current controversies over access pricing and interconnection 
in telecommunications. 
 
                                                 
389 The NTIA Universal Service Working Group, chaired by Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary for 
Communications of the Commerce Department, held Universal Service hearings in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Dec. 
13, 1993, Los Angeles, California, Feb. 16, 1994, and Indianapolis, Indiana, July 12, 1994. 
390 104th Cong., 1st Sess., The Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, version seen 
by author dated Mar. 28, 1995. 
 
170 
 
Life imitates art 
The first generation of universal service policy (1907-1920) aimed at the consolidation of 
service so that all telephone users could speak to each other. Since then, universal service was 
redefined as an industry-government policy focused on putting “a telephone in every home.” 
Although it was not implemented until the late 1960s, the second-generation universal service 
policy claimed a mandate from the 1934 Communications Act. And while more than 80 percent of 
American households already had telephones when it was begun, the second-generation policy 
claimed credit for making telephone service available and affordable. 
 
While the old Bell system is gone, the universal service mythology it created continues to 
haunt us. Current policy discourse about universal service is dominated entirely by the second-
generation concept. Noting that competing networks undermine the rate averaging and cross 
subsidies which allegedly produced widely affordable telephone service, it asks how the old 
subsidy system can be revised in order to make it sustainable in the new, competitive 
environment.391 
 
The historical mythology of universal service is shaping legislation as well as debate. The 
most recent draft of telecommunications reform law, the “Telecommunications Competition and 
Deregulation Act of 1995,” would add a new section to the Communications Act devoted 
exclusively to Universal Service. The goal of this section, according to a committee report 
accompanying the draft bill, is: 
 
…to clearly articulate the policy of Congress that universal service is a cornerstone 
of the Nation’s communications system. This new section is intended to make 
explicit the current implicit authority of the FCC and the States to require common 
carriers to provide universal service.392 
 
That statement is unusual in its direct admission that heretofore there has been no explicit 
legislative authority for the second-generation universal service policy. What is fascinating from a 
historical perspective is Congress’s determination to react to that fact by modifying the Act so that 
it conforms to the myth! A policy concept put forward by the Bell system as part of a last-ditch 
attempt to save regulated monopoly will now be enshrined in a law devoted to 
“Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation.” The old regulated monopoly system has 
exacted a posthumous revenge. 
 
                                                 
391 Eli M. Noam, NetTrans Accounts: Reforming the Financial Support System for Universal Service in 
Telecommunications. Universal Service in the New Electronic Environment Symposium, Benton Foundation and 
Columbia University CITI (Oct.15, 1993). OPASTCO, KEEPING RURAL AMERICA CONNECTED: COSTS AND 
RATES IN THE COMPETITIVE ERA. (Organization for the Protection and Advancement of Small Telephone 
Companies 1993). KOICHIRO HAYASHI, UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN JAPAN (in Japanese), RC Publishers, 1994, 
ISBN4-12-101175-9. 
392 Committee Report on the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, Senator Larry 
Pressler, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to Dr. June E. O’Neill, Director, 
Congressional Budget Office, Mar. 28, 1995. 
 
171 
 
The tragicomic character of those developments intensifies when one attempts to make 
sense of the new universal service mandate in the draft legislation. “Universal service” is defined 
therein as: 
 
an evolving level of intrastate and interstate telecommunications services that the [Federal 
Communications] Commission, based on recommendations from the public, Congress, and 
the Federal State Joint Board…determines should be provided at just, reasonable, and 
affordable rates to all Americans, including those in rural and high-cost areas and those with 
disabilities, to enable them to participate effectively in the economic, academic, medical, 
and democratic processes of the Nation. At a minimum, universal service shall include any 
telecommunications services that the Commission determines have, through the operation 
of market choices by customers, been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential 
customers.393 
 
The language is remarkably broad. If the law passes with that wording in place, the nation’s 
basic communications law will create universal service obligations whenever a “substantial 
majority” of Americans subscribe to a particular service. The mandate stretches beyond traditional 
telephony to include virtually any form of information transmission that might exist now or in the 
future. Presumably, those universal service obligations will continue to be funded via intra-industry 
price distortions. A process for progressively expanding universal service entitlement claims has 
been created in the form of a new Federal-State Joint Board, which, in response to political pressure 
from Congress or interest groups, can recommend subsidies in nearly any segment of the industry. 
Far from promoting a transition to a more normal, competitive marketplace, the proposed new law 
could institute a sweeping, permanent expansion of federal and state intervention in the industry. 
 
Historical mythology is only a part of the problem here. The more fundamental factors are 
the vested interests created by the old system of subsidies: rural, high-cost telephone companies, 
consumer lobbying groups, educational and library interests, and other constituencies who might 
benefit from the continuation of non-market revenue flows and who see in the “universal service” 
concept a new system of entitlements in the information age. AT&T’s equation of universal service 
with regulatory cross-subsidies and its rallying of the constituencies who benefit from that system 
will have a lasting impact on the political economy of telecommunications regulation in the United 
States. 
 
There is more to the problem than political interest, however. The purported conflict 
between competition and universal service also has some basis in the economic puzzles posed by 
our current approach to interconnection policy. Here, as before, a historical perspective is useful. 
 
For the past fifteen years, advocates of telecommunications competition have made 
interconnection to the public network the basis of competitive entry. Economists and lawyers have 
argued that interconnection to the public network should be made available on a nondiscriminatory 
basis to competitors as well as end users. Moreover, they have argued that the prices charged for 
the interconnection of competing networks should reflect only the incremental costs of supplying it. 
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In effect, they have equated the proper price of network access with the incremental cost of 
supplying the facilities enabling access. 
 
Competing networks that are given special forms of low-cost access to the public network 
are able to target only the most profitable markets and leave the supply of access to more costly or 
less high-volume markets to the regulated carrier. As that happens, the financial surpluses used to 
finance the higher cost routes and components of the public network will be competed away. At 
best, each user will be required to bear the stand-alone cost of the particular set of facilities he or 
she uses. Or, what is more likely, prices will be lowered for competitive routes and raised in the 
less competitive or noncompetitive ones, regardless of their relative costs. 
 
Faced with that scenario, policy analysts now propose to revamp some kind of subsidy 
scheme to recreate the effects of the one they have spent the last fifteen years tearing down. Indeed, 
an unresolved contradiction between the policy goal of promoting competition and the methods of 
universal service support has plagued common carrier telecommunications policy since the AT&T 
divestiture. The divestiture destroyed the old separations and settlements system, but recreated 
many of its economic effects with the National Exchange Carriers Association pool, weighted dial 
equipment minute (DEM) charges, and the Universal Service Fund. In a partially competitive 
environment, those measures encourage uneconomic bypass and other inefficiencies, just as their 
pre-divestiture forebears did. 
 
In order to fix that problem, most economists are proposing some kind of value added tax 
applied specifically to the telecommunications industry (Noam, 1993; Egan and Wildman, 1993; 
Einhorn, 1993; Teleport, 1994). An industry-specific tax and subsidy scheme is proposed because 
support from general tax revenues is not supposed to be politically feasible. The tax would be 
applied not just to long-distance carriers but also to cellular, PCS, information service providers, 
and virtually everyone else in the industry. In other words, instead of eliminating the cross 
subsidies and associated inefficiencies that developed during decades of regulated monopoly, we 
are now supposed to make them more extensive and generally applicable than ever before. 
Critique of the Prevailing View 
There are ample grounds to question that approach to the problem. To begin with, the 
historical data make it clear that the importance of rate subsidies in the development of telephone 
service has been greatly exaggerated. Most of what happened in the regulatory arena between 1920 
and 1970 were ways of sustaining or marginally expanding a level of coverage that was basically 
established by 1920. The progressive rise in telephone penetration after World War II had more to 
do with the doubling and tripling of household income during that period than with separations and 
settlement practices. Active utilization of the separations and settlements process to lower the price 
of local exchange service did not really begin until 1965. Household penetration was already 
growing rapidly, and hovered around 80 to 85 percent at that time. The importance of even those 
subsidies could be questioned. Household penetration has grown steadily since 1984 despite the 
major increases in local service rates made in the wake of the AT&T divestiture.394 
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If the historical impact of subsidies was much smaller than is generally supposed, the case 
for projecting them into the future can be questioned on the following grounds. The current 
preoccupation with universal service subsidies masks three serious problems. 
 
First, intra-industry subsidies, regardless of how they are designed, may not be compatible 
with a free, open, and competitive marketplace. At best, they may create an inherently tilted 
playing field in which there must always be a designated “carrier of last resort” with special 
obligations and protections. At worst, they may require that telephone companies in certain areas be 
franchised monopolies. Panzar and Wildman (1993), for example, argue for leaving monopolies in 
place in rural areas, and show convincingly how a mixture of competitive entry and universal 
service subsidies could have unintended and counterproductive effects. 
 
Second, under a subsidy mechanism it may not be possible to distinguish between “high 
costs” and obsolete or inefficient ways of doing things. Since the provision of service to high cost 
areas will be removed from marketplace competition, costs must be taken as a given and “covered” 
by the subsidy. It may be true that, given current applications of technology, factors of density and 
loop size make it more expensive to provide traditional telephone service in rural areas. But as long 
as the rural telephone companies are franchised monopolies collecting universal service subsidies, 
why should anyone bother to develop and deploy radically different, more efficient ways to serve 
those areas? 
 
Third, the subsidy approach conceals an interesting contradiction. On the one hand, the need 
for subsidies is based on the assumption that a universal telecommunications network is a costly 
liability rather than a valuable asset. In virtually the next breath, however, universal access is 
discussed as if it were a resource so valuable that no competitor can survive without it. Competing 
networks-competitive access providers, long-distance carriers, and wireless networks-all claim that 
interconnection to the public network at reasonable rates and with equal technical conditions is 
essential to their success. Apparently, the ability to terminate calls to any and every telephone user, 
a capability which can only be supplied by the public network, is extremely valuable. How is it 
possible that something so valuable and so much in demand is also economically unsustainable? 
Something is wrong with that picture. 
 
The basis of that contradiction lies in the current property structure, or perhaps we should 
say the absence of property structure, in the public telecommunications network. 
The appropriability problem in network economics 
A telecommunications network offers its customers an enormous bundle of services. Under 
the monopolistic structure, consumers purchased access to all or most of those services at rates 
which sustained the system as a whole. When competition is allowed, and the competing networks 
are interconnected, both can offer users the same access scope, despite what may be major 
differences in their actual scope. That is the source of an appropriability problem. A competitor 
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who buys only one unit of access into a universal network is technically able to resell access to all 
of the users connected by the incumbent, even though the competitor does not have to face the costs 
and risks of creating the entire network. The competitor is thus able to appropriate some of the 
economic value of the other network's bundle of access units. 
 
As noted in chapters 3 and 5, the appropriability problem in telecommunications is similar 
in a number of ways to the problem of intellectual property in information markets. Just as the 
information reseller need not worry about the costs of producing information but only the cost of 
reproducing it, so the telephone access reseller need not worry about the cost of reconstructing the 
established network but only about the cost of acquiring enough access into it to handle the traffic 
between the two systems. 
 
The salience of the appropriability problem hinges upon what the new networks pay for 
access to the incumbent. If the price of inter-network access compensates the incumbent adequately 
for its large scope, then interconnection with a competitor does not harm it. If the price a competing 
network pays is no different than that of any ordinary user, then parasitism may in fact occur. In the 
1910s, as we have seen, utility commissions confronted that problem when engaged in the process 
of establishing toll connections between Bell and independent networks. Their solution was to 
impose a “surcharge” on inter-network traffic. A surcharge allowed users to overcome the barrier to 
communication represented by dual service, but the additional expense associated with 
communicating with members of the other network allowed each network to maintain some degree 
of exclusivity. 
 
The modern approach to access pricing does not recognize the existence of an 
appropriability problem. It is more concerned with the survival of small competitors in the face of 
what it sees as the overwhelming advantages of larger, incumbent networks. Policies based on that 
view attempt to erase all discrimination between end users and intermediate users and prevent a 
network from deriving any competitive advantage from its larger scope. Thus, the modern policy 
tends to exacerbate the appropriability problem, with potentially dire consequences for universal 
service. 
 
We have seen in earlier chapters that appropriability is not a purely theoretical construct. It 
played a major role in shaping the development of the American telephone system. Competition 
between the Bell system and the independents between 1894 and 1920 was structured as a system 
rivalry between unconnected local exchanges and toll networks. They were not interconnected 
because the prevailing interpretation of property rights gave competitors the option of deciding 
whether or not to interconnect with a competitor network. That type of property structure gave both 
competitors a powerful incentive to make their networks as universal as possible. 
 
A different but related historical lesson is that under access competition, telephone networks 
often sustained their large scope by averaging rates and costs. Most economists believe that intra-
network “cross-subsidies” or transfers of revenues would not exist in a competitive market. That 
belief is contradicted by the historical evidence. Intra-system averaging seemed to be sustainable as 
long as the competing systems were not interconnected. During the competitive era, the Bell system 
established many small exchanges in outlying areas and sustained them in part through toll usage 
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revenues. That is, it paid the competing networks to add remote exchanges even if the small 
exchanges did not sustain themselves with local exchange access revenues alone, because the 
presence of many additional termination points increased toll usage and revenues in other 
exchanges. 
 
There are more recent indications that universality and rate averaging are not incompatible 
with competition, given the right property structure. Overnight delivery services such as DHL, 
FedEx, and UPS are competitive network businesses. The economics of those package delivery 
services are in some ways analogous to telecommunications networks. Though competitive, those 
businesses still maintain uniform rates for a broad bundle of services. 
 
The price of sending an overnight DHL, FedEx, or UPS package is the same regardless of 
whether the package goes across town or across the country. Originally that was the case because 
(in the case of FedEx, the industry pioneer) all packages went to the Memphis hub regardless of 
their ultimate destination. But since that time regional sorting centers and package “bleed off” 
functions have been introduced, which undoubtedly lower the costs of regional or local distribution 
relative to national distribution. Yet the consumer prices have remained the same because 
consumers prefer uniform national pricing. Clearly, that kind of pricing system is sustainable in a 
competitive market. 
 
It is also interesting to note that all of the package delivery services are constantly striving 
to improve and increase the universality of their distribution networks. Each one recognizes that it 
is in their direct business interest to provide service to as many places as possible. While service to 
points outside primary service areas may incur a surcharge or result in slower service, competition 
forces each network to continually attempt to increase the number of places to which they can 
provide overnight service at the regular price. 
 
In the overnight express industry, each network competes on a stand-alone basis. There is 
no price regulation and no common carrier or universal service obligation. It is interesting, but of 
course inconclusive, to speculate about what the economic impact of a different property structure 
might be. Assume, for example, that federal regulators required DHL and FedEx to exchange 
packages; FedEx could require DHL to complete the delivery of FedEx packages if the destination 
was served by DHL and not FedEx, or vice versa. One suspects that uniform rates would end. Each 
courier service would serve only those areas which were most profitable for it and leave the rest to 
the others. One also suspects that the imputed costs each courier claimed to incur by serving the 
more remote regions would suddenly become very large, particularly if federal subsidies were 
made available to support them. 
 
In conclusion, market competition and network universality can be reconciled if the 
telecommunications industry adopts a property structure that allows networks to appropriate the 
increased value created by enlarging a network’s scope. Since current policies prevent networks 
from doing that, it is not surprising that the growth of competition seems to corrode the economic 
foundations of universal service. With the right property structure, universality ceases to be a costly 
liability and instead becomes a valuable asset. 
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Why Vail’s universal service is still relevant  
As noted earlier, widespread acceptance of the second-generation universal service concept 
has literally buried the older concept. The telecommunications industry is almost entirely unaware 
of the earlier debate about dual service. Consequently, we have lost sight of why the United States 
ended up with a monopolistic telephone industry. 
 
The first-generation debate about universal service, however, is far more relevant to the 
policy challenges of the next two decades than the current preoccupation with financing universal 
service subsidies. A better understanding of the basic policy choice faced in Vail’s era is essential if 
we are to understand the implications of current developments in information technology. 
 
The new information infrastructure that is under construction is characterized by competing, 
overlapping, and often incompatible or imperfectly integrated technologies. The typical business 
card today carries three or four different user addresses-one each for the voice telephone, the 
cellular phone, the fax line, the electronic mail address, or the pager. There may be additional 
information about internal, enterprise networks. Compared to that, the advertisements of the dual 
service era, in which businesses had to list two different telephone numbers, seem simple. Far from 
showing any signs of abating, the proliferation of communication devices continues with the 
development of new wireless telephone services, portable personal computers, enhanced pagers, 
and personal digital assistants. Aside from the efflorescence of devices and applications, the 
number of service providers is also growing. In fact, no less than four prospective categories of 
service provider are now contending for a role in developing the information infrastructure: 
telephone companies, cable television systems, terrestrial and satellite radiocommunications 
providers, and the internet. How those diverse providers will exchange traffic and achieve technical 
compatibility is anybody’s guess. 
 
Within that increasingly heterogeneous environment, technologists, policyrnakers, and 
businesses continue to hold out the promise of total, seamless integration. For more than two 
decades, we have been told that sometime in the near future a single device and an integrated 
network will deliver interactive voice, video, and data capabilities everywhere. That vision is, of 
course, a modern version of the first-generation universal service concept. It assumes that the full 
panoply of information technology will someday achieve the uniformity, compatibility, and 
ubiquity of the telephone system of the regulated monopoly era. 
 
It is an appealing vision, and it may even happen, eventually. If we are envisioning a 21st 
century version of universal service, however, there is much we can learn from the earlier debate 
between dual service and universal service. 
 
Integration is a Policy Choice, Not a Law of Nature 
To begin with, universal integration of the information infrastructure really is a choice we 
face and not an inevitable product of technology or economics. Even in the era of the telephone, 
there was an alternative to complete integration-namely dual service. The replacement of dual 
service by universal service did not come about “naturally,” via routine market processes, but 
required major institutional innovations (the suspension of antitrust laws, the use of state regulatory 
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commissions to regulate rates, and later the creation of a new federal regulatory agency). The first-
generation universal service debate took the better part of two decades. Those were simpler times, 
in that we were dealing with only one type of technology (voice telephony), and the policy choice 
was restricted to one national economy. 
 
It is possible that technological and institutional differences between the past and the 
present have tilted the social optimum away from integration and towards more tolerance of 
heterogeneity, fragmentation, and competition. The expansion of telecommunications access can no 
longer be considered an unqualified good, as it may have been in the era of Vail. As fears about 
privacy and security grow, and technologies such as voicemail and caller ID gain popularity, one 
can only conclude that today’s users are as interested controlling and restricting access as they are 
in broadening it. To many people, the indiscriminate intrusion of a universal “information 
superhighway” into their home or business is about as welcome as the presence of an eight-lane 
interstate highway in their backyard. We should not assume, as if by reflex, that the new 
information infrastructure will or should follow the trajectory of the telephone system. At the very 
least, our policy dialogue needs voices capable of articulating and defending a 21st century version 
of dual service. 
 
Integration Has Costs as Well as Benefits 
A historical perspective can make us more aware of the difficult trade-offs that must be 
made. Integration involves costs and well as benefits. History suggests that unification is driven by 
demand-side economies of scope. Compatibility and integration can benefit users by eliminating 
the need for duplicate investments in terminal equipment and access facilities and by eliminating 
the confusion and uncertainty caused by heterogeneous products and services. But the realization of 
demand-side economies of scope also creates market inertia. As the communications infrastructure 
matures and users converge on a single system or standard, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
new technologies or networks to gain a foothold in the market. In other words, there is an inherent 
trade-off between integration and competition. 
 
Thus, it is likely that when the much-ballyhooed seamless integration of the information 
infrastructure actually arrives, many of us won’t like it. The dominance of Microsoft in the 
software marketplace has already given us some inkling of the problems to be faced. Microsoft’s 
Windows software has succeeded in establishing itself as the standard user interface for most IBM-
compatible personal computers. Consumer acceptance of Windows has given the Microsoft 
Corporation a significant amount of market power in the software and computer industries. Just as 
AT&T was the perennial focus of antitrust activity from 1910 to 1980, so Microsoft (and more 
generally the interface between PC, user, and software applications) will become the focal point of 
competition policy controversies in the near future. In both cases, the economic forces contributing 
to market power are the same-demand-side economies of scope. The dominance of Windows in the 
marketplace is derived from users’ unwillingness to make duplicate investments in time spent 
learning how to use different software procedures, just as the dominance of AT&T was derived 
from users’ unwillingness to duplicate their investments in telecommunications access. 
 
Microsoft’s success has been achieved in what is really only a small subset of the overall 
market for telecommunications and information. One can scarcely imagine the amount of market 
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power that could be achieved by a company which succeeded in winning mass acceptance of a 
standardized software application and terminal for accessing and navigating a fully integrated, 
global information infrastructure. If and when that occurs, the tension between demand-side 
efficiencies and supply-side diversity may reach some kind of breaking point (as occurred between 
1912 and 1920) and impose a policy choice upon us. 
 
Unfortunately, the prevailing thinking about competition policy does not offer much help in 
making such a choice. The theoretical roots of antitrust policy are derived from natural monopoly 
theory. The natural monopoly doctrine, as we have seen, is only equipped to identify and remedy 
anti-competitive behavior based on supply side abuses such as predatory pricing. Current antitrust 
doctrine gives us little guidance as to how to handle monopolies that originate in demand-side 
economies of scope. That is why the relationship between communications monopoly and the 
antitrust laws has always been so ambiguous historically. 
 
History Never Repeats Itself 
There are three important structural differences between the first generation universal 
service debate and what might be called the “third-generation” confrontation with that issue in the 
future. Although the parallels are significant, the differences need to be kept in mind as well. 
 
One important difference pertains to the globalization of information and 
telecommunications markets. The institution of telephone monopoly was a response to the problem 
of creating a comprehensive and uniform communications capability across political units known 
as nation-states. Historically, the response to that challenge in the telecommunications sector was 
surprisingly uniform across the globe. In practically every nation, post, telephone and telegraph 
(PTT) monopolies were created so as to make the telecommunications infrastructure an extension 
of the national state.395 
 
The national PTT system lasted for eighty years, but is currently being eroded almost 
everywhere in the developed and developing world. As the PTT system breaks down, the old 
tradeoff between fragmentation and competition versus integration and monopoly is being faced 
once again. But the developmental process that took place at the national level in the industrializing 
nations of the late 19th and early 20th century is now taking place at the international level. The 
liberalization of the sector allows companies to enter multiple national markets. In response, 
telecommunications service providers and manufacturers are becoming horizontally integrated 
across nations. That gives the 21st-century equivalent of dual service competition an added level of 
complexity. At the global level, there is more room for competing systems and standards to take 
hold, and it is more difficult for user convergence to take place in a coordinated fashion. On the 
other hand, the stronger linkage between national markets and the transnational integration of firms 
makes it impossible for one country to ignore the systems and standards established in another. 
 
Wireless personal communications hold the promise of the ultimate in universal service-
two-way telecommunications that are available at any time in any part of the world. But the 
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promise of ubiquity is undermined by the development of competing, incompatible wireless 
telephone standards in Europe, the United States, and Japan. The same thing is happening with 
High Definition Television standards. The desire for and benefits of global compatibility are strong, 
but business competition, technological diversity and national industrial policies make unification 
elusive. As information technology matures and the international economy becomes more 
dependent upon its capabilities, is it not possible that some sort of universal service drama will be 
acted out once again, on a global scale? Of course, it is impossible to predict what kind of 
institutional form will result. 
 
The nature of technology is another important difference between the past and the present. 
One of the key economic features of the first-generation dual service-universal service debate was 
the diseconomy of scope associated with the growth of networks. Both manual and 
electromechanical switching technologies became increasingly expensive to operate and maintain 
as the scope of a network grew. The older, analogue technology also made the achievement of 
compatibility between equipment and network more delicate and difficult to achieve. In that 
context, vertical integration and monopoly may have been the most efficient ways of bringing 
about the demand-side economies of scope that users wanted. 
 
Electronic and digital switching systems have conquered the supply-side diseconomy of 
scope, however. The unit cost of serving a given number of access lines actually declines now with 
the new technologies. In addition, digital signal processing is more robust and more easily 
interconnected and standardized than analogue or manual systems. In the present environment, it is 
easier to achieve various levels or gradations of compatibility and interconnection. Thus, it is 
unlikely that users will be confronted with the stark, binary choice of interconnection/no 
interconnection as in the past. That does not mean, however, that the dual service-universal service 
debate is not relevant to current policy problems or that we can effortlessly have the best of both 
worlds. The dynamics of access competition still apply today. The impact of interconnection policy 
on competition and universal service in telecommunications are two areas in which historical 
parallels are extremely important and instructive. They will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Last but not least, the political economy surrounding telecommunications policy is radically 
different now than it was in the early 1900s. After nearly thirty years of the second-generation 
universal service policy, strong vested interests in telecommunications subsidy schemes have been 
created. Small, rural independent telephone companies, for example, provide a well-organized and 
surprisingly influential lobbying presence on Washington. Activist organizations devoted to the 
special interests of the blind, the deaf, libraries, schools, and household consumers also are able to 
articulate subsidy claims and lobby for them in regulatory and legislative proceedings. The 
organized activity of those groups helps to explain why the cross-subsidies of regulated monopoly 
period have proven to be virtually ineradicable, despite the nominal dedication of regulators and 
Congress to competition and deregulation. 
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Interconnection of competing networks 
The issue of access pricing between competing networks has emerged as the preeminent 
telecommunications policy problem of the present day.396 The prevailing view of 
telecommunications competition, however, turns the older viewpoint on its head. Where Bell and 
the independents actively competed on the basis of their scope, current policy strives to ensure that 
no network can derive a competitive advantage from its “bottleneck” control of access. Current 
regulatory practice stresses pricing based on incremental costs and goes to great lengths to impose 
equal technological conditions among competing networks. 
 
That doctrine purports to give us the best of all possible worlds. “Open access” will foster 
competition but without the fragmentation of the dual service era. It will provide universal service, 
but without monopoly or even, perhaps, much regulation. Here again, the vision is appealing but its 
practicality is suspect. The prevailing doctrine of open access rests upon theoretical and historical 
assumptions which have been called into question in that book. 
 
Historical Lessons 
Historical evidence provides limited support for much of the prevailing wisdom concerning 
interconnection and competition. We assume that an incumbent network’s refusal to interconnect 
with a new competitor is intrinsically anti-competitive. But Bell’s refusal to deal with its 
competitors did not foreclose competition. Despite its seventeen-year head start and its superior 
capital resources, Bell’s total exclusion of the independents from its system did not deter, and may 
actually have stimulated, their explosive growth. (Of course, that growth occurred in a market with 
plenty of room for additional development.) Furthermore, the effects of access competition were 
not so negative-noninterconnection promoted universal service by rewarding systems for enlarging 
their scope. 
 
Current doctrine also is strongly committed to unbundling and interconnection among 
competitors, assuming that it is always conducive to consumer choice. Historically, however, 
competition in the local exchange market was discouraged and sometimes eliminated by 
interconnection. Specifically, Bell’s sublicensing of independent exchanges was the most damaging 
blow to the independent movement, as it removed much of the incentive to develop an alternative 
system. That experience also suggests that the modern assumption that dominant incumbents have 
no incentive to interconnect with smaller competitors is incorrect. Without any prodding from 
regulators, Bell progressively liberalized its interconnection terms and conditions from 1901 to 
1912 in order to prevent an alternative system from developing. 
 
An understanding of those points, sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit, led early telephone 
regulators and users to reject a telephone industry structure based upon compulsory interconnection 
of competitors in the early 1900s. The industry and its early regulators did consider, and in some 
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cases even experimented with, interconnection. But regulatory experience in the United States and 
Canada tended to confirm the observations made in the preceding paragraph. In addition, regulators 
were unwilling to accept the high costs associated with implementing interconnection. 
 
That book has retrieved and elaborated on the older approach to interconnection policy in 
order to illuminate the current debate. The intention is not to argue that the older views are 
perfectly correct or that they are directly applicable to the current situation. They do, however, help 
us to understand some of the weaknesses and problems inherent in the modern approach to 
interconnection policy. We need to have a dialogue, not a monologue, about that vital aspect of 
telecommunications policy. Much can be learned by using the older approach as the point of 
departure for a critique of contemporary policies. 
 
Nondiscriminatory Pricing and Appropriability 
We have already discussed how the modern approach to interconnection creates an 
appropriability problem (see section entitled THE DEBATE OVER UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
“SUBSIDES”). Indeed, it is clear now that incremental cost-based interconnection pricing, while it 
has some legal and theoretical support from concepts of nondiscrimination and common 
carriage, has succeeded among regulators largely for political reasons. Politicians and regulators 
who introduce long-distance competition develop a vested interest in the viability of the new 
competitors and want to be able to deliver quick and visible price reductions to consumers. 
Incremental-price based interconnection readily supports that agenda. New competitors can 
provide substitute facilities only on a few long haul routes while benefiting from the universal 
access of the incumbent. Under those conditions it is easy to undercut the price of the 
incumbent, particularly when the incumbent is a government monopoly or has a long history of 
overpriced long-distance rates. 
 
Quite apart from its political motives, that policy has several economic advantages-it eases 
the entry of new firms in the telecommunications market, thereby putting pressure on the 
incumbent to improve its service and rationalize its prices. Those advantages apply even if the new 
networks are not actually more efficient than the older one. In the long run, however, the 
appropriability and universal service problems inherent in such an approach cannot be ignored, 
particularly when competition enters local access as well as long-distance markets. Thus, the 
modern approach to interconnection really has not avoided or superseded the concerns about 
appropriability expressed in the early 1900s. 
 
Recognition of that fact is indicated by the growing debate over “efficient component 
pricing” as the theoretical basis for access pricing. The efficient component pricing rule was 
developed by the economists William Baumol and Robert Willig, initially in the context of railroad 
regulation.397 In that pricing methodology, competing networks pay incremental costs plus an 
opportunity cost, representing the foregone profit that the incumbent loses by extending service to a 
competitor. Compensation for opportunity costs allows the incumbent to appropriate the value of its 
larger scope. Although its theoretical derivation is more precise, the principle of efficient 
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component pricing is similar to the surcharge concept employed by utility regulators eighty years 
ago. The Baumol-Willig pricing rule is still controversial,398 and its widespread adoption is by no 
means assured. Nevertheless, the regulatory climate is being nudged closer to the older position 
regarding appropriability than it was. 
 
Whatever the specific merits and demerits of the Baumol-Willig proposal, a sustainable 
access pricing regime cannot require telephone companies to make access available to competitors 
at a price that reflects only the incremental costs of the facilities used. To do so would be as 
fallacious as requiring software producers to base the price of their product on the cost of producing 
and distributing the floppy discs that carry the software. In both types of markets, the marginal cost 
of extending access to an additional user is very low. But to make the product available to 
competitors or resellers at such a price is unsustainable. It is necessary and legitimate for the 
owners of the information resource to price discriminate depending on whether or not the user 
intends to resell it. That is true even though there is no difference in the incremental cost of 
supplying access to a reseller or an end user. 
 
Unbundling 
Unbundling is the mantra of current policy. Its hopes for a completely open, deregulated 
telecommunications marketplace are pinned to the process of separating out the components of the 
public network so that consumers can assemble the services they want and need, and no supplier 
can use its power in one service area to control another. 
 
That book has provided the outline of a theoretical critique of that policy. As discussed in 
chapter 3, networks by their very nature are enormous bundles of heterogeneous access units. 
Consumers benefit from a service provider's ability to deliver multiple services over a single access 
facility. Economies of scope, on both the demand side and the supply side, are the very basis of 
network efficiencies. That theoretical groundwork has two important implications for contemporary 
policy. 
 
First, if networks are bundles then a policy that equates bundling with restrictions on 
competition is bound to find anti-competitive behavior everywhere. Such a policy will be 
perpetually at war with the very basis of network efficiencies. We need a much clearer standard for 
determining when bundling constitutes a barrier to competition than is currently available. 
Moreover, such a standard needs to take into account the positive social value that can be derived 
when networks compete on the basis of the size of their service bundle, as the Bell system and the 
independents did in the early 1900s. 
 
Second, although breaking apart the components of a network does give users more choice 
and control over the nature of the bundle, that shift of responsibility entails costs as well as 
benefits. Every act of unbundling creates additional transactions costs for users. A modem 
consumer of telecommunication network services and functions who must assemble various 
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elements himself is faced with decisions which require costly information and time.  On the supply 
side, unbundling may also sacrifice economies of scope. 
 
It is instructive to compare the economic effects of modem network unbundling with those 
of dual service competition. In the dual service era, the costs of integration were entirely shifted to 
users who had to buy duplicate access facilities. In the modem approach, those costs are 
internalized by the public network. Duplications of facilities still exist-they have just become 
invisible to the user and the costs are distributed among users in unaccounted for ways. For 
example, the existence of competing but interconnected local exchanges requires additional signal 
processing and transport facilities to handle traffic between the systems. Those facilities would not, 
in principle at least, be necessary in an optimized single system. The implementation of equal 
access arrangements and number portability also require heavy investments in transport-signal 
processing and switching capabilities that would not be necessary otherwise. Whether that regime 
is more efficient than an alternative such as dual service is outside the scope of this book. We do, 
however, need to pay closer attention to the trade-offs involved in mandated unbundling. The 
current doctrine may impose upon consumers and suppliers an economically inefficient level of 
unbundling. 
 
Interconnection Policy, Regulation, and Property Rights 
Open access was supposed to pave the way for market competition in telecommunications. 
But the current approach to interconnection has not done away with regulation. Far from it-
implementing equal access and “fair” interconnection pricing have generally increased regulatory 
intervention in the industry. Increased regulation is an unavoidable byproduct of the basic 
assumptions of the policy. If incumbent networks hold insurmountable, “bottleneck” control over 
access, then unregulated market transactions cannot be relied upon to set prices. If regulators are to 
fill the gap, long and usually inconclusive deliberations about the identification of costs are 
required. The arcane debates about pricing pale in comparison to the complex forms of intervention 
in the technical structure of the network that have been necessitated by the open access policy. 
Interconnection of competing operators is seldom possible through the purchase of pre-existing 
types of service from the incumbent. It usually involves new forms of access and interoperability 
for which no established market or prices exist. Thus, regulators have been forced to reach deeply 
into the structure of the public network in order to create, by fiat, an intermediate market for 
telecommunications access. The implementation of equal access, for example, required the creation 
of artificially defined territories known as Local Access and Transport Areas (LATAs) and the 
restriction of local exchange telephone companies to those territories. At the local exchange level, 
equal access interconnection requires that regulators take control of numbering plans, mandate 
deployment schedules for certain kinds of switching and signaling technologies, and even regulate 
the number of seconds it takes to process a call. 
 
True deregulation in telecommunications will never be possible without a competitive, 
unregulated market for interconnection and access. This book has shown that unregulated access 
competition is not an unthinkable option. The applicability of America’s historical episode of 
access competition to the present time increases as alternative infrastructures, such as cable 
television systems and wireless telephone companies, proliferate. The idea that no firm is capable 
of duplicating the local access network of the telephone company is looking increasingly dated. In 
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addition, the computer industry now provides a model (although not, of course, a perfect one) of 
how compatibility, interconnection, and unbundling can be achieved without pervasive regulation 
of terms and conditions. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
THIS BOOK HAS REEXAMINED America’s early experience with telephone competition 
and the emergence of a policy of universal service. Its objectives were threefold: 1) to reformulate 
and test current economic theories regarding network competition; 2) to provide a more complete 
and accurate understanding of early telephone history, particularly the phenomenon of competition 
between unconnected telephone systems and the emergence of universal service as a policy 
prescription; and 3) to derive insight into current telecommunications policy from historical 
experience. 
 
The historical argument presented here diverges sharply from the prevailing views of 
interconnection, competition, and universal service in telephone history. While in possession of 
patent monopoly, the Bell companies left the market for telephone service drastically 
underdeveloped. When the patents expired, independent competitors rushed into the developmental 
vacuums left by the Bell companies. In keeping with their organizational mandate to be an 
integrated, centrally managed, nationwide system, the Bell companies refused to connect with 
them. Bell’s refusal to connect was not the devastating blow to competition it has often been made 
out to be. From 1894 to 1900, independent competition thrived despite its total exclusion from the 
Bell system. Independent telephone systems were able to establish thousands of new exchanges and 
attract hundreds of thousands of new telephone users. Far from being unwilling victims of Bell’s 
refusal to connect, most of the independents reciprocated. They viewed themselves as a mutually 
exclusive, nationwide movement bent on displacing the Bell system’s control of the telephone 
business. Both the Bell and independent interests opposed efforts by the courts and legislatures to 
compel interconnection of the rival systems. By 1898, with the support of both telephone interests 
and the acquiescence of the courts, the U.S. telephone industry had taken the path of access 
competition. 
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Access competition pushed both systems into a race to achieve universal geographic 
coverage and broader penetration. Neither telephone system could afford to leave any part of the 
country or any part of the population uncontested. The telephone network grew to embrace most of 
the country because the companies derived a direct competitive advantage from adding new users 
or locations to their systems. The absence of interconnection allowed the rival networks to 
appropriate the added value derived from expanding their scope. The legal and (non)regulatory 
environment of the time permitted and even encouraged that approach to competition. 
 
The stereotype of the independent telephone movement as consisting largely of small, local, 
and technologically inferior systems is unfounded. By 1910, many commercial independents had 
grown into consolidated regional operating companies. They had their own long-distance 
companies and were able to offer connections to independent exchanges over a 150-mile area. It is 
true, however, that the lack of integrated financial and managerial control made it more difficult for 
the independents to achieve connectivity and to maintain system integrity against the Bell 
challenge. The independents’ attempt to rely on long-term contracts providing for exclusive 
connection rights might have been a solution to that, but, ironically, that tactic was overruled by the 
courts as “anti-competitive.” 
 
The success of the Bell system in the competitive struggle cannot be attributed to superior 
technology, public relations, politics, predatory pricing, or financial acquisitions, although all of 
those tactics were employed. Bell’s dominance came primarily from its decision to pursue 
comprehensive coverage of the country. Its decisions to accelerate exchange development in 
smaller towns, to systematically create toll connectivity among all of its exchanges, and to 
aggressively pursue interconnection with thousands of non-competing independents in the rural 
areas gave it the edge. Its incentive to expand was a natural product of access competition. The 
achievement of critical mass by an independent system of comparable scope was prevented not by 
Bell’s refusal to connect per se but by sublicensing contracts which drew thousands of independent 
exchanges out of the independent movement and into the Bell system. Ironically, then, Bell’s 
willingness to interconnect with independents was more “anti-competitive,” in effect, than its 
policy of total exclusion had been. Bell’s ability to attract independent exchanges into its orbit was 
in turn a product of its all-encompassing connectivity. 
 
Bell achieved dominance in the competitive marketplace but not total victory. Dual service 
survived the return of Theodore Vail and the Morgan interests in 1907, the accelerated sublicensing 
policy of 1908, the buyouts and sellouts of 1910-12. By 1914, significant pockets of dual service 
were still in place in major urban areas. Federal and state antitrust laws and municipal anti-
consolidation requirements prevented the consolidation of competing exchanges. While it is evident 
that AT&T wanted to achieve a monopoly (Vail was perfectly explicit about it), the Bell system 
alone was unable to achieve it. 
 
The crucial additional ingredient needed to make the transition from competition to 
monopoly was public acceptance of the philosophy of universal service. Universal service at that 
time meant a unified and technically integrated telephone network - the end of user fragmentation 
into separate systems. Telephone users and state and local government officials came to see a 
divided telephone service as a public nuisance. The economic basis for monopoly, then, came from 
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demand-side economies of scope among influential user groups, not from supply-side efficiencies. 
Although business and household users were still suspicious of monopoly, they had become 
increasingly impatient with the inconveniences of a fragmented service. The presence of regulatory 
commissions seemed to offer the best of both worlds; it created the unified service of a monopoly 
but promised to control rates as effectively as competition. 
 
AT&T spokesmen helped to formulate and publicize the concept of universal service, but to 
view a monopoly structure as something foisted upon the public by the Bell system is to give one 
actor in the historical process too much weight. The debate over unification of the service was 
explicit, public and extended over a period of fifteen years. Unification could be, and often was, 
held up when opposed by newspapers, state or federal antitrust laws, public referenda, independents 
unwilling to sell out, or hostile city councils. The passage of the 1921 Willis-Graham Act, which 
exempted the industry from federal antitrust laws, provided explicit national recognition of the 
importance of unifying telephone service.  The law was preceded by many “mini Willis-Graham 
Acts” in various states, exempting the industry from state antitrust laws or the anti-consolidation 
provisions of municipal utility franchises. 
 
Interconnection of competing exchanges made a tentative appearance on the historical stage 
but was not seen as a permanent solution to the problem of telephone competition. From 1907 to 
1918 telephone companies, users, regulators, and the courts considered and sometimes 
experimented with a telephone industry structure based on interconnection of competitors. They 
rejected it for four reasons. Those can be summarized as the parasitism argument, the 
complementarity argument, the compatibility argument, and the cost argument. 
 
The parasitism argument, which could also be termed an appropriability argument, held 
that interconnection undermined the ability of larger networks to derive economic benefits from 
their larger scope. Small, “parasitical” networks could benefit from the widespread access created 
by the “host” network without shouldering any of the costs or risks of creating the access. 
 
The complementarity argument held that interconnection of competing networks produced a 
relationship of interdependence rather than one of competition and substitution. To interconnect 
competing exchanges was tantamount to ending real system competition. Early experiences with 
interconnection of competing networks in the United States and Canada tended to confirm that 
observation. Users tended to gravitate toward one local exchange network while enjoying the 
benefits of the Bell toll lines. 
 
Compatibility and control was one of the Bell system’s main concerns about a telephone 
network made up of interconnected competitors. A heterogeneous mass of competing networks 
would work against coordination and compatibility by making standardization of practices and 
equipment more difficult. 
 
The cost argument held that interconnecting competing exchanges was an expensive 
proposition and, given the other three points, represented a needless duplication of facilities and 
labor relative to the option of consolidation. 
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Thus, by the mid-1920s, the model of universal service under regulated monopoly had been 
adopted uniformly as the proper structure for the telephone industry. From 1920 to the late 1960s, 
universal service, insofar as the term was used, meant a telephone system that covered the country 
and sacrificed access competition for the sake of unification of the service. It did not mean rate 
regulations that subsidized local telephone rates by using long-distance revenues. Universal service 
policy was not mentioned in or mandated by the 1934 Communications Act. State and federal 
regulators in that period did not conceive of the jurisdictional separations process as a means of 
subsidizing household telephone penetration. 
 
The modern concept of universal service, which uses rate regulation to effect cross 
subsidies between various services and user groups, is in fact a very recent invention. The first hard 
evidence of proposals to use the separations and settlements process to lower local service rates can 
be found in the late 1960s. Those ideas were not fully realized until the implementation of the 
Ozark Plan in 1971. By that time household telephone penetration already stood at 80 to 85 percent. 
The attempt to promulgate an ideological linkage between universal telephone service and the 
separations and settlement procedures of regulated monopoly did not come until the mid-1970s. 
That alleged linkage was put forward by AT&T as part of its efforts to fend off long distance 
competition. In other words, it was inspired by contemporary policy battles and not by historical 
evidence. 
 
That reinterpretation of the history of universal service was shown to have significant 
contemporary policy implications. Those can be summarized as follows. 
 
First, the earlier definition of universal service, which stressed integration and unification of 
the service in order to realize the benefits of the so-called “network externality” (actually, demand-
side economies of scope), is in many ways more relevant to the policy challenges of the next two 
decades than the latter conception of universal service as subsidized household penetration. The 
developing global information infrastructure is characterized by competing and often incompatible 
or imperfectly integrated technologies. Mandating compatibility can improve the lot of 
telecommunications users by creating demand-side economies of scope or by otherwise eliminating 
the frustrations and inconveniences of fragmentation and heterogeneity. But such a policy can also 
limit competition and technological diversity. Thus, the policy choices to be faced in the next two 
decades are quite similar to the debate over the unification of telephone service in the second 
decade of the 20th century. The major differences are that the debate will take place on a global 
scale rather than a national scale and that the increasing sophistication of information technology 
may soften the nature of the choice somewhat. At any rate, current antitrust law and theory does not 
provide much of a basis for making such a choice because its roots in the theory of natural 
monopoly only equip policymakers to respond to supply-side phenomena. Current antitrust doctrine 
gives us little guidance as to how to handle monopolies that originate in demand-side economies of 
scope. 
 
A second area of policy relevance concerns the relationship between interconnection and 
network competition. Today’s policy analysts and theorists have oversimplified the relationship 
between unbundling, interconnection, and competition in telecommunications. The unbundling of 
network components and the interconnection of competing networks to the incumbent on 
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nondiscriminatory terms have been portrayed as unqualifiedly good things. That view was 
challenged on both theoretical and historical-empirical grounds. Networks are very large bundles of 
different services; they derive their value to users and their supply-side efficiencies from 
integrating services and components together. If bundling is what networks are all about, a 
regulatory doctrine that equates competition with unbundling is bound to find anticompetitive 
behavior everywhere and will be perpetually at war with the very basis of network efficiencies. 
Moreover, the doctrine of charging only incremental costs for interconnection makes it difficult for 
networks to profit from enlarging their scope and may actually penalize them for doing so. 
 
The historical evidence supports those theoretical critiques. It shows that the refusal of the 
competing telephone networks to connect in the early 1900s actually promoted the achievement of 
universal service by giving both networks a strong incentive to enlarge their scope. Competition 
over the size of the bundle is, then, not necessarily a bad thing. At the very least, that analysis lends 
support to proposals to base interconnection prices upon opportunity costs rather than incremental 
costs alone. More fundamentally, it indicates that the deregulation of telecommunications must be 
based upon a property rights regime that allows networks to appropriate some of the value added by 
enlarging the size of their service bundle. 
 
A third policy application concerns the demystification of regulated monopoly’s claims 
regarding universal service. The role of regulated monopoly and rate subsidies in creating a 
universal infrastructure has been greatly exaggerated and deliberately so. Those invalid claims have 
distorted the policy dialogue for many years. The rate subsidies which are alleged to be so central 
to the development and maintenance of universal service in the United States did not even exist 
until after 1965, when household penetration already exceeded 80 percent. Access competition 
provided the real stimulus to create a geographically ubiquitous network. It also had created, by 
1920, startlingly modern levels of telephone penetration in many parts of the country. If nothing 
else, this book should discredit, once and for all, the idea that competition and universality are 
fundamentally inimical. 
 
The universality of communications access will always be a salient public policy issue. 
Debate over the nature of the telecommunications infrastructure – whether it should be fragmented 
or integrated, competitive or monopolistic, more or less subsidized – can only increase in 
importance as information technology occupies an ever-larger role in society. This book sheds light 
on the historical origins of that debate and in so doing, attempts to illuminate the contemporary 
debate as well. 
 
